On direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed. Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209, 232 S.E.2d 47 (1977). Apparently, no immediate petition for writ of certiorari was filed at that time in the United States Supreme Court.
APPENDIX. Alderman v. State, 254 Ga. 206 ( 327 S.E.2d 168) (1985); Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113 ( 303 S.E.2d 266) (1983); Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 228 ( 290 S.E.2d 43) (1982); Krier v. State, 249 Ga. 80 ( 287 S.E.2d 531) (1982); Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 558 ( 284 S.E.2d 390) (1981); Brown v. State, 247 Ga. 298 ( 275 S.E.2d 52) (1981); High v. State, 247 Ga. 289 ( 276 S.E.2d 5) (1981); Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219 ( 275 S.E.2d 29) (1981); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119 ( 274 S.E.2d 549) (1981); Cape v. State, 246 Ga. 520 ( 272 S.E.2d 487) (1980); Thomas v. State, 245 Ga. 688 ( 266 S.E.2d 499) (1980); Hardy v. State, 245 Ga. 272 ( 264 S.E.2d 209) (1980); Hamilton v. State, 244 Ga. 145 ( 259 S.E.2d 81) (1979); Bowen v. State, 244 Ga. 495 ( 260 S.E.2d 855) (1979); Johnson v. State, 242 Ga. 649 ( 250 S.E.2d 394) (1978); Alderman v. State, 241 Ga. 496 ( 246 S.E.2d 642) (1978); Morgan v. State, 241 Ga. 485 ( 246 S.E.2d 198) (1978); Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292 ( 236 S.E.2d 637) (1977); Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209 ( 232 S.E.2d 47) (1977); Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718 ( 230 S.E.2d 1) (1976). SMITH, Presiding Justice.
Cases selected for comparison include those involving a death sentence or those involving a life sentence for domestic homicides, that is, where the victim was a girlfriend, spouse or ex-spouse of the perpetrator or a relative of the girlfriend, spouse or ex-spouse. As we noted in Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 126 ( 274 S.E.2d 549) (1981), "although lesser sentences than death are frequently imposed in domestic murder cases, it does not follow that the death penalty would not be authorized for the murder of one spouse by another under any circumstances," citing Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209 ( 232 S.E.2d 47) (1977). Some of the most vicious homicides have been perpetrated by family members against one another.
While this is a domestic case, "[t]he statute does not forbid imposition of the death penalty upon marital murderers; it merely requires that [a] statutory aggravating [circumstance] exist[s]." Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209, 216 ( 232 S.E.2d 47) (1977). This case is distinguishable from the recent United States Supreme Court case of Godfrey v. Georgia, supra.
Under this statute, "if the facts are given on which opinions are based, laymen are competent to give opinions on a person's mental condition." Moreland , 356 Ga. App. at 454 (1), 847 S.E.2d 641 (citation and punctuation omitted); see also generally Dix v. State , 238 Ga. 209, 213 (2), 232 S.E.2d 47 (1977) (observing that the Supreme Court of Georgia "has repeatedly held that a person's state of mind or mental condition is properly the subject of opinion testimony and that after narrating the facts and circumstances upon which his conclusion is based, a nonexpert witness may express his opinion as to the state of mind or mental condition of another"). Decisions addressing prior versions of the Evidence Code properly may bear on the construction of OCGA § 24-7-702.
We note, however, that the Harris case apparently did not involve "torture" in this sense.See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 240 Ga. 393, 242 S.E.2d 1 (1977); Stanley v. State, 240 Ga. 341; 241 S.E.2d 173 (1977); Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209, 232 S.E.2d 47 (1977); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815, 225 S.E.2d 248 (1976); McCorquodale v. State, supra. The Georgia courts did not, however, so limit § (b)(7) in the present case.
See also Bly v. State, 283 Ga. 453(1), 660 S.E.2d 713 (2008). A person's state of mind or mental condition is properly the subject of opinion testimony after the facts and circumstances upon which the opinion is based are stated. Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209(2), 232 S.E.2d 47 (1977). The trial court did not err when it allowed the testimony.
APPENDIX. Newland v. State, 258 Ga. 172 ( 366 S.E.2d 689) (1988); Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715 ( 352 S.E.2d 762) (1987); Hance v. State, 254 Ga. 575 ( 332 S.E.2d 287) (1985) (see factual statement in Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856 ( 268 S.E.2d 339) (1980)); Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113 ( 303 S.E.2d 266) (1983); Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 228 (7) ( 290 S.E.2d 43) (1982); Krier v. State, 249 Ga. 80 ( 287 S.E.2d 531) (1982); Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 558 (9) ( 284 S.E.2d 390) (1981): Cape v. State, 246 Ga. 520 ( 272 S.E.2d 487) (1980); Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209 ( 232 S.E.2d 47) (1977). SMITH, Presiding Justice.
APPENDIX.Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715 ( 352 S.E.2d 762) (1987); Hance v. State, 254 Ga. 575 ( 332 S.E.2d 287) (1985) (see factual statement in Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856 ( 268 S.E.2d 339) (1980)); Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113 ( 303 S.E.2d 266) (1983); Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 228 (7) ( 290 S.E.2d 43) (1982); Krier v. State, 249 Ga. 80 ( 287 S.E.2d 531) (1982); Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 558 (9) ( 284 S.E.2d 390) (1981); Cape v. State, 246 Ga. 520 ( 272 S.E.2d 487) (1980); Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209 ( 232 S.E.2d 47) (1977).
There was no need to charge that the inference could be rebutted and absent a request, "the court's failure to define the meaning of terms used in the charge is not ordinarily ground for reversal. [Cits.]" Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209, 215 ( 232 S.E.2d 47) (1977). We find no error.