Dixon v. Credit Bureau of Douglas

8 Citing cases

  1. Nichols v. Pangarova

    443 P.2d 756 (Wyo. 1968)   Cited 11 times

    Nevertheless, the defendant's contention that there is a failure of proof as to the presentation of the creditor's claim cannot be countenanced, as the pretrial memorandum was specific in incorporating within it plaintiff's pretrial conference memorandum which recited the filing of the creditor's claim and the rejection thereof. In Dixon v. Credit Bureau of Douglas, Wyo., 419 P.2d 707, 709, we said under Rule 16, W.R.C.P., this limiting of the issues of trial by the court controlled the subsequent course of the action, and "It is manifestly improper that there now be raised another issue." 1A Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, p. 848 (1960), states that where "an admission or agreement concerning a factual issue is made and carried into effect by * * * [pretrial] order of the court, unless the order is thereafter modified by the court, the issue stands as fully determined as if adjudicated after the taking of testimony.

  2. Franks v. Olson

    975 P.2d 588 (Wyo. 1999)   Cited 7 times

    The propriety of granting a summary judgment depends then upon the correctness of the court's dual findings that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dixon v. Credit Bureau of Douglas, Wyo., 419 P.2d 707 (1966).Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867, 871 (Wyo. 1975).

  3. CONNETT v. FREMONT CTY. SCH. DIST., ETC

    581 P.2d 1097 (Wyo. 1978)   Cited 11 times

    The propriety of granting a summary judgment depends then upon the correctness of the court's dual findings that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dixon v. Credit Bureau of Douglas, Wyo., 419 P.2d 707 (1966)." [Parenthetical matter supplied]

  4. Wendling v. Cundall

    568 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1977)   Cited 17 times
    Applying U.C.C. good faith standard to contract for the sale of real estate

    We must decide whether the trial court correctly determined that the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a given set of facts. See Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867 (1975); Dixon v. Credit Bureau of Douglas, Wyo., 419 P.2d 707 (1966). Turning then to the merits of this appeal, we first consider the appropriate rule to be applied, i.e., what standard is imposed by a requirement incorporated in a contractual provision which requires utmost good faith.

  5. Johnson v. Soulis

    542 P.2d 867 (Wyo. 1975)   Cited 130 times
    Requiring actual reliance only

    The propriety of granting a summary judgment depends then upon the correctness of the court's dual findings that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dixon v. Credit Bureau of Douglas, Wyo., 419 P.2d 707 (1966). In the cited cases and others, this Court has emphasized the effect of the presence or absence of a genuine factual issue. It is not to be overlooked, however, that such issue must relate to a material fact. Gladstone Hotel, Inc. v. Smith, Wyo., 487 P.2d 329 (1971).

  6. Boode v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company

    458 P.2d 653 (Wyo. 1969)   Cited 6 times

    The pretrial order, under the provisions of Rule 16, W.R.C.P., supersedes the pleadings. Stafos v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 10 Cir., 367 F.2d 314, 319; Beck v. Sampson, 158 Me. 502, 186 A.2d 783, 788; see Dixon v. Credit Bureau of Douglas, Wyo., 419 P.2d 707, 709. Moreover, any assumption that the only issue presented in the pleadings was the guest relationship is contrary to the sense of the later stipulation between appellant and the garnishee that the documents filed in the district court and the entire record in the declaratory judgment action might be considered and be a part of the record in the garnishment proceedings, which stipulation was entered after the garnishee answered denying any policy indebtedness to Wolfe; the traverse of Mrs. Boode, referring to the tort action; and the traverse of Wolfe, raising among other things the alleged impropriety of considering the employee relationship.

  7. Frontier Fibreglass Industries v. City of Cheyenne

    435 P.2d 456 (Wyo. 1967)   Cited 3 times
    Construing Wyo.R.Civ.P. 16

    Plaintiff's motion to revise judgment etc., asked, however, that the judgment previously entered include judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the corporation on the second count of plaintiff's complaint and the court in its nunc pro tunc order stated that "based on the evidence produced by the plaintiff at the trial held on July 20, 1966, plaintiff was entitled to a judgment on the second count against the defendant" corporation. Appellant argues on the basis of Dixon v. Credit Bureau of Douglas, Wyo., 419 P.2d 707; Washington v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, S.D.Fla., 19 F.R.D. 370; and United States v. An Article of Drug, etc., Acnotabs, D.N.J., 207 F. Supp. 758; that the pretrial order limited the issues for trial and consideration of another issue was improper. Although appellant's theory is correct insofar as it pertains to post-trial motions or appeals, pretrial orders may be amended prior to trial and in exceptional cases amendments are allowed during the course of a trial.

  8. Newton v. Misner

    423 P.2d 648 (Wyo. 1967)   Cited 19 times
    In Newton v. Misner, Wyo., 423 P.2d 648, 650 (1967), we stated, "it is proper that matter which fails to meet the requirements of Rule 56(e) be stricken on motion."

    The material presented to the trial court as a basis for a summary judgment should be as carefully tailored and professionally correct as any evidence which is admissible to the court at the time of trial, and it is proper that matter which fails to meet the requirements of Rule 56(e) be stricken on motion. Peripheral allusion was made to this in Dixon v. Credit Bureau of Douglas, Wyo., 419 P.2d 707, 709. Union Insurance Society of Canton, Ltd. v. William Gluckin Co., 2 Cir., 353 F.2d 946, 952; State of Maryland for Use of Barresi v. Hatch, D.Conn., 198 F. Supp. 1, 3; American Securit Company v. Hamilton Glass Company, 7 Cir., 254 F.2d 889, 893.