Dist. #8, Int. Ass. of Mach. v. Grindmaster Crathco Sys.

Full title: DISTRICT NO. 8, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, AFL-CIO…

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

Date published: Sep 23, 2002

02 C 4346 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 23, 2002)

Opinion

02 C 4346

September 23, 2002

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BLANCHE M. MANNING, United States District Judge.

District No. 8, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO ("the Union") seeks to confirm an arbitration award against Grindmaster Crathco Systems, Inc. ("Grindmaster") pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1; et seq., ("the FAA") and the Labor-Management Relations Act 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("the LMRA"). Confirmation turns, in part, on whether the Union properly served Grindmaster. For the following reasons, the court finds that the Union did not do so, so its motion is denied without prejudice.

Discussion

Grindmaster, which manufactures coffee grinding and brewing equipment, employs members of the Union. The Union and Grindmaster entered into a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") which contained an arbitration clause. The parties entered into arbitration when the Union claimed that Grindmaster had failed to increase certain employees' base pay as required by the CIBA. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the Union, and the Union filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award, claiming that Grindmaster failed to comply with the award.

The Union noticed up its motion and sewed a copy of the motion on Grindmaster's counsel pursuant to the court's rules. The FAA provides for service "as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion," 9 U.S.C. § 6, so all appears to be in order. Grindmaster, however, contends that the LMRA's service requirements apply. If so, the Union was required to file its motion as it would file a separate law suit and obtain service in conformance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. According to Grindmaster, the Union's service was defective, so the court lacks jurisdiction to confirm the award.

The LMRA, rather than the FAA, "confers the jurisdictional basis and corresponding source of law" for an action seeking enforcement of an arbitration award. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 135 v. Jefferson Trucking Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1980). Thus, "[in] seeking to confirm an arbitration award created by virtue of a collective bargaining agreement, recourse is to the LMRA, not the FAA." Cleveland v. Porca Co., 38 F.3d 289, 296 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1994), quoting Martin v. Youngstown Sheet Tube Co., 911 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990).

So, what happens when the court has jurisdiction pursuant to two federal statutes (here, the FAA and the LMRA)? The Seventh Circuit has harmonized the statutes by regarding the FAA as a "prescription of procedures for a class of cases otherwise within federal jurisdiction," as opposed to a competing source of jurisdiction. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co v. Thosen Tractor Equipment, 109 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, in Pryner, the parties disputed whether the limitations period in the FAA or the LMRA applied. The court differentiated between procedural and substantive matters. Id. It then found that the FAA governed substance and the LMRA governed procedure. Id.

This would seem to spell victory for the Union, because service of process is procedural, not substantive. The fly in the ointment, however, is that the FAA can only be used in LMRA actions when doing so does not create any tension with the LMRA or the common law of collective bargaining agreements. Id. The LRMA and the FAA each have their own service requirements. The LMRA postdates the FAA and an implied repeal of portions of the FAA is disfavored unless there is no way to reconcile the two statutes. Id. at 358. There is no way to reconcile the two methods of service here, so the LMRA's method controls.

This all may well be a tempest in a teapot, however, because there doesn't seem to be a good reason why the Union cannot simply serve its motion in conformance with Rule 4. Indeed, the Union is still within the 120 days specified by Rule 4(m). The court makes no pronouncement on the propriety of such a procedure, but simply brings it to the parties' attention. The court also notes that jurisdiction under both the FAA and the LMRA is proper; failure to serve a complaint properly does not divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

For now, however, the court will limit its holding to the FAA/LMRA issue. For the above reasons, the LMRA's service rules trump the FAA's service rules. Because the Union did not effect service in accordance with Rule 4, the court cannot reach the merits at this time.

Conclusion

The Union's motion to confirm [2-1] is denied without prejudice.