Opinion
No. 90-2088
Submitted April 9, 1991 —
Decided July 3, 1991.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 89-44.
On August 25, 1989, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a multi-count complaint against respondent, Burt H. Sagen. An amended complaint followed on November 2, 1989. After obtaining a time extension, respondent filed a timely answer.
Three of the incidents alleged in the complaint are particularly relevant. The first ("Count One") arose from protracted litigation between Mr. and Mrs. Robert E. Humphrey and Mr. and Mrs. Vencel Bohaty. In 1969, the Humphreys purchased real estate from the Bohatys on a land contract. The Humphreys later defaulted on payments and the Bohatys sued in the Medina County Common Pleas Court to rescind the contract. The Humphreys retained respondent as counsel and counterclaimed for specific performance.
The Humphreys prevailed. A June 21, 1976 judgment entry conveyed the property to the Humphreys and ordered that monies previously deposited in escrow on behalf of the Humphreys, plus interest and back taxes, be tendered to the Bohatys. Respondent approved this entry.
The Court of Appeals for Medina County affirmed the judgment of the trial court. However, the escrow agent returned the deposited funds in the amount of $13,361.29 to respondent, who retained the money. Being unable to obtain this money from respondent, the Bohatys successfully sued respondent in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. In October 1985, a jury awarded the Bohatys $13,361.29 plus specified pre- and post-judgment interest. The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County affirmed. To date, however, respondent has paid nothing to the Bohatys.
The second incident ("Count Two") also stemmed from a real estate transaction. In early 1985, respondent, by his own admission, signed the name of Richard Cole on a warranty deed transferring property from Cole to respondent. In defense, respondent falsely claimed that he had been "designated" as "Richard Cole" in a "trust agreement" between respondent and Margaret Cole, Richard Cole's sister. The alleged "trust agreement," however, was no more than a property agreement that said nothing about respondent's so-called "designation" as Richard Cole.
The third incident ("Count Five") involved respondent's representation of Helen Szakacs, a longtime client. According to a judgment entry from a resulting lawsuit, Szakacs, in her later years, was befriended by Paulette and Judith Bobko. In January 1984, Szakacs prepared a holographic will devising her Kuenzer Drive home in Seven Hills, Ohio, and a commercial property on Pearl Road in Parma to Judith Bobko. It also devised a Florida property to Paulette bobko and also indicated that Szakacs's Virginia Road property in Parma could not be sold without first giving the tenant, Bernice Pyle, an opportunity to buy it.
On July 25, 1984, two quitclaim deeds were executed that became the source of later controversy. The first deeded a remainder interest in the Pearl Road property to respondent. The second deeded a remainder interest in the Virginia Road property to Bernice Kmitt, a.k.a. Bernice Pyle, respondent's longtime associate.
In October 1984, Szakacs retained a new attorney, Bradford Zelasko, and asked him to prepare a new will. Apparently, she reiterated to him her desire to have the Bobkos receive the Pearl and Virginia Road properties on her death. The will prepared by Zelasko bequeathed $25,000 to respondent with the residue of the estate going to the Bobkos.
Szakacs died on November 11, 1984. On November 16 respondent recorded the Pearl and Virginia Road deeds. Szakacs's will was admitted to probate the following March. In August 1985, Paulette Bobko, Szakacs's executrix, and Judith Bobko commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking, among other things, to have the Pearl and Virginia Road properties returned to the estate.
The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, by judgment entry of January 6, 1988, ordered the property returned to the estate. The court of appeals affirmed that judgment. See Bobko v. Sagen (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 397, 572 N.E.2d 823.
A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court ("panel") heard these and other allegations during the course of a two-day hearing on June 21 and 22, 1990. After considering numerous witnesses and exhibits, the panel concluded that the allegations contained in Counts One, Two and Five were true and dismissed two remaining counts. The panel emphasized respondent's propensity for placing the blame for his actions on others and his "remarkable lack of insight into his situation."
As to Count One, the panel found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law) and 9-101 (appearance of impropriety). As to Counts Two and Five, the panel found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(4), (5) and (6) in each count. The panel recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio. The board adopted the recommendations of the panel, and also recommended that costs of the proceeding be charged to the respondent.
J. Warren Bettis, Disciplinary Counsel, and Charles T. Brown, for relator.
Paul Mancino, Jr. and Charles W. Kettlewell, for respondent.
We adopt the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of the board. Respondent is hereby permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio. Costs taxed to the respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.