Therefore, the circuit court's decision to dismiss the amended petition without an evidentiary hearing was not manifestly erroneous because there was no evidence to support the claim that counsel was addicted to cocaine at the time of trial. (See People v. Mendez (1991), 221 111. App. 3d 868, 872-73, 582 N.E.2d 1265, appeal denied (1992), 143 Ill.2d 644, 587 N.E.2d 1021; People v. Jackson (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 806, 812, 572 N.E.2d 475, appeal denied (1991), 141 Ill. 2d 551, 580 N.E.2d 125; People v. Pittman (1989), 192 Ill. App.3d 943, 950, 549 N.E.2d 742, appeal denied (1990), 131 Ill.2d 564, 553 N.E.2d 400.) Even if there were evidence supporting the allegation, however, the allegation would fail both prongs of the Strickland test, because counsel's representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and defendant was not prejudiced even if it did.
See also People v. Barnhill (1989), 188 Ill. App.3d 299, 309, appeal denied (1990), 129 Ill.2d 566 (interpreting section 5-8-1(a)(1)(b), "these words are sufficiently indicative of the type of murder which warrants a sentence of natural life imprisonment and are not unconstitutionally vague on their face"); People v. Fyke (1989), 190 Ill. App.3d 713, 722 (applying the rule in Barnhill to section 5-5-3.2(b)(2)); People v. Page (1990), 193 Ill. App.3d 467, 472, appeal denied (1990), 131 Ill.2d 564 ("Section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) is not unconstitutionally vague in nondeath penalty cases").) Accordingly, we find that section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections is not unconstitutionally vague.
1) are so interrelated as to require suppression of evidence in a DUI prosecution solely because such evidence was statutorily invalidated for purposes of the summary suspension proceedings. In another context, that question was recently answered in the negative by the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court ( People v. Giere (2d Dist. 1989), 192 Ill. App.3d 520, 548 N.E.2d 1104, appeal denied (1990), 131 Ill.2d 562) and in the affirmative by this district ( People v. Monckton (3d Dist. 1989), 191 Ill. App.3d 106, 547 N.E.2d 673, appeal denied (1990), 131 Ill.2d 564). At issue in Monckton and Giere was whether a breath test taken without defendant's voluntary consent as required for purposes of the summary suspension provision tainted the test result for purposes of a subsequent DUI prosecution. In Monckton this court rejected its own precedent in People v. Eaves (3d Dist. 1988), 174 Ill. App.3d 911, 529 N.E.2d 277, ruling that "[a]dmission of the result in either the summary suspension hearing or the DUI trial would defeat the legislature's objective of allowing a defendant to make a knowing and voluntary decision regarding the test."