other grounds by 239 Miss. 35, 121 So.2d 720 (1960) (architects and engineers are members of a learned profession); Clephane v. Progressive Realty Bldg. Co., 1927 WL 2770 (Ohio Com.Pl. 1927) ("The business of an architect has the dignity of a learned profession."); Sherwood v. Wise, 132 Wn. 295, 304, 232 P. 309, 312 (Wash. 1925) ("There was a time when the learned profession seemed to be in some degree limited to three in number, to wit, religion, law, and medicine, but we apprehend no such narrow view can justifiedly be taken in this progressive age. Indeed, it seems hard to conceive of any older or more thoroughly recognized branch of learning than that of architecture."); Smith v. Board of Education, 222 P. 101 (Kan. 1924) ("The business of an architect has the dignity of a learned profession."); 29 C.F.R. § 541.301 (architects qualify as members of the "learned professions."); see generally Twaddell v. Anderson, 136 N.C. App. 56, 61-63, 523 S.E.2d 710, 715-16 (1999), rev. denied, 351 N.C. 480, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2000) (looking to other jurisdictions for guidance and adopting a holding that "is consistent with the majority of other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue."). Indeed, architecture is undoubtably considered a "profession" in North Carolina, and the courts have found architects subject to the purview of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-15(c) governing "malpractice arising out of the performance or failure to perform professional services."
The concept of "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" is crucial to determining whether North Carolina has jurisdiction to modify, or merely enforce, a child support order issued by another state. "Any [child support order] issued by a court of another state may be registered in North Carolina for enforcement" by following the procedures set forth under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-6-602. Twaddell v. Anderson , 136 N.C. App. 56, 60, 523 S.E.2d 710, 714 (1999), disc. review denied , 351 N.C. 480, 543 S.E.2d 510 (2000). A support order issued in another state is registered and enforceable in North Carolina upon filing.
We are not, however, entitled to consider this information in evaluating the validity of Defendant's challenge to the trial court's judgment in view of the fact that none of this information was presented to the trial court at Defendant's revocation hearing. See Twaddell v. Anderson, 136 N .C.App. 56, 68, 523 S.E.2d 710, 719 (1999) (holding that “[t]his Court can only consider the pleadings and filings before the trial court”), disc. review denied,351 N.C. 480, 543 S.E.2d 510 (2000); Markham v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125 N.C.App. 443, 456, 481 S.E.2d 349, 357 (stating that “this Court can only judicially know that which is of record”), disc. review denied,346 N.C. 281, 487 S.E.2d 551 (1997). Although the State appears to argue that these materials were before the trial court on the grounds that the hearing which led to the entry of the trial court's judgment involved three different violation notices, we do not find this argument to be persuasive given that the record before us contains no indication that the documents contained in the supplement to the record submitted for our consideration by the State were admitted into evidence at Defendant's revocation hearing.
It is reasonable to assume that the State Bar adopted a limitations rule for the same purpose the legislature has enacted statutes of limitations-“to afford security against stale claims." Trexler v. Pollock, 135 N.C.App. 601, 607, 522 S.E.2d 84, 88 (1999) , [cert.] denied, 351 N.C. 480, 543 S.E.2d 509 (2000) . The Commission found that the State Bar did not intend the time limitation to be less than six years.
"[I]n determining compliance with Rule 11, courts should avoid hindsight and resolve all doubts in favor of the signer." Twaddell v. Anderson, 136 N.C.App. 56, 70, 523 S.E.2d 710, 720 (1999), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 480, 543 S.E.2d 510 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, defendant contends that discovery materials demonstrate that Kohler and its counsel knew their filings contained incorrect factual allegations and unsupported legal assertions and were aware that pleadings were filed for an improper purpose.
"[I]n determining compliance with Rule 11, courts should avoid hindsight and resolve all doubts in favor of the signer." Twaddell v. Anderson, 136 N.C. App. 56, 70, 523 S.E.2d 710, 720 (1999), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 480, 543 S.E.2d 510 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, defendant contends that discovery materials demonstrate that Kohler and its counsel knew their filings contained incorrect factual allegations and unsupported legal assertions and were aware that pleadings were filed for an improper purpose.
See also Twaddell v. Anderson, 136 N.C.App. 56, 62-63, 523 S.E.2d 710, 715 (1999) ("Under URESA, a subsequent order [in North Carolina] does not necessarily nullify a prior order [from another state].... [U]nder URESA, more than one state could have simultaneous jurisdiction over a case."), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 480, 543 S.E.2d 510 (2000). As a result, under URESA, "a case may involve more than one valid child support order even though the orders may be inconsistent in their terms."
.Compare Twaddell v. Anderson, 136 N.C. App. 56, 523 S.E.2d 710 (1999) (substantial compliance with registration requirements was sufficient to allow registration of a California support order in North Carolina), review denied, 351 N.C. 480, 543 S.E.2d 510 (2000), and Nelson v. Halley, 827 So. 2d 42 (Miss.Ct.App. 2002) (registration was valid despite absence of social security numbers and employer information), with In re Interest of Chapman, 973 S.W.2d 346 (Tex.Ct.App. 1998) (procedural requirements in UIFSA are mandatory and failure to provide required documentation prevented registration). ¶14 The validity of the order to be registered, not the power of the registering court to proceed, is the paramount concern of the statute governing registration of out-of-state orders.
The North Carolina court's orders under URESA did not automatically nullify or vacate the Kansas orders. K.S.A. 23-480 (Ensley); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 52A-21 (1992) (repealed 1996); Wornkey, 12 Kan.App.2d at 512, 749 P.2d 1045; Twaddell v. Anderson, 136 N.C.App. 56, 62-63, 523 S.E.2d 710 (1999), rev. denied 351 N.C. 480, 543 S.E.2d 510 (2000). The Kansas orders were sent to North Carolina for enforcement purposes only.
Although superceded by UIFSA, URESA is still applicable to determine the validity of an order originally entered when URESA was in effect and before UIFSA's and FFCCSOA's one-order rules were effective. Twaddell v. Anderson, 136 N.C. App. 56, 62, 523 S.E.2d 710, 715 (1999), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 480, 543 S.E.2d 510 (2000) (the effect of a subsequent North Carolina URESA order on a prior California order registered "shall be determined in accordance with URESA."). Under URESA, a subsequent support order "does not necessarily nullify a prior order."