Opinion
Civil Action 3:21-CV-00521
04-30-2024
MARIA J. DISEN, Plaintiff, v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Defendant.[1]
Magistrate Judge Carlson
ORDER
ROBERT D. MARIANI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
AND NOW, THIS 30th DAY OF APRIL, 2024, upon de novo review of Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson's Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 36) Plaintiff Maria J. Disen's Objections to the R&R (Doc. 37), Defendant Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC's response thereto (Doc. 38), and all other relevant documents, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
A district court may “designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition” of certain matters pending before the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). If a party timely and properly files a written objection to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. at § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); M.D. Pa. Local Rule 72.3; Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193,195 (3d Cir. 2011). The de novo standard applies only to objections which are both timely and specific. Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5,6-7 (3d Cir. 1984). The Court first notes that Plaintiffs objections are timely. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Although the Court finds that Plaintiff's objections are general complaints that lack clarity and specificity, out of an abundance of caution, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff's Objections de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
1. Plaintiffs Objections are OVERRULED. Plaintiff first objects to the R&R on the basis that the R&R “focuses on the Bankruptcy issue. The Bankruptcy is not the Claim at the present time.” (Doc. 37 at 2.) In his R&R, Magistrate Judge Carlson determined that there “is a fundamental and overarching flaw in [Plaintiffs] complaint” in that “[t]he Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Res Judicata Principles Bar These Claims.” (Doc. 36 at 10.) “Rooker-Feldman does not allow a plaintiff to seek relief that, if granted, would prevent a state court from enforcing its own orders.” Easley v. New Century Mortg. Corp., No. CIV A 08-4283,2009 WL 2256692, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2009), aff'd, 394 Fed.Appx. 946 (3d Cir. 2010). Magistrate Judge Carlson correctly determined that “[t]his matter arises out of prior state mortgage litigation which concluded with the entry of judgment against the plaintiff' and that “the complaint contains claims which necessarily invite a federal court to, de novo, review, re-examine, and reject state court rulings in this prior state mortgage case." (Doc. 36 at 10.) As Magistrate Judge Carlson concluded, this is exactly what is forbidden by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Easley, 2009 WL 2256692 at *1, aff'd, 394 Fed.Appx. 946. This insurmountable hurdle encapsulates Plaintiffs
arguments contained within her Objections that Defendant failed to apply her mortgage payments in the amount of $4,900 and $360. (Doc. 37 at 12.) These contentions were raised in Plaintiffs answer in the foreclosure actions. (See Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, Doc. 38-1, Ex. C, ¶¶ 16,17.) The Court therefore overrules this basis of Plaintiffs Objections.
In her Objections, Plaintiff complains that “The Report and Recommendation's caption reads my name as Maria Disen. My name was legally changed in the Federal Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania from Maria Jacqueline Jimenez Disen to Maria Jacqueline Dicent a shorter version.” (Doc. 37 at 1.) Plaintiff has not offered any record of Plaintiffs alleged name change. Additionally, Plaintiff's complaint regarding her alleged name change does not constitute a substantive objection to the Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Carlson. See Goney, 749 F.2d at 6-7. Nonetheless, the Court will refer to Plaintiff only as “Plaintiff in this Order.
Plaintiff also contends that Magistrate Judge Carlson's determination that Plaintiffs claims are barred by res judicata “does not meet the elements or is applicable for this case [sic].” (Doc. 37 at 7.) Res Judicata bars claims that were or could have been raised in a state action. Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 Fed.Appx. 149,153 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, Magistrate Judge Carlson correctly noted that each of Plaintiffs claims were raised or could have been raised in the state foreclosure action and bankruptcy proceeding. (Doc. 36 at 14.) Magistrate Judge Carlson was therefore proper in concluding that dismissal is warranted under the doctrine of res judicata, and the Court overrules this basis of Plaintiffs Objections. Plaintiff also argues that her claims arising under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) were “not addressed” in the state court proceedings and are thus not barred. (Doc. 37 ¶ 2.) As Magistrate Judge Carlson correctly noted (Doc. 36 at 18-19), claims under the FDCPA must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” (Doc. 36 at 18); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (d). Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated the FDCPA by not crediting a payment in March of 2019 and brining this foreclosure action in October of 2019. (Doc. 37 at 10-11.) Magistrate Judge Carlson accurately explained that Plaintiff did not bring her case until March of 2021, “well beyond the one-year limitations period prescribed by statute.” (Doc. 36 at 18.) Therefore, Magistrate Judge Carlson's determination that Plaintiffs FDCPA claims should be dismissed was correct, and this basis of Plaintiffs Objections is overruled.
To the extent Plaintiff is asserting in her Objections a new “Fair Credit Collection Act” claim or “New Matter” that she acknowledges is related to selling of the mortgage to Home Land Financial Services, Inc., (Doc. 37 at 3, 6-8, 10), she is barred from doing so given that these claims were not alleged in her Complaint (Doc. 1). See, e.g., Santo v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 1:17-CV-1597, 2018 WL 4680090, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28,2018) (“First, it is axiomatic that pleadings cannot be amended through briefing in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”).
Finally, Plaintiff generally argues that her Fourteenth Amendment claims do not warrant dismissal. (Doc. 37 ¶¶ 1,30.) As Magistrate Judge Carlson explained, Defendant is not a state actor (Doc. 36 at 19-20), and Plaintiff is thus unable to make out a Fourteenth Amendment claim against it. See Bailey v. Harleysville Nat'l Bank & Tr., 188 Fed.Appx. 66,67 (3d Cir. 2006) (“To show that the defendant acted under color of state law, a litigant must establish that the defendant is a ‘state actor' under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The Court therefore overrules this basis of Plaintiffs Objections.
2. The R&R (Doc. 36) is ADOPTED for the reasons discussed therein.
3. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24) is GRANTED.
4. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE Case Number 3:21 -cv-00521.