Div. of Youth Fam. Serv. v. P.M

6 Citing cases

  1. Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner

    478 N.J. Super. 426 (App. Div. 2024)

    The Chancery court held In the Matter of K.L.F., 275 N.J. Super. 507, 511, 646 A.2d 532 (Ch. Div. 1993), that N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 applies to governmental bodies. Almost four years later, another Chancery court reached a contrary result in Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.M., 301 N.J. Super. 80, 82, 693 A.2d 941 (Ch. Div. 1997). The Borough cites P.M. to support its immunity contention.

  2. Cliffs v. Trautner

    478 N.J. Super. 426 (App. Div. 2024)

    The Chancery court held In the Matter of K.L.F., 275 N.J. Super. 507, 511, 646 A.2d 532 (Ch. Div. 1993), that N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 applies to governmental bodies. Almost four years later, another Chancery court reached a contrary result in Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.M., 301 N.J. Super. 80, 82, 693 A.2d 941 (Ch. Div. 1997). The Borough cites P.M. to support its immunity contention.

  3. Everest v. Newark Div. of Tax Abate

    18 N.J. Tax 50 (Tax 1998)   Cited 4 times
    Awarding litigation costs against the defendant under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-22 after finding that the defendant had "no basis in law or fact" for opposing the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 66

    Plaintiff argues that, under either N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 ( L. 1988, c. 46, the "frivolous litigation statute") or N.J.S.A. 54:51A-22, the State Tax Uniform Procedure Law, it is entitled to attorneys' fees. Sometimes referred to as the Frivolous Pleading Statute, Matter of K.L.F., 275 N.J.Super. 507, 511, 646 A.2d 532 (Ch.Div. 1993); sometimes referred to as the frivolous litigation statute, Div. of Youth Family Services v. P.M., 301 N.J.Super. 80, 82, 693 A.2d 941 (Ch.Div. 1997); Iannone v. McHale, 245 N.J.Super. 17, 21, 583 A.2d 770 (App.Div. 1990). In New Jersey, the general rule is that attorneys' fees are not authorized without specific statutory authority.

  4. Toll Bros., v. Tp. of West Windsor

    190 N.J. 61 (N.J. 2007)   Cited 66 times
    Concluding that "[i]f the court determines that compliance was practicable from the time ordinarily required under the Rule, relief may be denied in its entirety"

    The court denied the Akselrads' motion for counsel fees and costs, finding that the Township was immune from frivolous litigation sanctions. Relying on Division of Youth Family Services v.P.M., 301 N.J.Super. 80, 693 A.2d 941 (Ch.Div. 1997), the court reasoned that public entities like the Township cannot be "nonprevailing person[s]" under N.J.S.A. 2A: 15-59.1 and therefore cannot have counsel fees and costs awarded against them. The court summarily denied the Township's cross-motion for sanctions and advised the parties to put their differences to rest.

  5. Matter of the Adoption of a Child by W.P. and M.P

    163 N.J. 158 (N.J. 2000)   Cited 78 times
    Granting substantial deference to "the position of the Division of Youth and Family Services ..., which intervened as amicus curiae in this interlocutory appeal" to express its interpretation of the Grandparent Visitation Statute -- an enactment falling within its area of expertise

    The presumption of validity is especially strong here in light of the similar subject matter and common purpose of both statutes — protecting the best interests of children. Cf.In reReturn of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 115 (1997) (reading two provisions of Domestic Violence Act together to determine Legislature's intent); F W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 276 N.J. Super. 519, 525-26 (App.Div. 1994) (harmonizing New Jersey Development District Act and Municipal Land Use Law to share "common purpose" of control of traffic); Division of Youth Family Servs. v. P.M., 301 N.J. Super. 80, 90 (Ch.Div. 1997) (holding that courts must "construe together all existing statutes on the same subject matter," particularly when statutes address similar problems). Statutes that deal with the same matter or subject should be read in pari materia and construed together as a "unitary and harmonious whole."

  6. In the Matter of Farnkopf

    363 N.J. Super. 382 (App. Div. 2003)   Cited 31 times
    Finding a counsel fee award time-barred where motion for fees was not filed until four months after dismissal

    N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 expressly states that a prevailing "party" may be awarded counsel fees if the pleading of the non — prevailing "person" was frivolous. We note but need not resolve the conflict between Matter of K.L.F., 275 N.J. Super. 507 (Ch.Div. 1993) and Div. of Youth Fam. Serv. v. P.M., 301 N.J. Super. 80 (Ch.Div. 1997) as to whether a public body (in those cases, the Division of Youth and Family Services) may be found to be a non-prevailing "person." For these reasons, we find that the order in question cannot be justified by reference to either R.1:4-8 or N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.