Thus, Wife incorrectly asserts that the valuation of EAH is purely a question of law subject to de novo review. Property valuation “is a determination of fact by the trial court, to which we give great deference, [and n]o one formula or method of determining value is binding or conclusive.” Thill v. Thill, 26 S.W.3d 199, 203 (Mo.App. W.D.2000) (emphasis added); see also D.K.H. v. L.R.G., 102 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Mo.App. W.D.2003) (“The court has broad discretion in ... valuing marital property....”). Nonetheless, we recognize that, although the trial court has broad discretion, it “is ‘prohibited from entering a valuation of marital property not supported by the evidence at trial.’ ” Nelson v. Nelson, 195 S.W.3d 502, 507 (Mo.App. W.D.2006) (quoting Sullivan v. Sullivan, 159 S.W.3d 529, 535 (Mo.App. W.D.2005)).

Here, "[t]he court's objective was to find the true or actual value of Husband's marital interest in the medical practice." D.K.H. v. L.R.G., 102 S.W.3d 93, 102 (Mo.App. 2003). The record shows that from 1983 until midway through the trial in this matter, when WPI was established, Husband and Armstrong operated WPIA based on an agreement that provided for an equal division of the corporation's profits; however, the record is clear that throughout that time Husband owned one hundred percent of WPIA, was the sole shareholder, was the sole owner of the corporation's assets, and was the sole manager of the corporation's funds.

Section 452.335.1 ; D.K.H. v. L.R.G., 102 S.W.3d 93, 103 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). In applying this standard, the trial court must first determine the reasonable needs of the party seeking maintenance.

The trial court abuses its discretion only where its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before it, and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration. D.K.H. v. L.R.G., 102 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003). Where the court is confronted with conflicting valuation evidence, the reviewing Court defers to the trial court's resolution of the conflict.

The trial court abuses its discretion only where its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before it, and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration. D.K.H. v. L.R.G., 102 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). Where the court is confronted with conflicting valuation evidence, the reviewing Court defers to the trial court's resolution of the conflict.

Section 452.330.4; D.K.H. v. L.R.G., 102 S.W.3d 93, 100 (Mo.App. 2003). "Rather, the owner's intent to convert the property to marital property is the determining factor."

The plain language of the QDRO and the subsequent second amended DRO make no mention of an immediate payment — even though they could have been drafted to provide an immediate payment. See D.K.H. v. L.R.G., 102 S.W.3d 93, 105 (Mo.Ct.App. 2003) (noting that the "domestic relations order entered by the [circuit] court . . . indicates that Wife's share `shall beimmediately payable in a lump-sum form of benefit or such other form as [Wife] elects as permitted under the Plan.'") (emphasis added); In re Marriage of Novak, 83 S.W.3d 597, 601 (Mo.Ct.App. 2002) (per curiam) (noting that the DRO entered by the circuit court specifically stated that the wife could immediately receive payments from the husband's pension plan, as part of her maintenance award). Mindful that it must look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the DRO's language as though it was a contract, the court concludes that neither the first QDRO nor the second amended DRO provide for an immediate payment.

Under Missouri law, a spouse may hold title to property separately, in his or her own name. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 452.330.3 (2000); D.K.H. v. L.R.G., 102 S.W.3d 93, 97 (Mo.Ct.App.2003). As of the commencement of this case, the real property was held by the Debtor's spouse in her name only.

Although during some points of Husband’s trial testimony he stated he had a "vague memory" of the 35 shares of stock being gifted to him and he admitted he stated in a pre-trial deposition that he did not recall such a gift, the trial court’s decision indicates the court disbelieved these unfavorable portions of Husband’s testimony and instead chose to believe and accept the other portions of Husband’s testimony demonstrating the 35 shares were a gift. SeeD.K.H. v. L.R.G. , 102 S.W.3d 93, 98 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) (similarly finding based on the principle that a trial court is "free to believe or disbelieve all, part, or none of the testimony given by any of the witnesses") (quotations omitted); see alsoDay , 528 S.W.3d at 411. We defer to the trial court’s decision to accept and find credible the portions of Husband’s testimony that he was gifted the 35 shares of voting common stock in PPI.

Husband asserts that if a 5% return rate was applied to “a $391,000.00 [sic] investment[,]” then Wife's “necessity for spousal maintenance” would be reduced “to $809.00 per month.” Husband argues that “Missouri [courts] consider 5% to be a modest return on investments and where [courts] lack evidence of the rate of return on investments, they frequently assume a 5% rate of return[,]” citing D.K.H. v. L.R.G., 102 S.W.3d 93, 104 (Mo.App.W.D.2003). We do not read D.K.H. as standing for the proposition that a 5% rate of return is always assumed when there is no evidence of a return rate, nor can we find (due to Husband's failure to provide the exhibits admitted at trial) that the trial court was without evidence of an appropriate rate of return in this case.