Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2486-GTV
May 9, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This diversity action is before the court on the motion to dismiss of Defendant United States (Doc. 121). In 1999, Plaintiff Karen Disidore suffered injuries when her car was hit by a runaway trailer which had detached from a tractor-trailer rig driven by an employee of Defendant Mail Contractors of America ("MCofA"). At the time, Defendant MCofA was carrying mail for the United States Postal Service ("USPS") pursuant to a contract between the two entities. An employee of the USPS had coupled the trailer to a converter dolly on the tractor-trailer rig. Plaintiff filed the instant suit against Defendant MCofA, and later amended her complaint to allege causes of action against Defendant United States, Defendants Unitran and Hoovestol (the owner(s) of the converter dolly and the party/ies responsible for the ongoing inspection, maintenance and/or repair of the trailer and converter dolly), and Defendant Holland Hitch (the manufacturer of the fifth wheel assembly mounted on the converter dolly). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant United States is responsible for her damages because (1) the USPS failed to inspect, maintain and/or repair the converter dolly as required by federal statute and regulation and (2) a USPS employee negligently coupled the trailer to the converter dolly. Plaintiff also seeks to hold Defendant United States liable based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Defendant United States has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. For the reasons stated below, the court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.
I. STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT
Defendant United States moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will be granted only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is unable to prove any set of facts entitling her to relief under her theory of recovery. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). "All well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as true." Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984). The court must view all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and the pleadings must be liberally construed. See id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f). The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support her claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. Fiztgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are based upon the allegations in Plaintiff's amended complaint. The USPS entered into a contract with Defendant MCofA. Under that contract, Defendant MCofA was responsible for providing tractors and drivers to haul United States mail. Defendant MCofA used trailers and converter dollies furnished by the USPS through leasing agreements with Defendant Unitran.
Both Plaintiff and Defendant United States have attached documents to their briefs on this matter. When deciding a motion to dismiss, however, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings only if the court converts the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. See Prager v. LaFaver, 180 F.3d 1185, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997)). While the court has broad discretion to convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment in order to consider matters outside the pleadings, the court declines to do so here. See id. at 1189. The parties have not requested that the court convert the motion nor has the court put the parties on notice that it will apply a summary judgment standard. Therefore, the court looks no further than the pleadings in deciding the motion to dismiss presently before it.
On February 9, 1999, an employee of the USPS coupled one of its leased trailers loaded with United States mail to the converter dolly in question; this allowed a tractor rig to transport two trailers at a time. Randy Rich, an employee of Defendant MCofA and the driver of the tractor rig, attached his tractor to the coupled trailers. The loaded tractor-trailer rig then departed the United States Post Office. At that time, the locking mechanism connecting the trailers was not adequately secure.
The tractor-trailer rig began traveling westbound along Interstate 70 in Kansas. At the same time, Plaintiff was driving her car westbound on Interstate 70, slightly behind the tractor-trailer rig. The rear trailer became detached from the tractor-trailer rig and headed in the direction of Plaintiff's car, ultimately colliding with Plaintiff's car, and causing Plaintiff injuries. Plaintiff now brings the instant suit, seeking recovery for both her non-economic and economic injuries and damages, as well as punitive damages, allowable expenses, fees, and costs.
III. DISCUSSION A. FMCSR and Negligent Coupling Claims
First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant United States is responsible for her damages because an employee of the USPS failed to inspect, maintain and/or repair the trailer or converter dolly. In order to prevail on her claim of negligence, Plaintiff must establish that Defendant United States owed a duty to her, that Defendant United States breached that duty, that she was injured, and that a causal connection existed between the duty breached and the injury sustained. See Napell v. Aten Dep't Store, Inc., 115 F. Supp.2d 1275, 1278 (D.Kan. 2000). Defendant United States argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to offer evidence on her negligence claim, because Defendant United States owed Plaintiff no statutory or regulatory duty. Defendant United States contends that Plaintiff's amended complaint only alleges a negligence cause of action under the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act and its regulations (the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, or "FMCSR"), and that Defendant United States is exempt from the Act and the FMCSR. Plaintiff counters that her amended complaint states a common law cause of action for negligent coupling, and that the references to the FMCSR are only made to establish a standard by which the USPS's actions can be measured.
At first glance, Plaintiff's amended complaint appears to allege a cause of action under the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the FMCSR. To the extent that Plaintiff's amended complaint attempts to allege a cause of action under the Act and the FMCSR, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The regulations do not apply to transportation performed by the federal government. See 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(f)(2) ("Unless otherwise specifically provided, the rules in this subchapter do not apply to . . . [t]ransportation performed by the Federal government. . . ."). The USPS is "an independent establishment of the executive branch of the Government of the United States," 39 U.S.C. § 201, and transportation performed by the USPS is "transportation performed by the Federal government." Such transportation is excluded from compliance with the FMCSR. The court notes that Plaintiff makes no argument to the contrary. Accordingly, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act and its regulations. To the extent that Plaintiff has attempted to allege a claim under the Act and its regulations, the motion to dismiss of Defendant United States is granted.
For example, Plaintiff's amended complaint states as follows:
56. The United States, through the actions of the USPS, is alleged . . . to be a designated motor carrier under the Federal Highway Administration.
57. To the extent the USPS is the motor carrier responsible for inspection, maintenance and repair of the equipment under the FMCSR, then both plaintiff's and defendant's allegations of fault for failure to inspect, maintain and repair would fall on the United States through the USPS.
58. To the extent the defendant successfully establishes its allegation that the USPS is a motor carrier with respect to the equipment involved in this action, and to the extent the USPS is held to have a duty under the FMCSR to inspect, maintain, and/or repair, and to the extent MCofA establishes that failure to inspect, maintain and/or repair caused or contributed to cause plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff seeks recovery for her injuries and damages against the United States of America.
The definitions in the Act also indicate that Congress did not intend for the Act and its regulations to apply to the federal government. The general requirements of the FMCSR are "applicable to all employers, employees, and commercial motor vehicles, which transport property or passengers in interstate commerce." 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(a). However, an "employer," statutorily defined, "does not include the Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State." 49 U.S.C. § 31132(3)(B). The definition of "employee" expressly excludes "employee[s] of the United States Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State acting in the course of the employment by the Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State." 49 U.S.C. § 31132(2)(B).
As noted above, however, Plaintiff argues that her amended complaint actually alleges a common law claim for negligent coupling against Defendant United States. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant United States has a common law duty "toward people on public roadways who might be harmed as a result of the USPS's negligent coupling of trailers," and that, regardless of whether the USPS is covered by the FMCSR, Defendant United States cannot act negligently and escape liability.
Plaintiff does not argue in her briefs that her complaint states a common law cause of action for failure to inspect, maintain and/or repair; in her response to the motion to dismiss of Defendant United States, heading I of the discussion section reads: "In addition to the question of whether the USPS is a motor carrier under the F.M.C.S.R., defendant United States has a common law duty to safely couple trailers when it is aware that the trailer will be traveling on public roadways" (emphasis added). The paragraphs under this heading only address negligent coupling. The court interprets Plaintiff's argument to be only that her complaint states a common law cause of action for negligent coupling, and not for failure to inspect, maintain and/or repair.
Defendant United States contends that this claim of common law negligence is absent from Plaintiff's amended complaint, and is asserted only in response to the motion to dismiss. The United States argues that Plaintiff may not rely on arguments extending beyond the allegations of her amended complaint to overcome pleading deficiencies; the amended complaint itself must show that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. The court agrees. Any deficiency in Plaintiff's amended complaint may not be rectified by arguments made outside the amended complaint. See Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 619 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Bauchman v. West High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 550 (10th Cir. 1997)). The issue then becomes whether Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a cause of action for negligent coupling in her amended complaint.
The federal rules require no more than "notice pleading" to adequately state a cause of action. See Phillips USA, Inc. v. Allflex USA, Inc., No. 94-2012-JWL, 1994 WL 398277, at *1 (D.Kan. July 6, 1994). Notice pleading under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The complaint need not contain specific facts, but it must "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. More specifically, the complaint "must 'set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.'" Gallardo v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 857 F. Supp. 783, 787 (D.Kan. 1994) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Co., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988)). The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. See Moridge Mfg., Inc. v. WEC Co., No. CIV.A. 94-2428-EEO, 1995 WL 520030, at *3 (D.Kan. Aug. 3, 1995) (citing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236).
In the instant case, Plaintiff's amended complaint contains the following paragraphs relevant to her claim for negligent coupling:
33. On February 9, 1999, an employee of the USPS, acting within the scope of his employment undertook to couple trailer #2 to [converter] dolly #102.
. . . .
36. Upon departure from the post office compound the release handle and jaws on the locking mechanism of the fifth wheel were in the open position.
. . . .
38. Suddenly and without warning to Karen Disidore, trailer #2 detached from the tractor-trailer-rig, dropped onto the road surface at a high rate of speed, and careened freely and uncontrolled down the highway just in front of Karen Disidore's car, placing plaintiff in imminent peril.
. . . .
40. Karen Disidore was unable to avoid a . . . collision . . . which . . . caused her severe, permanent and disabling injuries.
The court concludes that given the liberal notice pleading rules of federal courts, Plaintiff's amended complaint adequately states a cause of action for negligent coupling. Plaintiff's amended complaint puts Defendant United States on notice that she intends to claim that the USPS employee negligently coupled the trailer. The court denies the motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff's negligent coupling claim.
B. Res Ipsa Loquitur Claim
Plaintiff also asserts a cause of action for negligence based on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. Defendant United States argues, however, that liability based on this theory is precluded by the presence of a superseding cause.
Defendant United States uses the terms "intervening" and "superseding" interchangeably in its briefs. Plaintiff uses the term "superseding." In this order, "superseding" refers to both "intervening" and "superseding" causes referenced by the parties.
To establish liability under the theory of res ipsa loquitur, Plaintiff must establish the following:
1) the defendant must have management and control of the instrumentality which, at that time or later, caused the injury;
2) the circumstances must be such that according to common knowledge and the experience of mankind the injury would not have occurred without negligence on the part of those having management and control;
3) and that plaintiff's injuries resulted from the occurrence, and that he was free from fault.
Robinson v. Nightingale, 362 P.2d 432, 435 (Kan. 1961). Defendant United States concedes that Kansas law allows application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to multiple defendants, so long as the causal relationship to the injuring instrumentality may be extended back through the line of defendants. It argues that the causal relationship cannot be extended back in this instance, because, despite the fact that a USPS employee coupled the second trailer to the converter dolly, Defendant MCofA had the non-delegable duty thereafter to fully inspect all connections and the entire tractor-trailer rig. Thus, Defendant United States reasons, even if the USPS employee negligently coupled the trailer, the non-delegable duty of Defendant MCofA to inspect the rig serves as a superseding cause between any USPS act and the alleged accident.
The United States also argues that it may avoid liability because the tractor-trailer rig was in the exclusive control and possession of Defendant MCofA at the time of the injury. Defendant United States contends that the USPS never had exclusive possession of the instrumentalities at issue because other entities owned the equipment and had maintenance, repair and inspection duties over the equipment.
Finally, Defendant United States asserts that an express contractual agreement was created between the USPS and Defendant MCofA which transferred any duty incumbent upon the USPS to Defendant MCofA. Defendant United States argues that this contractual duty-shifting also serves as a superseding cause pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 452(2) and the accompanying comments, thus relieving Defendant United States from any liability.
The court is unable to rule at this time whether a superseding cause is present in the instant case. First, determining whether the imposition of a statutory and regulatory duty on the driver to inspect the rig serves as a superseding cause requires evidence beyond the pleadings. The court declines to rule on this issue based on the pleadings.
Second, the court is unable to determine solely from the pleadings whether Defendant MCofA had exclusive possession, as a matter of law, of the equipment at issue. This is clearly a question of fact that requires the presentation of evidence for its resolution.
Finally, as previously noted, this court may only consider evidence and information contained within the pleadings when evaluating a motion to dismiss; any extraneous information upon which Defendant United States relied in the course of crafting its arguments has been ignored. Although the court recognizes that a contract between the parties may have existed, the terms of that contract have not been considered. The court, therefore, does not decide whether a contractual duty-shifting agreement was present between the parties. Again, the content of the contract is a question of fact that requires the presentation of evidence for its resolution.
The arguments of Defendant United States are perhaps more properly the subject of a motion for summary judgment. This court concludes that, based solely on the pleadings, Plaintiff has stated a cause of action for which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied with regard to Plaintiff's res ipsa claim.
In sum, the motion to dismiss is granted with respect to Plaintiff's claim under the FMCSR. The motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Plaintiff's negligent coupling and res ipsa loquitur claims.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that the motion to dismiss of Defendant United States (Doc. 121) is granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.