Dixon v. United States

9 Citing cases

  1. Owens v. United States

    497 A.2d 1086 (D.C. 1985)   Cited 66 times
    Finding harmless the failure to give a special unanimity instruction when there was “no rational way” for jurors to have come to a verdict predicated on different sets of fact

    For this reason robbery is often accompanied by other crimes. E.g., Bates v. United States, 327 A.2d 542 (D.C. 1974); Dixon v. United States, 320 A.2d 318 (D.C. 1974). But see (Ulysses) Jones v. United States, 483 A.2d 1149 (D.C. 1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2363, 86 L.Ed.2d 263 (1985), in which convictions of felony murder based on two underlying robberies were upheld on the theory that the two robberies were part of "a continuous joint venture" by the defendants.

  2. Norris v. U.S.

    585 A.2d 1372 (D.C. 1991)   Cited 11 times
    In Norris, the victim was hit with a pipe to keep him quiet during an in-progress robbery; hence, the assault was a part of the robbery.

    Owens, supra, 497 A.2d at 1097. See also Bates v. United States, 327 A.2d 542, 545-47 (D.C. 1974); Dixon v. United States, 320 A.2d 318, 321 (D.C. 1974). Specifically, here, the government, relying on the separate acts theory, argues that the assault at the door was committed to effect entry, was "entwined with the burglary charge," and thus constituted an act apart from the armed robbery.

  3. Allen v. United States

    495 A.2d 1145 (D.C. 1985)   Cited 103 times
    Holding that plain error review applied to unpreserved claims of error in jury instructions pursuant to Rule 30

    In considering claims identical to Allen's, we have held that although two convictions of this type would normally merge as a matter of law, we will not find merger if two conditions are satisfied: first, the two counts in the government's indictment must clearly charge the defendant with criminal acts arising out of two distinct incidents; and second, the trial court must instruct the jury that the two counts represent independent offenses, distinct in time and circumstances. Davis v. United States, 367 A.2d 1254, 1270 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 114 (1977); see Bates v. United States, 327 A.2d 542, 547 (D.C. 1974); Dixon v. United States, 320 A.2d 318, 321 (D.C. 1974). This approach is necessary to foreclose the possibility that the jury will inadvertently return two convictions based on identical conduct, representing in effect but a single offense, and in addition to insure that the jury will be unanimous as to the predicate facts underlying each separately charged incident.

  4. Logan v. United States

    460 A.2d 34 (D.C. 1983)   Cited 13 times

    The doctrine of merger, however, "does not apply where the offenses arise out of separate acts or transactions." Villines v. United States, 320 A.2d 313, 314 (D.C. 1974); see Tuckson v. United States, 364 A.2d 138, 142 (D.C. 1976) (merger inapplicable where evidence shows "two separate and distinct" offenses); Dixon v. United States, 320 A.2d 318, 321 (D.C. 1974) (merger cannot occur where offenses are "separate and apart" from one another). Moreover, where offenses are separate, the trial court's decision to prescribe concurrent sentences may not be reviewed.

  5. Heiligh v. United States

    379 A.2d 689 (D.C. 1977)   Cited 10 times

    Finally, because we view the assault with a dangerous weapon as separate and distinct from the assault with intent to commit robbery while armed, the former offense does not merge into the latter. Dixon v. United States, D.C.App., 320 A.2d 318 (1974). The assault by Heiligh occurred outside the building after the earlier crimes were completed and consequently was not a necessary element of the robbery or of the assault with intent to commit robbery while armed.

  6. Strickland v. United States

    332 A.2d 746 (D.C. 1975)   Cited 9 times

    The armed robbery, an offense against the person, thereafter committed is an offense separate and distinct from the burglary. Dixon v. United States, D.C.App., 320 A.2d 318, 322 (1974); Irby v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 17, 390 F.2d 432 (en banc 1967). Another of appellant's contentions is that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for the armed robbery of Yvonne Holt. One Rose Smith, who was present at the robbery, testified that she saw Eskeridge "take money from Yvonne."

  7. Bates v. United States

    327 A.2d 542 (D.C. 1974)   Cited 16 times

    Finding nothing of value, appellant turned to leave but warned Mrs. Morton saying, "you better not come out before I get out of here. I'm liable to shoot you." In Dixon v. United States, D.C.App., 320 A.2d 318 (1974), there were, as here, convictions for armed robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon. The jury was instructed in that case that it could return a verdict of guilty on the assault charge only if it found that, separate and apart from the armed robbery, the complaining witness was threatened by the pointed gun.

  8. Taylor v. United States

    324 A.2d 683 (D.C. 1974)   Cited 11 times

    As to the conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon, the government concedes, and we agree, that on the facts of the instant case, this assault was a necessary part of the evidence needed to support the count of armed robbery. See Quick v. United States, D.C.App., 316 A.2d 875 (1974); Skinner v. United States, D.C.App., 310 A.2d 231 (1973); United States v. Inge, 494 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Anderson, 490 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Johnson, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 475 F.2d 1297 (1973); cf. Dixon v. United States, D.C.App., 320 A.2d 318 (1974). Accordingly, the conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon, and the sentence based thereon, must be set aside.

  9. Villines v. United States

    320 A.2d 313 (D.C. 1974)   Cited 4 times

    Appellant's contentions — that § 22-2705 merged with § 22-2706, and that § 22-502 merged with § 22-506 — are without merit. The doctrine of merger does not apply where the offenses arise out of separate acts or transactions. Dixon v. United States, D.C.App., 320 A.2d 318 (1974). Since the evidence here shows that these offenses arose out of separate acts at different times, we need not consider whether § 22-2705 is a lesser included offense of § 22-2706, or whether § 22-502 is a lesser included offense of § 22-506.