• 1, 2 Estoppel generally refers to reliance by one party on the words or conduct of another such that the first party changes his position and suffers harm as a result. ( Gary-Wheaton Bank v. Meyer (1984), 130 Ill. App.3d 87, 95-96, 473 N.E.2d 548, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554.) To establish an estoppel in an insurance policy context, an insured must show: (1) that he was misled by the acts or statements of the insurer or its agent; (2) reliance by the insured on those representations; (3) that such reliance was reasonable; and (4) detriment or prejudice suffered by the insured based upon that reliance.

Even assuming that Sgt. Levon may have believed the plaintiff needed training, for the purpose of the special duty exception to the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 85, par. 4-102), a public employee's actual notice of another's need for protection is not determinative of a finding of direct and immediate control. The determinative factor is whether the public official was responsible for the occurrence which gave rise to the need for protection. (See, e.g., Jackson v. Chicago Firefighters Union, Local No. 2 (1987), 160 Ill. App.3d 975, 513 N.E.2d 1002; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 505, 475 N.E.2d 960 appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554.) Clearly the City was not responsible for the circumstances that caused the injury to plaintiff, nor was a police officer in the vicinity when the injury occurred. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff failed to allege sufficiently the special duty exception.

The Consumer Fraud Act is not intended to provide a redundant remedy to redress a private wrong. ( Grass v. Homann (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 874, 880, 474 N.E.2d 711, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554; Frahm v. Urkovich (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 580, 586, 447 N.E.2d 1007, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 539; Exchange National Bank v. Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 212, 216, 438 N.E.2d 1247, appeal denied (1982), 92 Ill.2d 568.) In each of the above cases, the plaintiff brought action to redress an alleged wrong that arose in the course of one-to-one transactions between plaintiff and defendant.

• 2, 3 Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in entering judgment for defendant under the doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel refers to the reliance by one party on the word or conduct of another whereby the party changes its position and subsequently suffers harm. It arises whenever one by his conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe and have confidence in certain material facts, and, the latter having the right to do so, relies and acts thereon, and is, as a reasonable and inevitable consequence, misled to his injury. ( Gary-Wheaton Bank v. Meyer (1984), 130 Ill. App.3d 87, 95-96, 473 N.E.2d 548, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554; Wilson v. Illinois Benedictine College (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 932, 939, 445 N.E.2d 901.) The doctrine was developed to prevent a party from asserting rights where the assertion of those rights would work a fraud or an injustice on the other party. Launius v. Najman (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 498, 504, 472 N.E.2d 170, appeal denied (1985), 102 Ill.2d 554; Martin Brothers Implement Co. v. Diepholz (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 283, 288, 400 N.E.2d 320, appeal denied (1982), 92 Ill.2d 568.

• 1, 2 We conclude that the decision and rationale stated in In re Day are dispositive of the issue in this case: "Respondents rely principally on the recent decision of this court in In re Crouch (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 694, 476 N.E.2d 69, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554, for the proposition that failure to notify a known respondent in a juvenile proceeding results in the failure to properly invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction and that all orders of the trial court are voidable. This argument is based on the three-judge plurality and four-judge majority decisions of the supreme court to that effect in People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77, 445 N.E.2d 293 (Goldenhersh, J., specially concurring), and People v. R.S. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 1, 470 N.E.2d 297 (Goldenhersh, J., specially concurring), respectively.

Although Liberis may have witnessed a crime, neither he nor the city can be held liable for his failure to prevent the commission of a crime or his failure to arrest Linda Liberis. See Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 505, 506, 475 N.E.2d 960, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Authority (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 172, 176, 446 N.E.2d 1183, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 541; Nieder v. Gacy (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 854, 856, 460 N.E.2d 342; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, par. 4-102. Plaintiff has cited to various unsigned and unsworn statements purporting to show that Liberis announced that he was a police officer. Such statements cannot be considered in reviewing a motion for summary judgment.

The case of Day is the only case specifically on all fours with the instant case. The Day decision relies principally on the decision in In re Crouch (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 694, 476 N.E.2d 69, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554. In the case of Crouch, the reviewing court relied principally upon the supreme court case of People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77, 445 N.E.2d 293 (Goldenhersh, J., specially concurring, Simon, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, J.).

Defendant's motion for summary judgment does not, therefore, fail merely because it was not verified. • 2, 3 Summary judgment is properly granted only where there is no genuine issue of material fact ( Thompson v. Webb (1985), 138 Ill. App.3d 629, 631, 486 N.E.2d 326; Fearon v. Mobil Joliet Refining Corp. (1984), 131 Ill. App.3d 1, 5, 475 N.E.2d 549, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554), and this is to be determined from the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file in each case ( Heman v. Jefferson (1985), 136 Ill. App.3d 745, 752, 483 N.E.2d 537; In re Estate of Myers (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 726, 730-31, 458 N.E.2d 1102, appeal denied (1984), 101 Ill.2d 546). Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence, when construed most strongly against the moving party, establishes clearly and with no doubt his right thereto. Rambert v. Advance Construction Co. (1985), 134 Ill. App.3d 155, 157-58, 479 N.E.2d 1007, appeal denied (1985), 108 Ill.2d 586; Becovic v. Harris Trust Savings Bank (1984), 128 Ill. App.3d 107, 113, 469 N.E.2d 1379.

• 1 The village contends the August 4, 1981, order is void because (1) of lack of jurisdiction, (2) of vagueness, (3) the court's determination that a subdivision ordinance was inapplicable to Holiday Park's construction was not made in the decretal portion of its order, and (4) the court improperly awarded injunctive relief rather than a writ of mandamus. We first note that, although the village failed to appeal from the August 4, 1981, order within 30 days, or within 2 years, under section 2-1401(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2-1401(c)), a petition attacking a judgment as void may be brought at any time. ( In re Crouch (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 694, 697, 476 N.E.2d 69, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554; Village of Franklin Park v. Ogilvie (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 301, 303, 435 N.E.2d 1177; Augsburg v. Frank's Car Wash, Inc. (1982), 103 Ill. App.3d 329, 332-33, 431 N.E.2d 58.) Accordingly, we will consider the village's appeal from the August 4, 1981, order. • 2 The village first argues the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the August 4, 1981, order because more than 30 days had elapsed from its final order of April 15, 1980.

That doctrine provides that "a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action." ( Housing Authority v. YMCA (1984), 101 Ill.2d 246, 251; Fearon v. Mobil Joliet Refining Corp. (1984), 131 Ill. App.3d 1, 6, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554.) The doctrine is based on the principle that the law grants every man an opportunity to present his case on the issues in question, but requires him to put forth all grounds of recovery he has. Pedigo v. Johnson (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 392, 395, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 556; Pratt v. Baker (1967), 79 Ill. App.2d 479, 485, cert. denied (1967), 389 U.S. 874, 19 L.Ed.2d 157, 88 S.Ct. 165.