Dixie Downs, Inc. v. Arkansas Racing Commission

13 Citing cases

  1. Arkansas Dept. v. Smith

    370 Ark. 490 (Ark. 2007)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that a state agency has sole authority over determining Medicaid eligibility and that courts may exercise jurisdiction after exhaustion of administrative remedies

    A basic rule of administrative procedure requires that an agency be given the opportunity to address a question before a complainant resorts to the courts. Austin, supra; Dixie Downs, Inc. v. Arkansas Racing Comm'n, 219 Ark. 356, 242 S.W.2d 132 (1951). Where a party has failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedies, the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the suit.

  2. Austin v. Center Point Energy Arkla

    365 Ark. 138 (Ark. 2006)   Cited 17 times
    In Centerpoint, we declined to adjudicate the issue of the jurisdiction of the Texas Railroad Commission under Texas law vis-a-vis Texas ratepayers.

    A basic rule of administrative procedure requires that an agency be given the opportunity to address a question before a complainant resorts to the courts. McGhee, supra; Dixie Downs, Inc. v. Arkansas Racing Comm'n, 219 Ark. 356, 242 S.W.2d 132 (1951). The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is grounds for dismissal.

  3. Arkansas Prof. Bail Bondsman Lic. Bd. v. Frawley

    350 Ark. 444 (Ark. 2002)   Cited 14 times
    Reversing where the circuit court enjoined a State licensing board, where no court of equity prior to Amendment 80 would have had the power to enjoin the board

    The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed statutory administrative remedy has been exhausted. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Cummings v. Big Mac Mobile Homes, Inc., 335 Ark. 216, 980 S.W.2d 550 (1998); Delta School of Commerce, Inc. v. Harris, 310 Ark. 611, 839 S.W.2d 203 (1992); Dixie Downs, Inc., v. Arkansas Racing Comm'n, 219 Ark. 356, 242 S.W.2d 132 (1951). A basic rule of administrative procedure requires that an agency be given the opportunity to address a question before a complainant resorts to the courts.

  4. Ward v. Priest

    350 Ark. 345 (Ark. 2002)   Cited 23 times
    Finding that the ballot title fully disclosed that the proposed amendment would abolish taxes on food and medicine as those terms were defined in the amendment, where the definitions of the terms "food" and "medicine" adopted an "established benchmark."

    Further, the rule promotes the establishment of a record by which an appellate court can intelligently determine the validity of acts. Dixie Downs, Inc. v. Arkansas Racing Commission, 219 Ark. 356, 242 S.W.2d 132 (1951). [8] These general propositions, however, do not apply where the Constitution confers original and exclusive jurisdiction upon this court.

  5. Cummings v. Big Mac Mobile Homes, Inc.

    980 S.W.2d 550 (Ark. 1998)   Cited 15 times
    Holding plaintiffs not required to exhaust remedies with the Arkansas Manufactured Home Commission when the Commission only provided damages for the cost of repairs and the plaintiffs asserted their mobile home was beyond repair

    The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed statutory administrative remedy has been exhausted. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Delta School of Commerce, Inc. v. Harris, 310 Ark. 611, 839 S.W.2d 203 (1992); Dixie Downs, Inc. v. Arkansas Racing Comm'n, 219 Ark. 356, 242 S.W.2d 132 (1951). A basic rule of administrative procedure requires that an agency be given the opportunity to address a question before a complainant resorts to the courts.

  6. Arkansas Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Cantrell Marine

    808 S.W.2d 765 (Ark. 1991)   Cited 13 times

    There is no doubt that an application for a license as a motor vehicle dealer falls within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Failure on the part of Cantrell Marine to seek a hearing before the Commission with respect to the Director's action was clearly a failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. Dixie Downs, Inc. v. Arkansas Racing Comm., 219 Ark. 356, 242 S.W.2d 132 (1951). In Barr v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield, Inc., 297 Ark. 262, 761 S.W.2d 174 (1988), we noted exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, including instances where it would be futile to pursue an administrative remedy or where there was no genuine opportunity to do so.

  7. Selph v. Quapaw Vo. Tech. School

    643 S.W.2d 534 (Ark. 1983)   Cited 1 times

    The state agency aggrieved has a right by certiorari to seek review of such a matter. Dixie Downs, Inc. v. Arkansas Racing Commission, 219 Ark. 356, 242 S.W.2d 132 (1951); In re Goldsmith, 87 Ark. 519, 113 S.W. 799 (1908); Adams v. Cockrill, 227 Ark. 348, 298 S.W.2d 322 (1957). Affirmed.

  8. Stanton v. Trustees of St. Joseph's College

    233 A.2d 718 (Me. 1967)   Cited 27 times
    Noting that the relevant law was beyond the agency's power and any relief the agency could provide would have been insufficient

    There is no uniformity among the jurisdictions as to application of the rule, some courts holding the waiver of the doctrine by a court to be a matter of judicial discretion except in cases where the statute itself makes the exhaustion of administrative remedies a prerequisite to suit (Adler v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 956, 134 Ct.Cl. 200 (1956); Cuiffo v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 944, 131 Ct.Cl. 60 (1955); Durgin v. Brown, 37 N.J. 189, 180 A.2d 136 (1962)), and others that there is no jurisdiction in the court until the administrative procedure has been completed. Dixie Downs, Inc. v. Ark. Racing Comm., 219 Ark. 356, 242 S.W.2d 132 (1951); Alexander v. State Personnel Board, 22 Cal.2d 198, 137 P.2d 433 (1943); Goodwin v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 11, 215 S.W.2d 557 (1948); Sanders v. Okla. Employment Security Comm., 200 Okla. 366, 195 P.2d 272 (1948). Many courts hold that even such a fundamental question as jurisdiction must first be determined by the administrative agency and the appeal procedure applied by the statute.

  9. Piggott St. Bank v. St. Banking Bd.

    416 S.W.2d 291 (Ark. 1967)   Cited 8 times
    In Piggott State Bank v. State Banking Bd., 242 Ark. 828, 416 S.W.2d 291 (1967), after declaring that the banking business is closely related to the public welfare and within the police power of the state, we said that the power extends to the regulation or even the prohibition of the business except on such terms as the state may prescribe.

    In view of the fact that the act in question does not require any hearing, reduction of evidence to writing, or formal findings, there might be considerable doubt whether the action of the board would support a proceeding by certiorari. See Dixie Downs, Inc., v. Arkansas Racing Commission, 219 Ark. 356, 242 S.W.2d 132; Annotation 102 ALR 534; 14 Am.Jur.2d 800 et seq., Certiorari, 24. We bypass that question, however, as a hearing was held and a transcript of the testimony made.

  10. Cheney, Commissioner v. East Texas Motor Freight

    233 Ark. 675 (Ark. 1961)   Cited 3 times

    The rule is uniform that administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial relief can be sought. We have a number of cases on that point, some of which are: Cook, Commr. v. Wofford, 209 Ark. 824, 192 S.W.2d 550; LeCroy v. Cook, Commr., 211 Ark. 966, 204 S.W.2d 173, 1 A.L.R.2d 1032; City of Little Rock v. Griffin, 213 Ark. 465, 210 S.W.2d 915; Dixie Downs, Inc. v. Arkansas Racing Comm., 219 Ark. 356, 242 S.W.2d 132; and Consumers Co-op. Addn. v. Hill, 233 Ark. 59, 342 S.W.2d 657. There is no weakening of this rule by failure to decide this point in this case; but there is a division in the Court as to whether the administrative remedy had been exhausted, so we find it better to rest the opinion on the ultimate question presented, rather than on the procedural point.