Dixon v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Bright v. State

    314 Ga. App. 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 3 times

    See Thompson v. State, 271 Ga. 105, 107(1), 519 S.E.2d 434 (1999) (evidence of an accused's unlawful entry into a building where valuable goods are stored may give rise to an inference of an intent to commit a theft therein, particularly where no other motive is apparent for the entry); Phagan v. State, 243 Ga.App. 568, 570(2), 533 S.E.2d 757 (2000).Holden, supra at 39(2), 722 S.E.2d 873;Satterwhite v. State, 250 Ga.App. 313, 316–317(2)(b), 551 S.E.2d 428 (2001); Dixon v. State, 240 Ga.App. 644, 647(1)(e), 524 S.E.2d 734 (1999); Carr v. State, 251 Ga.App. 117, 118(1), 553 S.E.2d 674 (2001) (physical precedent only).2. Bright contends that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence when a witness was allowed to answer the following question: “And based on the results of [the crime lab's shoeprint analysis] what, if anything, did you do?” The witness, an investigator for the Forsyth County similar transaction, responded that he had obtained warrants for Bright's arrest.

  2. Koroma v. State

    350 Ga. App. 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 6 times

    Koroma's argument that the State failed to meet its burden of proof by not "introduc[ing] any evidence or proof of any similar transaction or any testimony of the victim of any similar transaction" overlooks the fact that Koroma voluntarily entered into a negotiated guilty plea to both counts of child molestation. See Dixon v. State , 240 Ga. App. 644, 646 (1) (a), 524 S.E.2d 734 (1999) (Alford guilty plea may be used as evidence of an independent offense or act). Judgment affirmed.

  3. Branesky v. State

    262 Ga. App. 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 18 times

    Baitey v. State, 275 Ga. 681, 682(2) ( 571 S.E.2d 733) (2002) See Dixon v. State, 240 Ga. App. 644, 647(2) ( 524 S.E.2d 734) (1999). c. Branesky's trial attorneys were not ineffective for failing to object to the separate sentencing as to Count 1 (child molestation by touching M. B.'s vagina) and Count 2 (aggravated sexual battery by penetrating M. B.'s vagina with his finger).

  4. Argot v. State

    261 Ga. App. 569 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 9 times

    An Alford plea is thus a guilty plea and places the defendant in the same position as if there had been a trial and conviction by a jury. See also Dixon v. State, 240 Ga. App. 644, 646 (1a) ( 524 S.E.2d 734) (1999) ( Alford plea may be introduced as similar transaction evidence, although plea of nolo contendere may not). As aptly noted by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals:

  5. Vanegas v. State

    249 Ga. App. 76 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 4 times

    The defendant's statutory privilege to enter a plea of nolo contendere lies within sound discretion of the trial court, O.C.G.A. § 17-7-95 (a); Bennett v. State, 153 Ga. App. 21, 28 (5) ( 264 S.E.2d 516) (1980); Smith v. State, 76 Ga. App. 847 (2) ( 47 S.E.2d 518) (1948), requiring that the parties' views and the public's interest in the effective administration of justice be considered in the exercise thereof. Dixon v. State, 240 Ga. App. 644, 645 (1) (a) ( 524 S.E.2d 734) (1999). While there is no right to enter a plea of nolo contendere, a right to tender a petition to enter such a plea necessarily arises out of the privilege to do so given by statute.

  6. Doe v. Liebsch

    872 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. 2015)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that statements of fact in a complaint may be used "for impeachment purposes" when they contradict later testimony

    Unlike a nolo plea, Alford pleas are accepted only after inquiry into actual guilt, so they should be accepted as standard guilty pleas for purposes of Rule 410. See Dixon v. State, 240 Ga.App. 644, 524 S.E.2d 734 (1999) (holding Alford plea admissible in burglary prosecution); United States v. In, No. 2:09CR00070 DS, 2010 WL 2869108 (D.Utah 2010) (holding Alford plea admissible in prosecution for felon in possession of firearm).Doe further argues that excluding evidence of an Alford plea under Rule 403 ignores a 100–year–old practice of admitting evidence of a guilty plea in a subsequent civil case.