Opinion
1983.
(58119) Trilla v. Mercantile National Bank ......................... Denied.
(58177) Trustees of Schools of Township 41 North, Range 12 East of the Third Principal Meridian v. Olsen ............ Denied.
(58237) Waters v. City of Chicago .................................. Denied.
(58157) Well Done Heating Sheet Metal Co. v. Ralph Schwartz Associates .................................... Denied.
(58192) Zieger v. Manhattan Coffee Co. ............................. Denied.
Roti v. Rush 94 Ill.2d 558 Roti v. Washington 94 Ill.2d 558 create any liability against a city which provide for the expenditure or appropriation of its money i.e. and administration APPENDIX
The following is the text of Justice Simon's dissent from the orders entered in (1983), , and (1983), , upon denial of the petitions for leave to appeal.
JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting:
The disposition of this appeal leaves unresolved a significant legal issue relating to the extent of the veto authority of mayors of Illinois cities. I believe there is good reason to reverse the appellate court on this point. In addition, the appeal arises in the context of a bitter dispute between aldermen who have aligned themselves thus far either with the plaintiffs (29 aldermen) or the intervenors (21 aldermen), the mayor being supported by the latter bloc. This is the closest division on the question of organization of a newly elected Chicago city council which has existed in at least three decades and probably much longer. On a practical level, the court's denial does nothing to further the resolution of this disagreement which, in my judgment, gives every sign of continuing indefinitely. Many predict that this dispute will cripple the process of government in Chicago.
The relevant veto authority is set forth in section 3-11-18 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 24, par. 3-11-18). It reads:
"Sec. 3-11-18. All resolutions and motions (1) which , or (2) , or (3) to sell any city or school property, and all ordinances, passed by the city council shall be deposited with the city clerk. If the mayor approves of them, he shall sign them. Those of
which he disapproves he shall return to the city council, with his written objections, at the next regular meeting of the city council occurring not less than 5 days after their passage. The mayor may disapprove of any one or more sums appropriated in any ordinance, resolution, or motion making an appropriation, and, if so, the remainder shall be effective." (Emphasis added.)
The question which therefore must be answered in this case is not simply whether a resolution actually appropriates money, the question on which the appellate court appeared to concentrate, but whether it "creates a liability" against the city — which can happen with or without an appropriation or an expenditure of funds so long as a debt is incurred — or "provide[s] for" (, prepares for, permits, arranges for, or creates the basis for) an expenditure of city money. The reason for allowing a mayor to veto such resolutions is to permit him to exercise supervisory control over municipal finances, subject to the clearly expressed will of his constituents as manifested by the two-thirds vote of the city council which is needed to override mayors' vetoes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 24, par. 3-11-19). Without the added voice that a veto gives him, a mayor would have no greater say in matters related to city finances, liabilities or expenditures which are passed by resolution or motion than a single alderman (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 24, par. 3-11-17), even though such a resolution may have a profound impact on the way in which financial matters are handled in the city. This is at odds with the fundamental concept that the mayor must take the lead in policing the finances of a city.
(Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 24, par. 3-11-8- the mayor "shall have the responsibility for the preparation of the annual budget of the municipality" (emphasis added).) It is especially important in this era of limited public resources that a central authority have the power to supervise this process.
The city council on May 2, 1983, passed five resolutions, two of which Mayor Washington later purported to veto.
The question to be answered is whether his veto, which has not been overridden by the city council, was authorized by the above-quoted statute. One of the resolutions adopted certain rules of order for the city council for 1983-87. Among these rules is one which creates standing committees, including a Finance Committee (Rule 35), and one which provides that the chairman of each standing committee or his designate has the sole responsibility for approving vouchers and payrolls (Rule 36). The other resolution which was vetoed appointed the committee members and in particular named Alderman Edward Burke chairman of the Finance Committee. Whether these vetoes were valid exercises of the mayor's authority under the Illinois Municipal Code deserves fuller treatment than the appellate court gave this question.
My view is that the resolution by which Alderman Burke assumed chairmanship of the Finance Committee was subject to veto. Under the Municipal Code of Chicago the chairman of the Finance Committee is to receive a salary of $31,400 — $3,800 more than the salary of the other aldermen.
(Municipal Code of Chicago, sec. 4-2 (1982).) Upon his selection as Finance Committee chairman, this additional salary became a "liability" due and owing by the city of Chicago to Alderman Burke and payable out of the appropriation provided for by the 1983 appropriation ordinance adopted at the end of 1982. This liability will continue for 1984, 1985 and 1986 and a portion of 1987. Sooner or later the city will have to appropriate funds to pay for this perquisite in 1984 and later years as in the case of any other debt. It makes little sense to say that the veto was premature and the mayor should have waited until Alderman Burke was actually paid when the act of designating him as chairman, by itself, entitled him to payment, thus creating the liability against the city.
The veto of the resolution which adopted these rules of order was proper for another reason. At least two of these
rules "provided for" expenditures of money belonging to the city. "Provide" is defined as "to afford * * * to arrange for * * * to take measures with due foresight * * *." (The Random House College Dictionary 1065 (rev. ed. 1975).) Rule 36, which gives the Finance Committee chairman and the chairmen of the other standing committees or their designates the unilateral authority to approve vouchers and payrolls, is a significant power from the standpoint of determining and arranging for what and who should get paid. In fact, Alderman Burke in a letter dated May 17, 1983, informed the acting city comptroller of Chicago that all disbursements of city funds which his predecessor purported to authorize after May 2 were not to be honored. Rule 35, by creating 29 standing committees (16 of which had existed under the rules that were in effect between 1979 and 1983), was the vehicle whereby preexisting appropriations included in the 1983 city budget for the "old" committees could be expended rather than being permitted to lapse and revert to the city treasury, thereby reducing the city's deficit. As I view it, the establishment of these committees and the designation of a chairman for each of them provided for the expenditure of city funds. The device for expending funds designated for operation of the council committees adopted by the vetoed rules was to name committee chairmen and authorize them to spend funds appropriated by the city budget for committee operations by signing vouchers and payrolls. Limiting the statutory language "provide for the expenditure" to an actual payout of funds is an unnecessarily narrow construction.
I have no problem with anything else that is said in the appellate court opinion. However, the question involving the scope of the veto power which this case raises is a trouble-some one which may come before the courts again. I respectfully suggest that this court would have avoided recurrence of the question of the scope of a mayor's veto authority had it granted leave to appeal at least on this issue.
I also respectfully suggest that because the underlying dispute involves the governance of the nation's second largest city, it is of great public interest and importance and merits the further attention of this court. For these reasons, I dissent.