Opinion
23A-JT-1951
01-31-2024
In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: D.M. (Child), v. Indiana Department of Child Services, and Johnson County CASA Appellees-Petitioners. and D.L. (Father), Appellants-Respondents,
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Carlos I. Carrillo Greenwood, Indiana. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Catherine A. Cornelius Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Johnson Circuit Court The Honorable Michael T. Bohn, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 41C01-2211-JT-27
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Carlos I. Carrillo Greenwood, Indiana.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Catherine A. Cornelius Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BAILEY, JUDGE.
Case Summary
[¶1] D.L. ("Father") appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights over his minor child. We affirm.
The child's mother consented to the adoption and does not participate in this appeal.
Issues
[¶2] Father raises two issues for our review:
1. Whether certain findings of fact are supported by the evidence.
2. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it terminated his parental rights. Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] Father and A.D. ("Mother") (collectively, "the Parents") are the parents of D.M. ("Child"), who was born on October 6, 2014. Child was born with several health issues, including an eye condition, a heart condition that resulted in Child having heart surgery, and a failure to thrive that necessitated a feeding tube during Child's infancy. As a result, Child has "extensive" medical needs and sees a number of doctors, including a cardiologist, a neurologist, an allergist, a primary care physician, and an ophthalmologist. Ex. Vol. 2 at 37.
[¶4] In July 2019, DCS received two reports that Mother and her husband, J.D., had medically neglected Child by failing to refill a prescription and by failing to keep an emergency Epi-pen for Child. At that time, Father's whereabouts were unknown. DCS removed Child from Mother's care on July 24, 2019. The next day, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a Child in Need of Services ("CHINS"). Father was ultimately located in Tennessee.
[¶5] At a hearing on September 10, Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS. Thereafter, the court held a fact-finding hearing on December 5, at which Father appeared. At the time of that hearing, Father had not engaged with local physicians to prepare for Child to move to his home. In addition, Father had not seen Child in approximately two years. Following that hearing, the court adjudicated Child a CHINS on December 12. The court then entered a dispositional order and ordered Father to participate in services. In relevant part, the court ordered Father to "[m]eet all medical and mental health needs of the child in a timely and complete manner," attend all scheduled visits with Child, and participate in Fatherhood Engagement. Ex. Vol. 3 at 42.
[¶6] In April 2020, Dr. Linda McIntire, a psychologist, evaluated Child. Dr. McIntire determined that Child is "a highly traumatized child" due to "neglect and various kinds of abuse allegations" over a number of years by Parents. Tr. at 39, 59. Dr. McIntire also concluded that Child has "some pretty concerning behavior that require[s] him to have twenty-four hour super close supervision," including behaviors that put himself and animals at risk. Id. at 40. Dr. McIntire then diagnosed Child with ADHD and a "significant" dissociative disorder. Id. at 39. Based on her diagnoses, Dr. McIntire recommended that Child engage in "ongoing individual therapy" and take medication. Id. at 40. Dr. McIntire also opined that spanking Child or yelling at him "is only going to increase his trauma." Id. at 47. Dr. McIntire then met with the Parents to discuss her diagnoses and recommendations. During that discussion, Father was "of[f] task" and "didn't really seem to be very focused on" Child. Id. at 56.
[¶7] In the summer of 2020, Father completed a fatherhood engagement program and a ten-step parenting class. After he completed the classes, Father requested custody of Child. At subsequent review hearings, the court determined that Father was compliant with his services, including visitation. In February 2021, the court granted Father's motion for change of placement. However, the court ordered Father to ensure that he had in place for Child the necessary medical care providers and comparable services to those Child was receiving in Indiana. The court placed Child with Father on March 5 for a trial home visit.
[¶8] On April 13, DCS filed a rule to show cause after it discovered that Father had failed to enroll Child in school for several weeks and that Father had only taken Child to see a nurse practitioner but failed to make appointments for Child to see specialists. DCS then discovered that Child had appeared at school with bruises on his neck and back, which bruises Child reported had been caused by Father. DCS also discovered that, in May, after an incident at school, Father had spanked Child "five or six" times over his clothes and an additional ten times on his "bare bottom[.]" Id. at 87. As a result, DCS removed Child from Father's care, and the court terminated Father's trial home visit.
[¶9] After Child was returned to Indiana, Father was permitted to participate in virtual visits that were supervised by Child's therapist, Elizabeth Goldsbury. Between July and December 2021, Father missed "[m]ultiple" visits with Child, which caused Child to be "disappointed." Id. at 104-05. Father's inconsistent visits caused Child to have a "negative emotional response," including "outbursts" and "anger issues." Id. at 124. During the visits that Father attended, Father and Child would "talk over each other." Id. at 105. As a result, Child "felt he wasn't being listened to and heard." Id. Goldsbury would attempt to redirect Father, but Goldsbury "felt like it wasn't taken seriously and maybe ignored at times." Id. at 106. Goldsbury had to redirect Father "multiple times per visit" at multiple visits. Id. Goldsbury tried to "provide trauma focused . . . therapy," but she felt that it "wasn't very successful" because Child continued to experience "trauma triggers." Id. at 107. Goldsbury believed that the "visits themselves seem[ed] to be traumatic at times." Id. Goldsbury requested that Father's visits be suspended because of Father's attendance issues and "the quality of interaction" between Father and Child. Id. at 110. During the time without visits, Child was "pretty stable," and he continued to engage with Goldsbury. Id. at 111. But once visits with Father resumed, "concerns" arose regarding Child's behavior. Id.
[¶10] Rachel Ference began supervising the visits between Father and Child in August 2022. After that time, Father attended only six visits and failed to confirm nine. Ference observed "issues" with the visits. Id. at 124. In particular, Ference noticed "emotional support issues," where Father appeared to have a "lack of awareness" that something was upsetting Child. Id. at 125. Ference redirected Father on "several occasions," but it "wasn't always met successfully." Id. Ference received "push back," and Father engaged in "inappropriate communication" with her. Id. Ference also observed some "boundary issues," where it "appeared that the communication was more of . . . [Child] supporting [Father] . . . than the reverse." Id. at 126. At one point, Ference discussed corporal punishment with Father. Ference explained that, given Child's "history of abuse and neglect," corporal punishment "is not allowed" and is not "appropriate." Id. at 129. Father "gave a lot of push[ ]back and said that he would use corporal punishment on his child." Id.
[¶11] On November 7, 2022, DCS filed a petition to terminate the Parent's parental rights over the Child. Then, on December 8, the court suspended Father's visits with Child and ordered that the visits could continue if Father complied with his fatherhood engagement program for forty-five days. After Father complied, the court reinstated Father's visits. But after that time, Father only had two visits with Child. At some point, Mother signed a form consenting to Child's adoption by his current placement.
[¶12] At a fact-finding hearing, Dr. McIntire testified that Child will require "more skilled parenting than other children," that he will require twenty-four-hour supervision for "an extended period of time," and that any progress with his "overall functioning" will take several years. Tr. at 42-44. She also testified that any further trauma to Child would "eliminat[e] treatment gains, if not deepen[] the illness." Id. at 59.
[¶13] Ference testified that, despite the fact that Father had completed parenting classes, she saw "no evidence that he has made significant progress" in "any" of the areas of concern. Id. at 132. She also testified that Father will not be able to provide Child with the proper support to cope with his behavioral issues. DCS Family Case Manager ("FCM") Supervisor Elizabeth Sheitzer testified that Father lacks the necessary "skills to parent" Child. Id. at 174. She further stated that Child continues to have "extensive medical needs" and that Father "failed to engage" the necessary medical providers. Id. at 176. And she testified that Father has an "unwillingness to make a change to parent [C]hild in the manner in which his child requires" and that Father has "not made any attempts or made minimal attempts to rectify his ability to meet his child's needs, to understand his child's medical needs, to understand his child's educational needs, [and] to understand his child's mental health and parent in a different manner." Id. at 179-80.
[¶14] Following the hearing, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon terminating Father's parental rights. In particular, the court concluded that "there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside of the home will not be remedied," that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the child," and that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of child. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 78. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[¶15] Father challenges the trial court's termination of his parental rights over Child. We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that "[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Bailey v. Tippecanoe Div. of Fam. &Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. &Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.
[¶16] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. &Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. &Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999), trans. denied.
Issue One: Findings of Fact
[¶17] Father first contends that the trial court erred when it terminated his parental rights because several of the court's findings are not supported by the evidence. Here, in terminating Father's parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. &Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. "Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference." Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208. On appeal, Father specifically challenges findings number 31, 45, 49, 52, 54, 62 and conclusion number 21. We address each argument in turn.
Finding Number 31
[¶18] On this issue, Father first asserts that the trial court erred when it found that "Father does not believe that Child suffers from Dissociative Disorder or ADHD." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 5. Father contends that he "did not state that he disagreed with the diagnosis that the Child had dissociative disorder." Appellant's Br. at 14. And he asserts that he "deferred to the medical providers" regarding Child's ADHD diagnosis. Id. However, Father testified that Child's behavior "reminded [him] of a typical child." Tr. at 239. Further, when asked if he believed that Child has dissociative disorder, Father responded: "Um, no. I've not witnesses my child be dissociative." Id. And when asked if he believed that Child had ADHD, Father responded: "To be honest, . . . I've never believed that he ever had ADHD." Id. at 240. Father's testimony supports the trial court's finding.
Finding Number 45
[¶19] Father next challenges the court's finding number 45, in which the court found that "Father failed to make appointments with a neurosurgeon, neurologist, or cardiologist for Child." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 6. Father argues that he "explained that he had scheduled the necessary medical appointments for the Child, but some or most of the appointments were scheduled later in the year because the providers were 'booked up,' and the Child was removed before he ever made it to his appointments." Appellant's Br. at 15. However, the only evidence to support Father's argument is his own testimony, which the court was not required to accept as true. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (stating that "factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted."). In addition, FCM Melinda Armstrong testified that Father never sent her "any text messages or confirmations of the doctors' appointments." Tr. at 148. And FCM Sheitzer testified that Father had only taken Child to see a nurse practitioner. See id. at 172. The evidence supports the court's finding that Father did not make an appointment for Child to see a neurosurgeon, neurologist, or cardiologist.
Finding Number 49
[¶20] Father also challenges the court's finding number 49, in which the court found that "[a]fter the trial home visit disrupted, Father's compliance with visits became increasingly detrimental to Child's mental health due to Father's inconsistency and inappropriateness." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 73. Father argues that the court "did not find how the visits were detrimental to the Child." Appellant's Br. at 20. And, while Father acknowledges that there were examples of "inappropriateness" and "inconsistenc[ies]," they "did not rise to the level of terminating Father's parental rights." Id. at 20. But Father's argument is simply a request for us to reweigh the evidence. Goldsbury testified that the visits with Father seemed "traumatic at times" and that visits were cancelled due to Father's "attendance and inappropriate communication." Tr. at 107, 111. In addition, Ference testified that there was a "lack of emotional support" and "boundary issues" during visits between Father and Child. Id. at 124, 126. And the Child's Court Appointed Special Advocate ("CASA") testified that Child "had a real regression" after he returned from Tennessee. Id. at 193. The court's finding is supported by the evidence.
Finding Number 52
[¶21] Next, Father contends that the court erred when it found that "Father would become frustrated with Child when Child did not answer Father in the way Father wanted, would talk over Child, and would yell at Child when Child did not behave how Father wanted Child to behave." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 74. Father maintains that he was "merely attempting to redirect the Child[.]" Id. But as Father acknowledges, Child's CASA testified that Father would become "frustrated" with Child when Child "wouldn't look at him, wouldn't respond to his questions." Tr. at 195. Further, Goldsberry testified that Father and Child would "talk over each other," which would cause Child to "escalate . . . because he felt he wasn't being listened to or heard." Id. at 105. And Ference testified that Father came "very close to yelling at [Child] for his behaviors." Id. at 131. That evidence supports the trial court's finding.
Finding Number 54
[¶22] Father also asserts that the trial court erred when it found that, "despite hearing Dr. McIntire's concern on how corporal punishment could further harm Child's mental health, Father maintains that he will utilize corporate punishment." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 74. Father argues that, while Dr. McIntire did not believe that spanking was appropriate, "the evidence does not show that Father was informed about this recommendation" and that, "after listening to Dr. McIntire's testimony," Father stated that he would use verbal communication with Child. Appellant's Br. at 16.
[¶23] However, Father testified as follows during the hearing when questioned by Child's CASA:
Q: Are you telling me that you're admitting it was wrong to spank him?
A: Um with the given (indiscernible) what had been conducted between him and his teacher I do not.
Q: So you think it was appropriate to spank him?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Against the doctor's advice?
A: At that point in time, I did, yes.
Q: You still admit that?
A: Um, at this current time, uh, given the circumstances of his behavior at that time and, uh, my parental discretion at the time yes, Sir.Tr. at 72. In addition, Ference testified that Father reported to her that he would continue "to use corporal punishment on his child." Id. at 129. That evidence demonstrates that Father was aware of the doctor's recommendation at the time he spanked Child fifteen to twenty times, and it supports the trial court's finding that Father will continue to use corporal punishment against the recommendations of Dr. McIntire.
Finding Number 62
[¶24] Father next contends that the court erred when it found that, "[s]ince May 2021, when the trial home visit with Father was ended, Child has thrived in his foster placement[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 74. Father asserts that "no one testified that Child was 'thriving'" and that there are reports that Child was "still behaving poorly, especially in school[.]" Appellant's Br. at 17-18. Father is correct that none of Child's or Father's providers specifically testified that Child has been "thriving" since he was placed with his current foster family. However, the evidence nonetheless supports that finding by the trial court. Goldsberry testified that Child has shown "progress overall." Tr. at 104. In addition, FCM Sheitzer testified that Child has shown a "marked improvement over the time that he has been in that home" and that Child's behaviors "have drastically improved[.]" Id. at 186. Further, Child's CASA testified that Child has "shown enormous progress[.]" Id. at 192. And Child's placement testified that she has "absolutely" seen an improvement in Child in the time he has been placed with her. Id. at 207. The court's finding is supported by the evidence.
Conclusion Number 21
[¶25] Finally, on this issue, Father challenges the portion of the trial court's conclusion number 21 in which the court found that "Father was hostile towards any redirection and failed to implement parenting skills learned through fatherhood engagement and his parenting course." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 77. To support his assertion, Father relies on the testimony of his home-based case manager, who testified that Father had made progress and was receptive to her ideas. In addition, he maintains that the "only reason [he] was unable to 'implement the parenting skills learned' was because he was deprived of in-person visits." Appellant's Br. at 19-20. But, again, Father's argument is a request that we reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses.
[¶26] Goldsberry testified that, when she tried to redirect Father during visits, she "felt like it wasn't taken seriously" and that she was "maybe ignored at times." Tr. at 106. She also testified that she would have to redirect Father "[m]any times" at multiple visits. Id. Goldsberry further testified that Father would get "upset" during the visits with Child. Id. at 110. Ference then testified that Father "didn't really seem to have an awareness" if Child had an emotional reaction and that Father would not "be able to provide that emotional support." Id. at 125. She also testified that she received "push back" when she attempted to redirect Father and that Father would engage in "inappropriate communication" with her. Id. at 125. And Ference testified that, while Father had completed a program and participated in fatherhood engagement, he had not made "significant progress" in any of her areas of concern. Id. at 132. That evidence supports the trial court's conclusion.
[¶27] The trial court's findings are supported by the evidence. Father's contentions to the contrary are simply requests to reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility, which we cannot do.
Issue Two: Termination of Parental Rights
[¶28] Father next contends that the court clearly erred when it terminated his parental rights as to Child. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.
* * *
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023). DCS's "burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of 'clear and convincing evidence.'" R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2).
[¶29] On appeal, Father does not challenge the court's conclusion that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Child, that being adoption by his current placement. However, he contends that the court clearly erred when it concluded that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the Child's best interests.
Father also contends that the "evidence did not clearly and convincingly support the trial court's finding that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posted a threat to the well-being of the Child." Appellant's Br. at 34 (emphasis removed). However, the court made no such finding. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 78.
Remedy
[¶30] To determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's continued placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied, the trial court should judge Father's fitness to care for Child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. See E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). However, the court must also "evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child[ren]." Moore v. Jasper Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id. Moreover, DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. Id. Further, this Court has clarified that, given the wording of the statute, it is not just the basis for the initial removal of the child that may be considered for purposes of determining whether a parent's rights should be terminated, but also any basis resulting in the continued placement outside of a parent's home. Inkenhaus v. Vanderburg Cnty. Off. Of Fam. & Child. (In re A.I.), 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied.
[¶31] Father contends that the court erred when it concluded that the conditions will likely not be remedied because "Father scheduled the Child's medical appointments, but the Child could not be immediately seen because the providers were 'booked up' at that point." Appellant's Br. at 29. He also contends that he ultimately enrolled Child in school, that he "was not charged or arrested for his actions" that led to the termination of the trial home visit, that he completed his dispositional goals, and he was "not given an opportunity to apply what he learned through fatherhood engagement." Id. at 29, 32.
[¶32] However, as discussed above, the evidence supports the findings, and the findings demonstrate that Child has a history of being abused and neglected that resulted in lasting trauma. And, because of that trauma, Child's service providers informed Father that corporal punishment was not appropriate for Child and that it could further traumatize him and impeded any progress he was making in therapy. However, Father indicated that he would continue to use corporal punishment. In addition, Child has extensive medical needs that require him to see multiple specialists. But despite that need, Father only ever took Child to see a nurse practitioner and not any of the specialists that Child required. Further, Child has diagnoses of ADHD and dissociative disorder, which will require years of therapy and treatment to address, but Father does not believe those diagnoses are correct.
[¶33] We acknowledge that Father completed a parenting class and fatherhood engagement. But despite his completion of those services, Father did not show any "significant progress" in any area of concern. Tr. at 132. Indeed, even after Father had completed the classes, Father's visits with Child were suspended because of issues with boundaries and emotional support. For the visits Father attended, Father had to be redirected multiple times at multiple visits. In addition, Father showed an "unwillingness" to change his behavior or learn new strategies, and he made only "minimal" attempts "to rectify his ability to meet Child's" medical, education, or mental health needs. Id. at 17980. And Father continued to lack the necessary "skills to parent" Child. Id. at 174.
[¶34] Based on the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the trial court's findings support its conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and the reasons for his continued placement outside of Father's care will not likely be remedied. Father's arguments on appeal are simply requests for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.
Best Interests
[¶35] In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide "adequate housing, stability, and supervision," in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id.
[¶36] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009). "The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship." Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed special advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.
[¶37] On appeal, Father contends that the court erred when it determined that the termination of his parental rights was in Child's best interest because "Father has fostered a loving relationship with the Child," which he demonstrated "in part through participation in his dispositional goals." Appellant's Br. at 23. He also contends that he did not have an opportunity to implement any of the skills he had learned because he was limited to only telephonic visits with Child.
[¶38] But, as the court's findings demonstrate, Father has not shown that he is capable of parenting Child. Father had several years to participate in services and show that he can adequately provide for the care and safety of Child. But despite that time and his completion of services, Father did not make any significant progress toward meeting Child's needs, and he showed an unwillingness to make any changes in the way he parented Child. And Father does not believe that Child suffers from either ADHD or dissociative disorder, both of which will require treatment and therapy for several years.
[¶39] Child needs permanency. At the time of the termination hearing, Child had been removed from Parents' care for nearly four years. And while Father had a trial home visit during that time, it only lasted for two months before it was terminated because of Father's actions toward Child. FCM Sheitzer requested that the court terminate Father's parental rights. And Child's CASA testified that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests. Further, Child's placement and several service providers testified that Child has improved since being placed at that home. The evidence that the reasons for Child's continued placement outside of Father's care will likely not be remedied, coupled with the testimony of the FCM and CASA, supports the court's determination that the termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests.
Conclusion
[¶40] The findings challenged by Father are supported by the evidence. And the court's findings support its conclusions that the reasons for Child's removal or continued placement outside of the home will not be remedied and that termination of the parental rights is in the Child's best interests. We therefore affirm the trial court.
[¶41] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.