• 3 Courts in Illinois and elsewhere appear divided as to whether a self-defense instruction is proper when a defendant testifies that a homicide or battery was accidental. ( E.g., compare People v. Tanthorey (1949), 404 Ill. 520, 89 N.E.2d 403 (instruction refused), with People v. Brooks (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 747, 474 N.E.2d 1287, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 556 (instruction given); see generally Annot., 15 A.L.R.4th 983 (1982); see also Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 620 (1974).) The question has been posed in a more limited alternative form: whether such an instruction is proper when not only the defendant testifies to accident but also no other evidence of self-defense is in the record.

People v. Bell, 132 Ill.App.3d 354, 87 Ill.Dec. 247, 476 N.E.2d 1239 (1st Dist. 1985). Justice Pincham dissented. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, 106 Ill.2d 556 (1985), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Bell v. Illinois, 474 U.S. 852, 106 S.Ct. 153, 88 L.Ed.2d 127 (1985). Petitioners thereafter sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court.

Absent a finding of plain error affecting defendant's right to a fair trial, any impropriety must thus be deemed waived. People v. Struck (1985), 136 Ill. App.3d 842, 845-46, 483 N.E.2d 1047, appeal denied (1986), 111 Ill.2d 578; People v. Piscotti (1985), 136 Ill. App.3d 420, 440, 483 N.E.2d 363; People v. Carter (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 1076, 1081, 473 N.E.2d 434, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 556. • 6 Review of the trial record discloses that a fundamental facet of defendant's theory of the case was his argument that the prosecution against him was based on Detective David Day's alleged vendetta against former convicts.

Thus it has often been held that one who accepts any of the benefits of a divorce decree, including the right to remarry, is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the court over either the person or the subject matter of the decree. ( Grimm v. Grimm (1922), 302 Ill. 511, 514, 135 N.E. 19 (subject matter jurisdiction); In re Marriage of Passiales (1986), 144 Ill. App.3d 629, 634, 494 N.E.2d 541, appeal denied (1986), 113 Ill.2d 30 (subject matter jurisdiction); Pierotti v. Pierotti (1951), 343 Ill. App. 116, 131, 98 N.E.2d 875 (personal jurisdiction); see also In re Marriageof Paulius (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 343, 348, 475 N.E.2d 1006, 1010, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 556 (attributing the legal origin of estoppel by remarriage to a "commingl[ing]" of concepts of equitable estoppel and ratification).) "`[T]he rule is well and generally settled that one who accepts the benefits and privileges of a divorce decree by a remarriage, even though the decree be void for want of jurisdiction, is estopped from thereafter assailing such decree.

The record here shows that the assertive conduct of certain persons conveyed their belief that defendant had committed the arsons, which assuredly had a prejudicial effect on the jury's determination of defendant's guilt. See also People v. Meredith (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 1065, 405 N.E.2d 1306, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill.2d 597; People v. Jones (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 896, 329 N.E.2d 855; cf. People v. Carter (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 1076, 473 N.E.2d 434, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 556. In our opinion the cumulative prejudicial impact of the trial errors noted above was sufficient to entitle defendant to a new trial.

Defendant Fort, then, faced the untenable position of defending himself against both the State and codefendant Cannon. The State seeks to analogize this case to People v. Cole (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 36, 475 N.E.2d 620, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 556, and People v. Lee (1981), 87 Ill.2d 182, 429 N.E.2d 461. Both of those cases are distinguishable.

96, 405, 396 N.E.2d 812, cert. denied (1980), 445 U.S. 929, 63 L.Ed.2d 762, 100 S.Ct. 1316; People v. Martin (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 590, 592, 464 N.E.2d 837, appeal denied (1984), 101 Ill.2d 573; People v. Marshall (1981), 101 Ill. App.3d 244, 246-47, 427 N.E.2d 1333, appeal denied (1982), 88 Ill.2d 553; People v. Jensen (1976), 37 Ill. App.3d 1010, 1014, 347 N.E.2d 371; People v. Gonzales (1970), 125 Ill. App.2d 225, 232, 260 N.E.2d 234, appeal denied (1970), 43 Ill.2d 397; People v. Brown (1964), 54 Ill. App.2d 450, 454, 203 N.E.2d 784.) Nor has the legislature seen fit to expand the parameters of the entrapment defense. As it is the function of this court to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent and not second-guess the plain meaning of a legislative enactment ( People v. Agnew (1985), 105 Ill.2d 275, 279, 473 N.E.2d 1319; People v. Richardson (1984), 104 Ill.2d 8, 15, 470 N.E.2d 1024; People v. Carlyle (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 205, 208, 474 N.E.2d 9, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 556), we find no basis upon which to expand the rule to include conduct by one who is not acting as a government agent. • 2 Defendant next asserts Odein was, in fact, acting as a police agent in this matter.

In the instant case, the antagonism which existed at trial was not the result of inconsistent defenses, but rather, concerned codefendants' pretrial statements, in which Hart asserted that Wolfe was responsible for the murders and Wolfe claimed that it was Hart who did the shooting. The jury was properly instructed, however, to only use each defendants' statement against the defendant who made that confession. Under similar circumstances, the court in People v. Cole (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 36, 475 N.E.2d 620, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 556, found that no severance was required. We reach the same conclusion here. While we note that defendant Wolfe's testimony did include an allegedly self-incriminating statement made by Hart, we do not believe that the possible antagonism resulting from this statement warrants a different result, in light of defendants' own confessions, as well as the other evidence linking both defendants to the crime.

( Housing Authority v. YMCA (1984), 101 Ill.2d 246, 251; Fearon v. Mobil Joliet Refining Corp. (1984), 131 Ill. App.3d 1, 6, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554.) The doctrine is based on the principle that the law grants every man an opportunity to present his case on the issues in question, but requires him to put forth all grounds of recovery he has. Pedigo v. Johnson (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 392, 395, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 556; Pratt v. Baker (1967), 79 Ill. App.2d 479, 485, cert. denied (1967), 389 U.S. 874, 19 L.Ed.2d 157, 88 S.Ct. 165. This principle of finality applies not only to questions which were actually litigated in the earlier proceeding, but extends also to those questions which could have been raised or determined. ( Spiller v. Continental Tube Co. (1983), 95 Ill.2d 423, 432; Old Orchard Bank Trust Co. v. Levin (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 443, 446; Bond v. Dunmire (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 796, 800; Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hospital Medical Center (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 93, 99, appeal denied (1984), 96 Ill.2d 568.) Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment in a prior suit may be conclusive as to all questions which could have been litigated in that action.