We conclude that there is a sound and substantial basis in the record for Family Court's [*2]finding that the older child was neglected and that the younger child was derivatively neglected (see generally Family Ct Act §§ 1012 [f] [i] [B]; 1046 [a] [i]; [b] [i]; Nicholson, 3 N.Y.3d at 368, 371; Balle S., 194 A.D.3d at 1395-1396). The record establishes that "each child's out-of-court statements were sufficiently corroborated, and cross-corroborated," by the photographs and witnesses' observations of the older child's injuries (Matter of Dixon v Crow, 192 A.D.3d 1467, 1468 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 904 [2021]; see Matter of Rashawn J. [Veronica H.-B.], 159 A.D.3d 1436, 1436 [4th Dept 2018]; Matter of Bryan O. [Zabiullah O.], 153 A.D.3d 1641, 1642 [4th Dept 2017]). The fact that the older child's injuries "did not require medical attention does not preclude a finding of neglect based on the infliction of excessive corporal punishment" (Balle S., 194 A.D.3d at 1395)

We conclude that there is a sound and substantial basis in the record for Family Court's finding that the older child was neglected and that the younger child was derivatively neglected (see generally Family Ct Act §§ 1012 [f] [i] [B] ; 1046 [a] [i]; [b] [i]; Nicholson , 3 N.Y.3d at 368, 371, 787 N.Y.S.2d 196, 820 N.E.2d 840 ; Balle S. , 194 A.D.3d at 1395-1396, 147 N.Y.S.3d 292 ). The record establishes that "each child's out-of-court statements were sufficiently corroborated, and cross-corroborated," by the photographs and witnesses’ observations of the older child's injuries ( Matter of Dixon v. Crow , 192 A.D.3d 1467, 1468, 144 N.Y.S.3d 766 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 904, 2021 WL 3925959 [2021] ; seeMatter of Rashawn J. [Veronica H.-B.] , 159 A.D.3d 1436, 1436, 72 N.Y.S.3d 686 [4th Dept. 2018] ; Matter of Bryan O. [Zabiullah O.] , 153 A.D.3d 1641, 1642, 61 N.Y.S.3d 409 [4th Dept. 2017] ). The fact that the older child's injuries "did not require medical attention does not preclude a finding of neglect based on the infliction of excessive corporal punishment" ( Balle S. , 194 A.D.3d at 1395, 147 N.Y.S.3d 292 ).

We reject respondents’ contentions that, prior to the fact-finding hearing, Family Court (Cohen, J.) abused its discretion when it denied their requests for an adjournment. "The grant or denial of a motion for an adjournment for any purpose is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court" ( Matter ofDixon v. Crow , 192 A.D.3d 1467, 1467, 144 N.Y.S.3d 766 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 904, 2021 WL 3925959 [2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. We note that neither the mother nor the father demonstrated any prejudice that they sustained as a result of the denial of their requests for an adjournment (see generallyid.

cross-examination (see Matter of Dixon v Crow, 192 A.D.3d 1467, 1468-1469 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 904 [2021]; Matter of Ricky A. [Barry A.], 162 A.D.3d 1747, 1748 [4th Dept 2018]). Even assuming, arguendo, that the court erred in admitting the hearsay statements, we conclude that any error is harmless because

We reject that contention. "The grant or denial of a motion for an adjournment for any purpose is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court" (Matter of Dixon v Crow, 192 A.D.3d 1467, 1467 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 904 [2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of John D., Jr. [John D.], 199 A.D.3d 1412, 1413 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 903 [2022]). Here, the father failed to demonstrate that the need for an adjournment to prepare for a trial on a petition that had been pending for two years was not due to his refusal to cooperate with his assigned counsel without good cause (see generally Matter of Carter H. [Seth H.], 191 A.D.3d 1359, 1361 [4th Dept 2021]; Matter of Anthony J.A. [Jason A.A.], 180 A.D.3d 1376, 1378 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 902 [2020]; Matter of Petkovsek v Snyder, 251 A.D.2d 1088, 1088-1089 [4th Dept 1998]).

"The grant or denial of a motion for an adjournment for any purpose is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court" ( Matter of Dixon v. Crow , 192 A.D.3d 1467, 1467, 144 N.Y.S.3d 766 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 904, 2021 WL 3925959 [2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeMatter of Nathan N. [Christopher R.N.] , 203 A.D.3d 1667, 1669, 165 N.Y.S.3d 212 [4th Dept. 2022], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 909, 2022 WL 2127495 [2022] ), and we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. Finally, we have reviewed respondent's remaining contention and conclude that it does not warrant modification or reversal of the order.

We reject respondent's contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his request for an adjournment. "The grant or denial of a motion for an adjournment for any purpose is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court" (Matter of Dixon v Crow, 192 A.D.3d 1467, 1467 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 904 [2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Nathan N. [Christopher R.N.], 203 A.D.3d 1667, 1669 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 909 [2022]), and we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion.

We reject respondents' contentions that, prior to the fact-finding hearing, Family Court (Cohen, J.) abused its discretion when it denied their requests for an adjournment. "The grant or denial of a motion for an adjournment for any purpose is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court" (Matter of Dixon v Crow, 192 A.D.3d 1467, 1467 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 904 [2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. We note that neither the mother nor the father demonstrated any prejudice that they sustained as a result of the denial of their requests for an adjournment (see generally id. at 1468).

We reject respondents' contentions that, prior to the fact-finding hearing, Family Court (Cohen, J.) abused its discretion when it denied their requests for an adjournment. "The grant or denial of a motion for an adjournment for any purpose is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court" (Matter of Dixon v Crow, 192 A.D.3d 1467, 1467 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 904 [2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. We note that neither the mother nor the father demonstrated any prejudice that they sustained as a result of the denial of their requests for an adjournment (see generally id. at 1468).