The courts have accordingly barred parties from bringing suit on issues that could have been raised, but were not, in an earlier proceeding. See Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hospital Medical Center (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 93, 99, 454 N.E.2d 684, appeal denied (1984), 96 Ill.2d 568; Redfern v. Sullivan (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 372, 375, 444 N.E.2d 205; Yaw v. Beeghly (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 627, 632, 440 N.E.2d 1066. On August 4, 1981, the circuit court considered the applicability of various ordinances to the development of the mobile-home site and concluded that Holiday Park's plan of development of the site met the requirements of all applicable ordinances and statutes.
The doctrine is based on the principle that the law grants every man an opportunity to present his case on the issues in question, but requires him to put forth all grounds of recovery he has. Pedigo v. Johnson (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 392, 395, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 556; Pratt v. Baker (1967), 79 Ill. App.2d 479, 485, cert. denied (1967), 389 U.S. 874, 19 L.Ed.2d 157, 88 S.Ct. 165. This principle of finality applies not only to questions which were actually litigated in the earlier proceeding, but extends also to those questions which could have been raised or determined. ( Spiller v. Continental Tube Co. (1983), 95 Ill.2d 423, 432; Old Orchard Bank Trust Co. v. Levin (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 443, 446; Bond v. Dunmire (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 796, 800; Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hospital Medical Center (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 93, 99, appeal denied (1984), 96 Ill.2d 568.) Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment in a prior suit may be conclusive as to all questions which could have been litigated in that action. Yaw v. Beeghly (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 627, 632; Thornton v. Williams (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 544, 546.
The Mundelein ordinance was declared invalid because it was in conflict with State statutes prohibiting driving while intoxicated. Village of Mundelein v. Hartnett (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 1011, 454 N.E.2d 29, appeal denied (1984), 96 Ill.2d 568. Wilmette does not dispute nor challenge the result in the Mundelein case.
Since it is solely the supreme court's prerogative to reconsider the underlying rationale in Wisslead, we therefore reject the State's arguments and vacate defendant's convictions for armed violence. (See People v. Alexander (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 33, 38, 454 N.E.2d 691, appeal denied (1984), 96 Ill.2d 568.) The vacation of these two convictions does not necessitate resentencing defendant on the remaining convictions, for the imposition of life imprisonment was premised on his instant as well as prior convictions for armed robbery.