Opinion
B303170
02-23-2021
BIANCA ARDELL DIXON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VICTORIA V. MOROZOVA, Defendant and Appellant.
Parsanj Law Group and Rana Parsanj for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STRO06213) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Gary D. Roberts, Judge. Reversed. Parsanj Law Group and Rana Parsanj for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant and appellant Victoria V. Morozova challenges a permanent restraining order issued in favor of plaintiff and respondent Bianca Ardell Dixon and against appellant. Appellant contends that the trial court's order lacks substantial evidence. We agree. Because the restraining order against appellant is not supported by substantial evidence, we reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2017, Larisa Morozova (Larisa), appellant's mother, and her husband rented a three-bedroom apartment. They lived in one of the rooms and rented out the other two rooms. Respondent rented one of the rooms for two years. According to respondent, Larisa, appellant, and appellant's father harassed her, prompting her to seek a restraining order against appellant.
Because appellant and Larisa share the same last name, we refer to Larisa by her first name. No disrespect is intended.
This was a tumultuous housing arrangement. Another housemate, Robert Spera, sought a restraining order against respondent because she brandished a knife at him. Larisa also sought a restraining order protecting her from respondent. And, respondent sought a restraining order against Larisa in a separate action. The police were called multiple times.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on October 22, 2019. According to respondent, Larisa and her husband made respondent's life difficult while the three of them lived in the shared residence. When asked by the trial court why she was seeking a restraining order, respondent testified, "Due to multiple times that I had to call the police on them, on Larisa, on the father, on mostly Larisa and the father. The daughter [appellant], she made threatening statements and stuff here and there, but she would just be there. She's never put her hands on me or anything."
The trial court held a hearing on all of the competing requests for restraining orders at the same time. According to respondent, "a lot of the same evidence" was going to be presented concerning appellant and Larisa. Thus, the trial court heard all of that evidence at one time.
When asked for additional information concerning appellant's alleged threatening statements, respondent referenced only one incident. On one occasion, respondent confronted appellant regarding an incident when appellant's father slapped respondent. According to respondent, appellant was there, but said that she did not see anything. Appellant then asked respondent, "What is it that you want? What do you want from us?" Respondent began yelling at her, and appellant replied, "[W]ell, I can have some friends come take you." When pressed for additional information concerning appellant, respondent replied that there was none. Rather, most of respondent's evidence pertained to Larisa, not appellant.
Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court issued a two-year restraining order against appellant and in favor of respondent.
Appellant's timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant law
Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 was enacted to protect an individual's state constitutional right to pursue safety, happiness, and privacy. (Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1113, overruled in part on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010.) Pursuant to section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), "A person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section." Subdivision (b)(3) defines "harassment" as "unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner."
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated. --------
A single incident of unlawful harassment or violence is an insufficient basis for a civil harassment restraining order; rather, the statute requires a course of conduct, defined as "'a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.'" (Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1, 4-5, citing § 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) "An injunction is authorized only when it appears that wrongful acts are likely to recur." (Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399, 402; accord, Babalola v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 948, 962.)
For a section 527.6 protective order to be issued, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists. (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) If the trial court finds clear and convincing evidence, the restraining order will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. (Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.)
When considering whether the evidence is sufficient to support the issuance of a restraining order, "[w]e resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court if it is supported by substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value." (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.)
II. The trial court erred in issuing a restraining order against appellant
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the trial court erred in issuing a restraining order against appellant. Respondent offered evidence of only one instance of alleged harassment, namely the time when appellant shrugged off respondent's questions regarding appellant's father slapping her. This one incident is not evidence of a course of unlawful conduct. Furthermore, we do not think that this one incident would "cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress." (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) In fact, respondent did not offer any testimony in support of her assertion that this incident with appellant caused her substantial emotional distress. While appellant's statement that she could get some friends to "take" her may have been inappropriate, that was an isolated comment that arose from an already heated situation between respondent and appellant's parents. Finally, there is no evidence that this alleged single incident of harassment was likely to recur.
In finding clear and convincing evidence, it appears that appellant is correct that the trial court understandably confused and/or conflated respondent's testimony concerning Larisa and her testimony regarding appellant. Respondent presented her evidence against mother and daughter jointly, and the trial court heard evidence concerning multiple competing requests for restraining orders in a consolidated hearing.
Accordingly, the restraining order against appellant must be reversed.
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. Appellant is entitled to costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
/s/_________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST We concur: /s/_________, J.
CHAVEZ /s/_________, J.
HOFFSTADT