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Dixon v. State

New York State Court of Claims
May 20, 2015
# 2015-041-509 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. May. 20, 2015)

Opinion

# 2015-041-509 Claim No. 120843

05-20-2015

ASHTON DIXON v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK

ASHTON DIXON Pro Se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esq. Assistant Attorney General


Synopsis

Claimant is awarded damages of $250.00 after trial where uncontradicted proof showed that defendant continued to hold inmate/claimant in disciplinary confinement for approximately seven (7) days after disciplinary hearing determination that ordered claimant's disciplinary confinement had been administratively reversed.

Case information


UID:

2015-041-509

Claimant(s):

ASHTON DIXON

Claimant short name:

DIXON

Footnote (claimant name) :

Defendant(s):

THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Footnote (defendant name) :

Third-party claimant(s):

Third-party defendant(s):

Claim number(s):

120843

Motion number(s):

Cross-motion number(s):

Judge:

FRANK P. MILANO

Claimant's attorney:

ASHTON DIXON Pro Se

Defendant's attorney:

HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esq. Assistant Attorney General

Third-party defendant's attorney:

Signature date:

May 20, 2015

City:

Albany

Comments:

Official citation:

Appellate results:

See also (multicaptioned case)


Decision

Ashton Dixon (claimant), while incarcerated at Clinton Correctional Facility (CCF) in August 2011, was charged with a number of misbehaviors and, after a Tier III disciplinary hearing, determined to be guilty of several of the charges. He was, among other penalties, ordered confined to special housing (more restrictive housing than that of general population inmates; the Court will refer to such restrictive housing as "disciplinary confinement" for the purpose of clarity). Claimant was ordered to be kept in disciplinary confinement for 18 months, from August 19, 2011 to February 19, 2013 (see Exhibit A). Claimant appealed the CCF disciplinary hearing determination.

After approximately thirty days of disciplinary confinement at CCF, claimant was transferred to Orleans Correctional Facility (OCF), where he was once again placed in disciplinary confinement. While in disciplinary confinement at OCF, claimant was informed that his CCF disciplinary hearing determination had been reversed on November 7, 2011. Claimant testified that he had received this news "approximately like a week later."

During his continuing disciplinary confinement in OCF, claimant was issued an inmate misbehavior report for creating a disturbance on November 14, 2011 (see Exhibit B). After a disciplinary hearing conducted on November 23, 2011, claimant was found guilty and, among other punishments, again penalized by disciplinary confinement to end on December 13, 2011 (see Exhibit C). Claimant was released from OCF disciplinary confinement on December 13, 2011. Claimant brings this action alleging defendant wrongfully confined him from August 19, 2011 (starting at CCF) to December 13, 2011 (ending at OCF).

Defendant provided the trial testimony of Daniel Holdridge, a security supervisor for defendant. Captain Holdridge testified that the defendant, subsequent to the reversal of claimant's CCF disciplinary determination, undertook a priority transfer analysis of claimant on November 9, 2011 (see Exhibit E). The analysis was intended to assess the transfer of claimant, who had a maximum security classification, from the medium security general population classification of OCF to a more secure facility because claimant was ineligible either to be further held in disciplinary confinement or to be placed in the OCF general inmate population. Captain Holdridge testified that this transfer analysis of claimant, given his classification, "required central office review," and had to go through several levels of approval and that the process could "take weeks."

Without commenting upon the reasonableness or propriety of the length of time such a transfer review or analysis would or should take, the Court notes that it is uncontradicted that defendant held claimant in disciplinary confinement at OCF beyond November 7, 2011, the date upon which the CCF hearing determination that formed the lawful basis of that confinement, was reversed.

To establish that he was wrongfully confined, claimant must prove that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929; Krzyzak v Schaefer, 52 AD3d 979 [3d Dept 2008]).

With respect to whether a confinement is privileged, Holmberg v County of Albany (291 AD2d 610, 612 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]), instructs that: "Generally, where a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged . . . and everyone connected with the matter is protected from liability for false imprisonment."

In the context of confinement pursuant to a prison disciplinary proceeding, such confinement is "privileged to the extent that it was under color of law or regulation, specifically in accordance with [inmate hearing] regulations" (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 402 [Ct Cl 1986]) .

Claimant's disciplinary confinement from August 19, 2011 to November 7, 2011, ordered by the CCF disciplinary hearing determination, was not shown at trial to have been undertaken in violation of applicable hearing regulations. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the initial basis for claimant's disciplinary confinement was subsequently reversed on November 7, 2011, defendant's actions in charging claimant with misbehavior, undertaking the CCF disciplinary Tier III hearing, issuing a determination sustaining certain charges against defendant and confining him until the determination was reversed, are privileged.

Similarly, defendant's disciplinary confinement of claimant at OCF, starting November 14, 2011, was privileged in that claimant was found, after a disciplinary hearing, to have misbehaved on November 14, 2011, and he was thereafter appropriately subjected to disciplinary confinement until his release on December 13, 2011 (see Exhibits B and C).

By reason of all of the foregoing, the Court finds that claimant has proven by a preponderance of the credible evidence that defendant wrongfully confined him at OCF from November 7, 2011 to November 14, 2011, and accordingly awards claimant damages in the amount of $250.00. To the extent that claimant has a paid a filing fee, it may be recovered pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 11-a (2).

All motions not previously decided are hereby denied.

Let judgment be entered accordingly.

May 20, 2015

Albany, New York

FRANK P. MILANO

Judge of the Court of Claims


Summaries of

Dixon v. State

New York State Court of Claims
May 20, 2015
# 2015-041-509 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. May. 20, 2015)
Case details for

Dixon v. State

Case Details

Full title:ASHTON DIXON v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Court:New York State Court of Claims

Date published: May 20, 2015

Citations

# 2015-041-509 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. May. 20, 2015)