DiPalma v. Phelan

2 Citing cases

  1. Brown v. State of New York

    89 N.Y.2d 172 (N.Y. 1996)   Cited 586 times
    Holding that award of damages for constitutional tort was necessary where injunctive remedies “all fall short”

    Thus, the rights guaranteed by that constitutional provision may be enforced in Supreme Court to recover damages for private acts of discrimination although enabling legislation was required before the action could be maintained because the provision was not self-executing ( see, Executive Law § 297; Civil Rights Law § 40-d). Furthermore, the State and Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over constitutional tort claims asserted under the procedures authorized by the Federal civil rights statutes ( see, Maine v Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3, n 1; Martinez v California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-284, n 7; 1 Friesen, op. cit., ¶ 7.03 [2]) and New York courts have consistently accepted jurisdiction of such claims against "individuals or corporations" ( see, e.g., Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88 N.Y.2d 41; Cox v City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 966; DiPalma v Phelan, 179 A.D.2d 1009, affd 81 N.Y.2d 754; Manti v New York City Tr. Auth, 165 A.D.2d 373; Clark v Bond Stores, 41 A.D.2d 620; see also, 1 Civil Actions Against State and Local Government, Its Divisions, Agencies and Officers §§ 7.90-7.97 [Shepards/McGraw-Hill, 2d ed]). Thus, while the analogy between a government and an individual or corporation contained in sections 8 and 12 of the Act has some inherent limitations because individuals "do not do the same things in the same way as does the State" (Davison, Claims Against the State of New York ¶ 11.03, at 76-77; and see, Newiadony v State of New York, 276 App. Div. 59), the causes of action asserted by claimants are sufficiently similar to claims which may be asserted by individuals and corporations in Supreme Court to satisfy the statutory requirement.

  2. Tonia E.-A. v. Kathleen K

    12 Misc. 3d 828 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2006)   Cited 1 times

    Indeed, all of the case law addresses issues of postconviction Freedom of Information Law requests by convicted defendants ( Matter of Fappiano v New York City Police Dept, 95 NY2d 738) and applications by media representatives for access to records. As stated by the Fourth Department in DiPalma v Phelan ( 179 AD2d 1009, 1010): "The principal purpose of the legislation was to protect the privacy of sex crime victims who are minors by giving public officers authority to refuse to disclose the identity of victims . . . ." The Court of Appeals has determined that a convicted defendant does not fall into the exception for persons "charged" under Civil Rights Law § 50-b (2) (a) ( Fappiano v New York City Police Dept, supra) as there is a conviction.