The plain language of section 247a(5) shows that application of the statute is not, as the trial court stated, "cloaked in equity." In deciding to deduct the redemption amount, the trial court relied substantially on In re Application of Cook County Treasurer Ex Officio Collector (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 212, 456 N.E.2d 221, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560 (hereinafter Viso), stating, "the Viso decision appears to allow trial court discretion to be somewhat creative in structuring an equitable award that justly compensates the property owner for the exact loss or damage sustained." Even had the trial court's reliance on Viso been proper, allowing Burke to recover less than the full value of his property was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
See White Way Sign Maintenance Co. v. Montclare Lanes, Inc. (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 199, 201, 355 N.E.2d 632. See also Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co. (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 512, 452 N.E.2d 1383, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560; Meyer v. Murray (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 106, 387 N.E.2d 878. • 2 Hughes next argues that Williams failed to show, and the trial court failed to find, that the covenant not to sue between Christmas and Yellow Cab had been made in good faith.
The award was struck down by the supreme court. Harvey v. Carponelli (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 448, 453 N.E.2d 820, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560, cert. denied (1984), 466 U.S. 951, 80 L.Ed.2d 539, 104 S.Ct. 2153, is contrary to most opinions and involved a legal malpractice case. In Harvey, the court held deliberate and premeditated conduct resulting in a mistrial was sufficient justification for an award of attorney fees.
Though there may be no all-inclusive test, most Illinois cases on personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations are said to have based their findings on the existence of factors such as offices or sales activities in Illinois that connoted continuous and permanent activity. ( Huck v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 837, 839-40, 453 N.E.2d 1365, 1368, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560 (citing cases).) Still, Huck and Maunder recognize the need for case-by-case decision making as to whether, in the context of all of each case's circumstances, it would be fair to subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts.
The sole question on review is whether the entry of summary judgment against plaintiffs was proper. • 1 Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, exhibits, affidavits and depositions on file disclose no genuine issue of material fact such that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Kroll v. Sugar Supply Corp. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 969, 975, 452 N.E.2d 649, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560.) Upon review of the trial court's entry of summary judgment, the appellate court must determine whether the trial court was correct in ruling that no genuine issue of material fact was raised and whether entry of judgment was correct as a matter of law. ( Fuller v. Justice (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 933, 938, 453 N.E.2d 1153.) Summary judgment should be granted "only where the evidence, when construed most strongly against the moving party, establishes clearly and without doubt his right thereto." Motz v. Central National Bank (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 601, 605, 456 N.E.2d 958.
The present defendants were the fifth set of attorneys plaintiff had retained to represent her in the matters of the probate of her father's estate and the alleged malpractice of her prior attorneys. The present suit is also based on alleged legal malpractice. See Harvey v. Carponelli (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 448, 453 N.E.2d 820, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560, cert. denied (1984), 466 U.S. 951, 80 L.Ed.2d 539, 104 S.Ct. 2153; Harvey v. Mackay (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 582, 440 N.E.2d 1022, appeal denied (1983), 92 Ill.2d 574; Harvey v. Connor (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 1061, 407 N.E.2d 879, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill.2d 602, cert. denied (1981), 451 U.S. 938, 68 L.Ed.2d 326, 101 S.Ct. 2019; Bard v. Harvey (1979), 74 Ill. App.3d 16, 392 N.E.2d 371, cert. denied (1983), 459 U.S. 1172, 74 L.Ed.2d 1016, 103 S.Ct. 819; Harvey v. Harris Trust Savings Bank (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 280, 391 N.E.2d 461, appeal denied (1979), 79 Ill.2d 611, cert. denied (1980), 445 U.S. 929, 63 L.Ed.2d 762, 100 S.Ct. 1316. On January 16, 1970, plaintiff's father, Ernest J. Sander (Sander), died.
• 1, 2 We consider first plaintiff's contention that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment on count I of the complaint in which plaintiff sought recovery under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, affidavits and depositions on file reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1005; Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill.2d 444, 463-64, 430 N.E.2d 1079; Kroll v. Sugar Supply Corp. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 969, 975, 452 N.E.2d 649, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560.) In deciding such a motion, the trial court must construe any evidence in support of it strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent.
On granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the circuit court found that there were no disputed issues of fact regarding privilege or malice. • 1 Summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions on file reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1005; Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill.2d 444, 463-64, 430 N.E.2d 1079; Kroll v. Sugar Supply Corp. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 969, 975, 452 N.E.2d 649, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560.) In deciding such a motion, the trial court must construe any evidence in support of it strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent.
"Any person who, with intent to defraud, violates any requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be liable in an amount equal to the sum of * * * three times the amount of actual damages sustained or $1,500, whichever is the greater * * *." 15 U.S.C. § 1989(a)(1) (1984). Summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions on file reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ( In re Estate of Whittington (1985), 107 Ill.2d 169, 176-77, 483 N.E.2d 210, cert. denied (1986), 475 U.S. 1016, 89 L.Ed.2d 313, 106 S.Ct. 1199; Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill.2d 444, 463-64, 430 N.E.2d 1079; Kroll v. Sugar Supply Corp. (1983) 116 Ill. App.3d 969, 975, 452 N.E.2d 649, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560.) All well-pleaded uncontradicted facts contained in a movant's affidavit will be taken as true for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff essentially contends that the actions based on the sales contract and on the note are separate and distinct causes of action and argues that the trial court erred when it awarded summary judgment to defendant. • 1 Summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, affidavits and depositions on file reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( In re Estate of Whittington (1985), 107 Ill.2d 169, 176-77; Kroll v. Sugar Supply Corp. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 969, 975, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560.) All well-pleaded, uncontradicted facts contained in a movant's affidavit will be taken as true for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 719; Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 261.