Opinion
No. 91-2164
Submitted December 4, 1991 —
Decided March 4, 1992.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 90-55.
On October 18, 1990, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court ("board") charging Edward C. Lucey, respondent, with two violations of DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in conduct involving moral turpitude) and one violation of DR 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law). In his answer, respondent admitted certain facts about the charges but denied the violations, although he admitted them at the hearing. These violations stem from respondent's conviction of aggravated assault, R.C. 2903.12, for stabbing Phyllis M. Lucey, his wife.
On December 14, 1987, after Phyllis arrived home about 7:00 p.m. from an early movie, she and respondent argued over treatment for respondent's renewed alcoholism. After they withdrew from the argument, Phyllis prepared to go to bed. She lay down in the bed of the guest bedroom and turned out the lights. However, she heard the electric knife sharpener in the kitchen being operated. Respondent was the only other person in the house.
Shortly thereafter, according to Phyllis's testimony, respondent entered the room with a towel over his right hand. He approached Phyllis as she lay in bed, lunged, and plunged a knife once into the left side of her chest. He then left the room.
Not realizing that she had been stabbed, she entered the master bedroom to telephone the police. She then discovered that she was bleeding. She dialed the phone, contacted the Cleveland Heights Police, and informed them that she had been stabbed. Respondent, in the meantime, had entered the master bedroom. He grabbed the phone from her hand, and it became unplugged.
Phyllis went downstairs to use the telephone in the kitchen, but, by then, the police had arrived. Respondent left the house; however, the police apprehended him in his car.
Phyllis was admitted to University Hospitals of Cleveland. The doctors there sutured her lacerated liver, stomach, and abdomen. She lost approximately 2,000 cc. of blood. Phyllis recovered from these injuries but has since died of cancer, which she knew she had when respondent stabbed her.
Respondent explains that he had been drinking, the two discussed his treatment, and Phyllis became extremely agitated. He claims he sharpened the knife to slice some salami for a sandwich. However, when the prosecutor suggested that the police did not find any preparations for a sandwich in the kitchen, respondent could not explain what had happened to the food. He also could not explain how he happened to have the knife when he went upstairs to continue talking about his alcohol problem or how his wife came to be stabbed. He claims that she continued to argue and began hitting him with her clenched fists; suddenly, he claims, she was bleeding. He testified that he had fought with her over the phone so that he could call the fire emergency squad and that he had left the house to start the car to take her to the hospital.
In any event, the grand jury indicted him for felonious assault, R.C. 2903.11, but the court convicted him of aggravated assault. The court sentenced him to a term of one to five years, but suspended the sentence and placed respondent on three years' probation, conditioned on alcohol treatment, alcohol counseling, and community service. We indefinitely suspended respondent from the practice of law under Gov.Bar R. V(9) on June 6, 1990. See In re Lucey (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 713, 556 N.E.2d 189.
Finally, several judges and lawyers testified before a panel of the board that respondent held a reputation of good character in the community.
The panel found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(3) and (6) and recommended that he be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law with credit given for time served since January 1, 1991. The panel also recommended that respondent's reinstatement be conditioned upon proof that he regularly attends Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and has lived a sober life style for at least six months prior to his application for reinstatement.
The board adopted the panel's findings of facts, conclusions of law, and recommendation.
J. Warren Bettis, Disciplinary Counsel, and Dianna L. Chesley, for relator.
Charles T. Brown, for respondent.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the board. Accordingly, we indefinitely suspend Edward C. Lucey from the practice of law in Ohio with credit for time served since January 1, 1991. We condition his reinstatement upon proof that he regularly attends Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and has lived a sober life style for at least six months prior to his application for reinstatement. Costs taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.