Opinion
03 Civ. 826 (LTS) (KNF).
November 7, 2008
REPORT and RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In this action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pro se plaintiff, Echo Westley Dixon ("Dixon"), alleges that the rights secured to him by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution were violated by defendants New York City Correction Officers Jeffrey Ragland ("Ragland") and Stephen Ryan ("Ryan") (collectively "Officer Defendants"), and New York City Correction Captains James "Salvo" ("Salvio"), Stephen Cottone ("Cottone"), and Angel Luyanda ("Luyanda") (collectively "Captain Defendants"). Upon the defendants' failure to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint, the plaintiff moved for judgment by default, which was granted in relation to the Officer Defendants, and denied in relation to the Captain Defendants. Your Honor referred the matter to the undersigned to conduct an inquest hearing and to report and recommend the amount of damages, if any, to be awarded to the plaintiff against the defaulting Officer Defendants.
The defendant's name is misspelled in the caption of the action.
The action has since been dismissed against Salvio, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). A jury trial was held on the plaintiff's claims against Cottone and Luyanda, which resulted in a verdict for those defendants.
II. BACKGROUND
Based on the parties' submissions, the testimony elicited at the inquest hearing, the Complaint filed in the instant action — the allegations of which, perforce of the defendants' default, must be accepted as true, except those relating to damages, see Cotton v. Slone, 4 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 1993); Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E. L. U. L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992) — and the Court's review of the entire court file maintained in this action, the following findings of fact are made:
At approximately 5:45 a.m., on December 4, 2002, the plaintiff, who was incarcerated at Downstate Correctional Facility ("DCF"), was transported from DCF to the Riker's Island jail facility ("Riker's Island") by Emergency Service Unit corrections officers. While the plaintiff was being transported from Riker's Island to the New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County, by the Officer Defendants and Salvio, the plaintiff began to converse with another inmate. Ragland told the plaintiff to "shut the fuck up," and the plaintiff told Ragland not to speak to him in such a manner. At approximately 9:30 a.m., the plaintiff arrived at the court and was taken to a holding cell; his restraints were removed; Ragland hit the plaintiff in the mouth; and the plaintiff struck Ragland's left eye, dislodging Ragland's eyeglasses. The plaintiff maintains Ryan then punched him and a "struggle" between the Officer Defendants, other prison officials, and the plaintiff ensued, during which the Officer Defendants kicked and punched the plaintiff's ribs, back, and head. According to Dixon, "[t]he officers struck [him]," and "he struck [] back." The plaintiff did not indicate whether he continued to "strike back" at the officers for the duration of this incident. The plaintiff determined not to submit to a medical examination, until he returned to DCF, at approximately 11:00 p.m., on the night of the incident.
The plaintiff attributed the following injuries to the December 4, 2002 incident: a "big knot" near his eye; pain in one tooth, that was later extracted; a "cyst [in his nose], that was already there"; and back pain. The plaintiff conceded the cyst in his nose was caused by a hairline fracture in his tooth, and that the hairline fracture in his tooth manifested in 1988 or 1989. The plaintiff explained that the tooth, from which he felt pain, "was already damaged and it was hit again and it damaged it even further." The plaintiff estimated that, on December 4, 2002, he was kicked in his back approximately 30 times, and, as he "blocked [his] head with his arms," corrections officers "attempted to stomp [on his] head," and he was punched at least four times. Medical records submitted at the inquest hearing demonstrated that, when Dixon was examined by medical staff at DCF, on the night of December 4, 2002, his injuries were documented as: "multiple minor contusions to [his] face [and] lower back pain." On December 5, 2002, Dixon did not attend a scheduled "clinic visit." When the plaintiff visited the medical clinic on December 6, 2002, he complained of blurred vision — a condition he experienced sporadically, since approximately 2000 — as well as pain in his back and forehead. The plaintiff testified, at the inquest hearing, that he feels paranoid around, and distrusts, corrections officers.
Testimony at the inquest hearing also established that, on February 11, 2003, a second incident occurred during which corrections officers used physical force against the plaintiff, which resulted in the plaintiff suffering "contusions to [his] face, back, upper trunk, and left elbow." The plaintiff testified that, in November 2003, he requested, and was granted temporarily, a "lower bunk," and, in 2005, he was prescribed a back brace. At the conclusion of the inquest hearing, the Court noted that Dixon could submit additional documentary evidence that he mentioned during the hearing, but did not have in his possession at the hearing. Dixon has not provided the Court with any further evidentiary submissions.
During the inquest hearing, when asked to specify the amount of damages requested, the plaintiff stated that he sought from each defendant: four million dollars, in compensatory damages; three million dollars, in punitive damages; and three million dollars, in future damages.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A default judgment in an action establishes liability, but is not a concession of damages. See Cappetta v. Lippman, 913 F. Supp. 302, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 [2d Cir. 1974]). Damages must be established by the plaintiff in a post-default inquest. See id. In conducting an inquest, the court need not hold a hearing "as long as it [has] ensured that there was a basis for the damages specified in the default judgment." Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997). The court may rely on affidavits or documentary evidence in evaluating the fairness of the sum requested. See Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1993). "[A] district court has discretion under Rule 55(b)(2) once a default is determined to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action." Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981).
Compensatory and Future Damages
"To recover compensatory damages under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that his injuries were proximately caused by the constitutional violation." Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1994). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, it must be shown that: (1) objectively, the deprivation alleged is sufficiently serious to reach constitutional dimensions; and (2) subjectively, the defendants acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind" associated with the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994). "[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the [Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is . . .: whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (1992).
The plaintiff's submissions and testimony at the inquest hearing show that Dixon had not engaged in bad behavior at the time Ragland first struck Dixon, and, therefore, it does not appear that force was applied in a "good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline," but, rather, was intended to cause harm wantonly. See id. at 7, 112 S. Ct. at 999 (finding that, in determining whether the use of force was wanton or unnecessary, a court may consider the severity of the injury, the need for the use of force, the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by corrections officers, and any efforts made to reduce the severity of a forceful response). Therefore, it appears that, with regard to Ragland's first blow to the plaintiff, Ragland's conduct constituted a violation of the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. See Romaine v. Rawson, 140 F. Supp. 2d 204, 212 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that a corrections officer "behaved in a wanton and malicious manner when he struck Plaintiff with no provocation and no need to use force, [and that such behavior was] objectively unreasonable").
The Court is aware that the Supreme Court has found "the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does not [ordinarily] extend to de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Baskerville v. Mulvaney, 411 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Inasmuch as the unnecessary use of force without provocation has been found to be "wanton and malicious," Romaine, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 212, and the Supreme Court has found that, "[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated. . . . whether or not significant injury is evident," Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S. Ct. at 1000, the single blow by Ragland — even if, arguendo, de minimis — appears to qualify as a use of force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, see Baskerville, 411 F.3d at 48.
In addition, because a reasonable officer would have understood that, at the time Ragland first struck Dixon, no amount of force was needed to "maintain discipline," and that the use of such unnecessary force violated the Eighth Amendment, Ragland is not shielded from liability for civil damages pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that qualified immunity "shields public officials from liability for their discretionary acts that do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known") (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2007).
After the initial blow by Ragland, Dixon — whose restraints had been removed — admittedly struck Ragland's face, and, according to Dixon, a "struggle" between him and the Officer Defendants ensued. Once Dixon became physically aggressive, it is reasonable to conclude that the Officer Defendants utilized force in a "good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline," and that the use of such force was not in violation of the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7, 112 S. Ct. at 998-99.
A review of the complaint and the plaintiff's inquest materials do not show clearly whether the plaintiff struggled with the Officer Defendants throughout the duration of this incident — thus causing the use of force by the Officer Defendants to be justified — or if the Officer Defendants continued to use force after they had been able to "restore discipline" — in which circumstance, the use of force would appear to be unjustified and unconstitutional. Therefore, it appears that the plaintiff has not established that the use of force by the Officer Defendants — after the plaintiff struck Ragland — violated the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force, especially considering that Dixon's injuries consisted primarily of minor contusions and back pain, Dixon's aggression towards Ragland created a perceived threat, and the Officer Defendants' use of force to ameliorate that threat was justified.See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S. Ct. at 999; see also Wright v. Dee, 54 F. Supp. 2d 199, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Where force is used in response to a prison disturbance, it is done in haste, under pressure, and must be balanced against the competing institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff or other inmates") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
"Where the plaintiff has been subjected to excessive force, compensable injury would normally follow"; however, "[a] finding of excessive force does not . . . entitle the victim to compensatory damages as a matter of law." Atkins v. New York City, 143 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1998). "A § 1983 plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages only in the absence of proof of actual injury." Id. The plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages when, "in the course of an altercation between an inmate and one or more prison officials, both justifiable force and excessive force might have been used, but any injuries — either physical or emotional — might have resulted only from the justifiable force." Haywood v. Koehler, 78 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1996). However, under such circumstances, "an award of nominal damages is proper." Atkins, 143 F.3d at 103.
In the case at bar, the evidence submitted by the plaintiff shows that the initial blow by Ragland constituted "excessive force," within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; however, the record does not indicate what actual injury, if any, was inflicted upon the plaintiff as a result of that blow. Since the plaintiff has not shown "proof of actual injury" with regard to Ragland's first blow, the plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages, but is entitled to recover nominal damages from Ragland. See id. As Ryan did not become involved in the physical altercation with the plaintiff until after the plaintiff used force against Ragland, it appears that Ryan was justified in his use of force and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover compensatory or nominal damages from Ryan. Similarly, with regard to "future damages," because the plaintiff has not shown what injury, if any, he endured as a result of the single, unjustified, blow by Ragland, he is unable to show that he is entitled to "future damages" flowing from this initial blow.
Punitive Damages
"Punitive damages may be awarded for violations of federal law where a defendant acts with 'reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff's rights, [and] intentional[ly] violat[es] federal law.'" Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 909 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1637). The plaintiff must show that the defendant acted "wantonly . . . or was motivated by ill will or malice." Lazaratos v. Ruiz, No. 00 Civ. 2221, 2003 WL 22283832, at *7, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003).
In the case at bar, Ragland's initial blow to Dixon appears to have been unjustified and "motivated by ill will," since it was unprovoked and constituted an unnecessary use of force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. Therefore, the Court finds that an award of punitive damages against Ragland, in the amount of $500, is appropriate. See e.g. Romaine, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 214 (finding that, "given the lack of severity of Plaintiff's injuries . . . [the] Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $500 in punitive damages from Defendant," after the defendant, a corrections officer, struck the plaintiff in an unnecessary use of force and without provocation). Whereas Ryan's actions appear to have been justified and not the product of "ill will or malice," an award of punitive damages, against Ryan, does not appear to be appropriate.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that a judgment for nominal damages, in the amount of $1, and punitive damages, in the amount of $500, be entered against Ragland. I recommend further that no judgment for damages be entered against Ryan.V. FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Such objections, and any responses to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Laura T. Swain, 40 Centre Street, Room 755, New York, New York, 10007, and to the chambers of the undersigned, 40 Centre Street, Room 540, New York, New York, 10007. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Swain. FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993); Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1992); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 57-59 (2d Cir. 1988); McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1983).