Opinion
353926
11-23-2021
AMY DOBOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAN WU, and SAAD HARRIS AHMAD, Defendants, and MEIJER, INC., #64, Defendant-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
Washtenaw Circuit Court LC No. 19-000140-NO
Before: Murray, C.J., and Markey and Riordan, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Amy Dobos appeals by leave granted the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant Meijer, Inc., #64 (Meijer), in this action involving a physical altercation between plaintiff and defendant Lan Wu as the two shopped inside a Meijer store and an alleged attempt by defendant Saad Harris Ahmad, a Meijer employee, to stop the fight, which plaintiff characterized as an assault by Wu. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
The following account comes from plaintiff's deposition testimony. During the evening of August 18, 2017, plaintiff went to a Meijer store in Washtenaw County. In the produce section of the store, plaintiff saw Wu picking cherries out of bags and putting them in her hand. Confused by Wu's behavior, plaintiff asked Wu if she was planning to pay for the cherries. Plaintiff then tried to continue her shopping, but Wu grabbed plaintiff's arm, shoved a bag of cherries in her face, and screamed at her. Plaintiff took her phone out and tried to take a picture of Wu. Wu's mother, Mie Zheng, upon seeing plaintiff attempting to take Wu's picture, said something to Wu. Wu then lunged at plaintiff and tried to rip the phone out of her hands. Plaintiff broke free of Wu's grasp, and she ran as fast as she could to try to get out of the store.
Wu caught up to plaintiff near "the breezeway." She grabbed plaintiff by the hair and slammed her up against a railing between the doors that led into the breezeway. Wu and Zheng both attempted to take plaintiff's phone from her. Ahmad, a Meijer cashier monitoring the self-checkout area, entered the breezeway in an effort to confront the situation. Zheng stopped attacking plaintiff, but Wu did not. Wu tore plaintiff's shirt, exposing her bra, put plaintiff in a headlock, and tried to bite her left arm. Plaintiff was about to break free from Wu near the exterior doors when Wu grabbed plaintiff by the hair. Ahmad then seized plaintiff's left wrist. Plaintiff could not make any progress in escaping Wu while Ahmad held her wrist, but she was able to back out of the breezeway and onto the sidewalk. Plaintiff did not recall Ahmad saying anything.
Outside the store, Wu maintained her grip on plaintiff's hair. Ahmad grabbed onto Wu, which had the effect of increasing the force that Wu was placing on plaintiff's neck while pulling her hair. Ahmad then "transferred his grip" to plaintiff. He had previously let go of plaintiff's left wrist, but he now once again clutched her wrist. Plaintiff asked Ahmad to release his grip. But Ahmad, instead of letting go, pushed plaintiff down on a berm that was on the other side of a crosswalk. Then, while plaintiff was on the ground, Ahmad kicked her right leg, causing plaintiff's legs to spread apart and expose her vagina. Eventually, a man came up and pushed Ahmad, Wu, and Zheng away from plaintiff. Plaintiff got up, ran to her car, and then drove home.
The following is the version of events Ahmad related in his deposition and by way of affidavit. On the date of the incident, Ahmad was monitoring the eight self-checkout stations near the produce section. Either another Meijer employee or a customer informed Ahmad that two female customers were fighting. Ahmad heard the commotion and saw the two women. He went to the area of the altercation because he was "a neutral person" and a Meijer employee. According to Ahmad, Meijer's policy was "customers first." He believed that as "a good Samaritan" he should go and break up the fight. Ahmad told the women three times to stop fighting. He yelled at them that he was a Meijer employee and that they needed to listen to him. The women, however, did not listen and continued fighting as they went through the store's exterior doors and into the parking lot. Ahmad followed them because he was worried that the fight might result in serious injuries. His intent was to stop the altercation. Once outside, Ahmad grabbed each woman by the wrist and tried to separate them. Ahmad claimed that he was able to separate them and that one of the women-plaintiff-ran away. Ahmad contended that he did not push plaintiff to the ground, nor did he kick her. He asserted that he had no contact with any part of plaintiff's body except for her wrist.
Ahmad never received any training from Meijer on what he should do if two customers were engaged in a fight. He believed that such training would have been helpful. The "basic thing" that Ahmad was taught in training was to "help customers."
In February 2019, plaintiff sued Wu, Ahmad, and Meijer. She asserted claims of assault, battery, negligence, and gross negligence against Wu. Plaintiff alleged claims of battery, negligence, and gross negligence with respect to Ahmad. She also pursued causes of action for negligence and respondent superior against Meijer. With regard to the negligence claim against Meijer, plaintiff alleged that Meijer breached its duty to train its employees to act with due care in the event of a physical altercation involving customers. In an amended complaint, plaintiff added claims of assault, battery, negligence, and gross negligence against Zheng.
In January 2020, Meijer moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Meijer argued that it could not be held vicariously liable for the alleged wrongful actions of Ahmad. Meijer maintained that an employer is not vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee when those torts are beyond the scope of the employer's business. Meijer contended that Ahmad's alleged conduct of forcing plaintiff to the ground, restraining her, and inflicting injury upon her did not serve Meijer's interests. Additionally, according to Meijer, there was no evidence that Ahmad's employment duties included the harmful or unwarranted touching of customers. Meijer argued that it never instructed Ahmad to physically restrain plaintiff. Meijer also asserted that plaintiff's claims of negligent training and supervision lacked merit. Meijer further claimed that there was no evidence that it knew or should have known, or that it was foreseeable, that Ahmad would assault or have improper physical contact with a customer. Meijer noted that Ahmad had no history of violence or tortious conduct and that nothing in his background suggested that he needed training or supervision regarding customer interactions. Plaintiff responded that there were genuine issues of material fact and that reasonable minds could differ regarding whether Ahmad was acting within the scope of his employment. According to plaintiff, the incident occurred while Ahmad was working and on Meijer property, and Ahmad intervened because he was concerned about customer safety, thereby serving Meijer's interests.
A hearing was conducted on the motion for summary disposition, and the trial court granted Meijer's motion, reasoning as follows:
[R]easonable minds could not differ[] that the conduct complained of was outside the scope of [Ahmad's] employment and not foreseeable. The Plaintiff importantly testified that all of [Ahmad's] offensive touching happened outside the store; not inside the store, but outside the store. At least outside the doors into - possibly not the conduct that she testified about pushed down and all that. That happened outside the store on a berm by a parking lot and the very most that could have happened is he put his hands on her wrists in the vestibule but all of that happened outside. No one would think that it was foreseeable to believe that a cashier, not a security guard, but a cashier would turn into some sort of security guard. Or that he should be trained not to engage in security guard heavy handed bouncer type techniques. The fact that he was trained to put customers first is in no way evidence that Meijer wanted the cashier to physically assault people who were in an argument. For all of those reasons the Court is of the opinion that it's very clear that reasonable minds could not differ that the conduct complained of was outside the scope. It was not foreseeable and for the reasons argued by Defendant the motion is granted.
In March 2020, the trial court entered an order granting Meijer's motion for summary disposition. And this Court subsequently granted plaintiff's application for leave to appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it held as a matter of law that Ahmad acted outside the scope of his employment when he assaulted plaintiff. Plaintiff notes that the trial court only considered plaintiff's claim of battery against Ahmad, but she had also alleged a claim of negligence, i.e., that Ahmad's negligent conduct created a danger to plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that Ahmad acted negligently during his initial involvement in the altercation, increasing the risk of harm to plaintiff when Ahmad first grabbed her wrist, considering that she was making progress toward escaping at that point. By restraining plaintiff, Ahmad prolonged Wu's attack on plaintiff. Plaintiff maintains that the trial court also failed to apply Stewart v Napuche, 334 Mich. 76; 53 N.W.2d 676 (1952), which confronted a very similar fact pattern. Plaintiff argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Ahmad was acting within the scope of his employment when he intervened in the attack on plaintiff. According to plaintiff, Ahmad was working on Meijer property when he effectively assaulted plaintiff, Ahmad had no prior relationship with plaintiff, Wu, or Zheng, and Ahmad intervened, not to further his own personal interests, but to further Meijer's business interests. Plaintiff claims that Ahmad intervened after being alerted to the altercation and that he identified himself to the two women as a Meijer employee. Plaintiff argues that Ahmad interjected himself to protect Meijer customers from injuries and to end a disruption to other customers in the store-Ahmad was putting "customers first" as he was taught. Plaintiff additionally asserts that the trial court erred by determining that Meijer was not liable for negligent training and supervision. Plaintiff maintains that it was reasonably foreseeable that if Meijer failed to train an employee on how to handle a stressful, emotionally charged situation between customers, injuries might result.
Meijer argues that Ahmad's alleged assault of plaintiff was committed outside the scope of his employment. Meijer claims that there is no reasonable argument that Ahmad's conduct in forcing plaintiff to the ground and restraining her served the interests of Meijer. According to Meijer, Ahmad acted on the basis of his own personal agenda, not upon the authority given to him by Meijer, and Meijer never instructed him to physically restrain or make any contact with plaintiff. Meijer contends that Ahmad even conceded that he was acting on his own accord to prevent further injury to the two women.
Meijer additionally argues that the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff could not recover on the claim for negligent training or supervision. For such a claim to be viable, there had to be evidence that Meijer knew or should have known, or that it was foreseeable, that Ahmad would assault a customer. Yet there was no evidence that Ahmad had a history of committing violent or tortious acts or that he even had propensities to commit such acts. Meijer further asserts that there was nothing in Ahmad's record to suggest that he needed training or supervision about not engaging in misconduct with customers. Meijer claims that if Ahmad assaulted plaintiff, his conduct was outrageous and a radical departure from expected social norms.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Hoffner v Lanctoe, 492 Mich. 450, 459; 821 N.W.2d 88 (2012). MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides that summary disposition is appropriate when, "[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law." A motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a party's action. Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Dells, 301 Mich.App. 368, 377; 836 N.W.2d 257 (2013). "Affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence in support of the grounds asserted in the motion are required . . . when judgment is sought based on subrule (C)(10)," MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b), and such evidence, along with the pleadings, must be considered by the court when ruling on the (C)(10) motion, MCR 2.116(G)(5). "When a motion under subrule (C)(10) is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but must, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." MCR 2.116(G)(4).
"A trial court may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact." Pioneer State, 301 Mich.App. at 377. "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich. 177, 183; 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003). The trial court is not permitted to assess credibility, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes, and if material evidence conflicts, it is not appropriate to grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Pioneer State, 301 Mich.App. at 377. "Like the trial court's inquiry, when an appellate court reviews a motion for summary disposition, it makes all legitimate inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich. 153, 162; 516 N.W.2d 475 (1994). A court may only consider substantively admissible evidence actually proffered by the parties when ruling on the motion. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 121; 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999); see also MCR 2.116(G)(6).
C. DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION
In Hamed v Wayne Co, 490 Mich. 1, 10-11; 803 N.W.2d 237 (2011), our Supreme Court discussed an employer's vicarious liability for an employee's conduct, explaining:
The doctrine of respondeat superior is well established in this state: An employer is generally liable for the torts its employees commit within the scope of their employment. It follows that an employer is not liable for the torts committed by an employee when those torts are beyond the scope of the employer's business. This Court has defined within the "scope of employment" to mean engaged in the service of his master, or while about his master's business. Independent action, intended solely to further the employee's individual interests, cannot be fairly characterized as falling within the scope of employment. Although an act may be contrary to an employer's instructions, liability will nonetheless attach if the employee accomplished the act in furtherance, or the interest, of the employer's business. [Quotation marks, citations, and ellipses omitted.]
The issue whether an employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment is generally a question for the trier of fact, but the issue may be decided as a matter of law when it is clear that the employee was acting to accomplish some purpose of his own. Bryant v Brannen, 180 Mich.App. 87, 98; 446 N.W.2d 847 (1989).
In Green v Shell Oil Co, 181 Mich.App. 439, 441; 450 N.W.2d 50 (1989), the plaintiff, as he was walking from a self-service island at the defendant's gas station to the station's office to pay for gas, was hit by a vehicle. The plaintiff slapped the hood of the vehicle and yelled at the driver to be more careful. Id. Leslie Salgado got out of the vehicle and began to hit the plaintiff. Id. An unidentified station attendant joined Salgado in the attack on the plaintiff. Id. This Court agreed with the defendant that it could not be held vicariously liable for the attendant's participation in the attack. Id. at 446. The panel stated that the attendant engaged in the violent conduct for the purpose of assisting Salgado and not for any purpose in furtherance of the defendant's business interests. Id. at 447. This Court noted that the case did not present a situation where the attendant's conduct could reasonably be construed as an attempt to end the altercation between Salgado and the plaintiff or to eject the plaintiff from the gas station in order to restore order. Id., citing Stewart, 334 Mich. 76.
In Stewart, id. at 78, the plaintiff went to the defendant's tavern. James Miner, an employee of the tavern, refused to give the plaintiff, who had already consumed 18 bottles of beer, another bottle of beer. Id. The plaintiff made a remark, which angered Miner, and Miner then hit the plaintiff. Id. Miner next walked around the bar, picked up the plaintiff using a "wrestling grip," and began to carry him out of the tavern. Id. Someone then interfered, and Miner put more pressure on the plaintiff's neck, injuring the plaintiff. Id. Miner testified that he hit the plaintiff because he did not want the plaintiff in the tavern as the plaintiff was highly intoxicated, and Miner believed that he was going to cause trouble. Id. The defendant moved for a directed verdict on the basis that Miner was not acting within the scope of his authority or employment when he committed the alleged assault on the plaintiff, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion. Id. at 79-81. The Supreme Court explained that the general rules are that a master is liable for the acts of a servant while the servant is acting within the scope of his employment and that the master is liable even if the servant uses more force than he was authorized to use when evicting a patron from the master's premises. Id. at 79-80. The Supreme Court also quoted the following rule:
The master who puts the servant in the place of trust or responsibility, or commits to him the management of his business or the care of his property, is justly held responsible when the servant, through lack of judgment or discretion, or from infirmity or temper or under the influence of passion aroused by the circumstances and the occasion, goes beyond the strict line of his duty or authority, and inflicts an unjustifiable injury upon another. [Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
Generally, in determining whether an employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment, a court must consider the duties and authority of the employee. See Cook v Mich. Central R Co, 189 Mich. 456, 458; 155 N.W. 541 (1915).
Ahmad was a cashier for Meijer, overseeing eight self-checkout registers at the time of the incident. There was no evidence that his duties included breaking up fights between customers or ejecting unruly patrons. Nevertheless, we conclude that Meijer was not entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff's claim of vicarious liability. The evidence viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff does not support a determination that as a matter of law Ahmad was at all times engaged in an independent action intended to solely further Ahmad's individual interests. With respect to the entire episode or any portion thereof that played out at the store, a reasonable juror could find that Ahmad was indeed attempting or intending to stop the physical altercation between plaintiff and Wu or to stop Wu's assault of plaintiff. And a reasonable juror could also conclude that Ahmad, in stepping into the melee for such a purpose, was doing so in furtherance of Meijer's business interests, demanding that plaintiff and Wu listen to him because he was a Meijer employee. From the perspective of a reasonable juror, if a Meijer employee, who is present when a physical altercation or assault takes place on store grounds, does absolutely nothing and stands to the side and simply watches, it could do harm to Meijer's business interests: Customers might be appalled by any inaction and take their business elsewhere. Customers might expect store personnel to interject themselves into a fray in which other customers assault each other, if only to halt the disruption to business caused by the altercation. Additionally, Ahmad's actions- conceptually-could have resulted in restoring order and allowing other customers to safely enter and exit the store, which certainly would have furthered or advanced Meijer's business interests. Assuming that Ahmad was advancing Meijer's business interests in the eyes of a juror by involving himself in the physical altercation or assault, any negligence or use of unjustified force by Ahmad in doing so would not mean that he was not acting within the scope of his employment. See Stewart, 334 Mich. at 79-80. If that were the case, vicarious liability by an employer for an employee's tort would never arise. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the vicarious liability claim.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to Meijer on her claim for negligent training and supervision. The negligent hiring, retention, training, or supervision of an employee is a direct tort committed by the employer absent reliance on vicarious liability. Mueller v Brannigan Bros Restaurants & Taverns, LLC, 323 Mich.App. 566, 572; 918 N.W.2d 545 (2018). Such claims require "actual or constructive knowledge by the employer that would make the specific wrongful conduct perpetrated by an employee predictable." Id. at 575 (emphasis omitted).
There is no evidence that Ahmad had any history of violence. But this fact does not necessarily dispose of plaintiff's claim for negligent training or supervision. The Mueller panel observed:
Plaintiff's claims of negligent retention, negligent training, and negligent supervision are not necessarily disposed of merely because none of the individual defendants had particularly egregious histories before their hiring. However, those claims still depend on the particular misconduct complained of being foreseeable. [Id. at 577.]
The complained of misconduct by Ahmad was his act of intervention in the physical altercation between plaintiff and Wu. We conclude that a reasonable juror could deem it foreseeable that a Meijer employee, upon observing a fight between customers or one customer assaulting another customer, would intervene in the altercation in an effort to stop it and restore peace and safety in the store and that the employee might physically mishandle the situation, resulting in injuries. And if foreseeable, a reasonable juror could also conclude that Meijer was negligent in its training of the employee, which training, if proper, may have averted the tort and injury. Accordingly, the trial court erred in summarily dismissing plaintiff's claim of negligent training and supervision.
We respectfully disagree with our colleague who dissents in regard to our ruling on the claim of negligent training and supervision. His foreseeability analysis does not apply in the context of this particular case. In MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich. 322, 325-326; 628 N.W.2d 33 (2001), our Supreme Court stated:
[M]erchants have a duty to respond reasonably to situations occurring on the premises that pose a risk of imminent and foreseeable harm to identifiable invitees. We hold today that the duty to respond is limited to reasonably expediting the involvement of the police and that there is no duty to otherwise anticipate and prevent the criminal acts of third parties. Finally, . . . we reaffirm that merchants are not required to provide security personnel or otherwise resort to self-help in order to deter or quell such occurrences.
With respect to the absence of a duty to anticipate and prevent the criminal acts of third parties, the principle applies in the context of a situation in which a third party commits a criminal act against a merchant's invitee and the invitee then sues the merchant for failing to anticipate and prevent the criminal act-such a suit fails as a matter of law. In the instant case, plaintiff did not sue Meijer for failing to anticipate and prevent Wu's alleged assault against plaintiff. As indicated, the proper foreseeability analysis for purposes of the negligent training and supervision claim focuses on whether Ahmad's alleged negligent intervention into the altercation was foreseeable. See Mueller, 323 Mich.App. at 577. And again, we conclude that this presents a question for the trier of fact.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Having fully prevailed on appeal, plaintiff may tax costs under MCR 7.219.
Michael J. Riordan J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority that there is a question of fact as to whether defendant Saad Harris Ahmad was acting within the scope of his employment when he intervened in the fight at issue. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that there is a question of fact as to plaintiff's claim for negligent training against defendant Meijer, Inc., #64 (hereinafter "defendant").
Employers are "subject to liability for their negligence in hiring, training, and supervising their employees." Zsigo v Hurley Med Ctr, 475 Mich. 215, 227; 716 N.W.2d 220 (2006). "[T]he negligent hiring, retaining, training, or supervising of an employee [is] a direct tort committed by the employer itself, not a matter of vicarious liability." Mueller v Brannigan Bros Restaurants & Taverns, LLC, 323 Mich.App. 566, 572; 918 N.W.2d 545 (2018). "In order to make out a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must prove the four elements of duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damages." Brown v Brown, 478 Mich. 545, 552; 739 N.W.2d 313 (2007). If the harm to the plaintiff is not foreseeable, then the defendant does not owe the plaintiff a duty. See Valcaniant v Detroit Edison Co, 470 Mich. 82, 87; 679 N.W.2d 689 (2004). With regard to the duty owned by a merchant to an invitee, "a duty arises only on behalf of those invitees that are readily identifiable as being foreseeably endangered." MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich. 322, 332; 628 N.W.2d 33 (2001) (cleaned up).
In this case, plaintiff argues that defendant, apparently by mere virtue of the fact that it operates as a store, should have been aware that patrons would possibly engage in fisticuffs on its premises and that it should have trained its employees accordingly on the art of mediating such physical disputes. The majority agrees, concluding that "a reasonable juror could deem it foreseeable that a Meijer employee, upon observing a fight between customers . . . would intervene in the altercation in an effort to stop it . . . and that the employee might physically mishandle the situation, resulting in injuries."
However, "a merchant has no obligation generally to anticipate and prevent criminal acts against its invitees." Id. at 334 (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has "never recognized as 'foreseeable' a criminal act that did not . . . arise from a situation occurring on the premises under circumstances that would cause a person to recognize a risk of imminent and foreseeable harm to an identifiable invitee." Id. Thus, for example, when a bar is aware of an ongoing fight between two patrons, the resulting harm is generally foreseeable. See Mason v Royal Dequindre, Inc, 455 Mich. 391, 404-405; 566 N.W.2d 199 (1997). Otherwise, "[a] merchant can assume that patrons will obey the criminal law." MacDonald, 464 Mich. at 335. "This assumption should continue until a specific situation occurs on the premises that would cause a reasonable person to recognize a risk of imminent harm to an identifiable invitee." Id.
Simply put, criminal conduct by the patrons of a merchant is unforeseeable by the merchant itself until a specific situation occurs on the premises suggesting the possibility of such conduct. The majority therefore errs, in my view, by reasoning that defendant should have foreseen that at some indefinite point in the future, two or more of its patrons would engage in an unlawful fight, such as the type that occurred in the matter before us. As a matter of law, such criminal conduct is unforeseeable. See id. And, if such conduct is unforeseeable, it follows that defendant also could not have foreseen that employee training concerning such conduct would prevent injury to a patron. In other words, defendant is not obligated to train its employees for an unforeseeable event. Accordingly, defendant cannot owe a duty to plaintiff under these circumstances because the harm to plaintiff was unforeseeable, and the claim for negligent training must fail.
Further, even disregarding the caselaw discussing foreseeability in this particular context, I would still conclude that defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiff under these circumstances. Plaintiff has not shown or even alleged that fights between patrons on defendant's premises were relatively common or anticipated. In the absence of such evidence, I would not impose a blanket obligation upon defendant, or any similarly situated merchant, to train its employees for how to respond to such a hypothetical event. Compare Long v MGM Grand Hotel, LLC, 128 Nev 914; 381 P.3d 635 (2012) (allowing claims including negligent training to proceed against the casino, where two patrons assaulted a third patron, and where the casino "knew that fights between its patrons were a regular occurrence and it had additional security on hand due to the New Year's holiday and the UFC fight").
For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant with regard to plaintiff's claim for negligent training.