The Chancery court held In the Matter of K.L.F., 275 N.J. Super. 507, 511, 646 A.2d 532 (Ch. Div. 1993), that N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 applies to governmental bodies. Almost four years later, another Chancery court reached a contrary result in Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.M., 301 N.J. Super. 80, 82, 693 A.2d 941 (Ch. Div. 1997). The Borough cites P.M. to support its immunity contention.
The Chancery court held In the Matter of K.L.F., 275 N.J. Super. 507, 511, 646 A.2d 532 (Ch. Div. 1993), that N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 applies to governmental bodies. Almost four years later, another Chancery court reached a contrary result in Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.M., 301 N.J. Super. 80, 82, 693 A.2d 941 (Ch. Div. 1997). The Borough cites P.M. to support its immunity contention.
Plaintiff argues that, under either N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 ( L. 1988, c. 46, the "frivolous litigation statute") or N.J.S.A. 54:51A-22, the State Tax Uniform Procedure Law, it is entitled to attorneys' fees. Sometimes referred to as the Frivolous Pleading Statute, Matter of K.L.F., 275 N.J.Super. 507, 511, 646 A.2d 532 (Ch.Div. 1993); sometimes referred to as the frivolous litigation statute, Div. of Youth Family Services v. P.M., 301 N.J.Super. 80, 82, 693 A.2d 941 (Ch.Div. 1997); Iannone v. McHale, 245 N.J.Super. 17, 21, 583 A.2d 770 (App.Div. 1990). In New Jersey, the general rule is that attorneys' fees are not authorized without specific statutory authority.
The court denied the Akselrads' motion for counsel fees and costs, finding that the Township was immune from frivolous litigation sanctions. Relying on Division of Youth Family Services v.P.M., 301 N.J.Super. 80, 693 A.2d 941 (Ch.Div. 1997), the court reasoned that public entities like the Township cannot be "nonprevailing person[s]" under N.J.S.A. 2A: 15-59.1 and therefore cannot have counsel fees and costs awarded against them. The court summarily denied the Township's cross-motion for sanctions and advised the parties to put their differences to rest.
The presumption of validity is especially strong here in light of the similar subject matter and common purpose of both statutes — protecting the best interests of children. Cf.In reReturn of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 115 (1997) (reading two provisions of Domestic Violence Act together to determine Legislature's intent); F W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 276 N.J. Super. 519, 525-26 (App.Div. 1994) (harmonizing New Jersey Development District Act and Municipal Land Use Law to share "common purpose" of control of traffic); Division of Youth Family Servs. v. P.M., 301 N.J. Super. 80, 90 (Ch.Div. 1997) (holding that courts must "construe together all existing statutes on the same subject matter," particularly when statutes address similar problems). Statutes that deal with the same matter or subject should be read in pari materia and construed together as a "unitary and harmonious whole."
N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 expressly states that a prevailing "party" may be awarded counsel fees if the pleading of the non — prevailing "person" was frivolous. We note but need not resolve the conflict between Matter of K.L.F., 275 N.J. Super. 507 (Ch.Div. 1993) and Div. of Youth Fam. Serv. v. P.M., 301 N.J. Super. 80 (Ch.Div. 1997) as to whether a public body (in those cases, the Division of Youth and Family Services) may be found to be a non-prevailing "person." For these reasons, we find that the order in question cannot be justified by reference to either R.1:4-8 or N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.