Dionne v. City of Manchester

14 Citing cases

  1. Coltey v. N.E. Telephone

    135 N.H. 223 (N.H. 1991)   Cited 4 times

    The plaintiff then brought this action, and the superior court, denying the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under New Hampshire law, ruled that NET was responsible for affording the plaintiff uninsured motorist coverage. On appeal, the defendant, relying on our recent decision in Dionne v. City of Manchester, 134 N.H. 225, 589 A.2d 1016 (1991), argues that, as a self-insurer, it is not required to provide its employees with uninsured motorist coverage. The plaintiff contends, to the contrary, that because NET is a self-insurer complying with the New Hampshire Financial Responsibility Laws, RSA ch. 264 (1982 and Supp. 1991), it must provide uninsured motorist coverage.

  2. Doe v. Dep't of Justice

    No. 2023-0449 (N.H. Dec. 3, 2024)

    In light of our decision, we need not address the parties' remaining arguments. See Dionne v. City of Manchester, 134 N.H. 225, 230 (1991) (declining to address parties' other remaining arguments when holding on one issue is dispositive).

  3. State v. Vincelette

    172 N.H. 350 (N.H. 2019)   Cited 5 times

    Because we have concluded that the evidence is sufficient to prove that the defendant purposely violated the order through his physical acts, we need not consider his remaining arguments, which relate to the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to the five speech-based acts that the trial court found that the defendant committed in violation of the order. Dionne v. City of Manchester, 134 N.H. 225, 230, 589 A.2d 1016 (1991) (declining to address parties' other arguments where holding on one issue is dispositive). As defense counsel conceded at oral argument, because the State charged the defendant in the alternative, the trial court could have found the defendant guilty of criminal contempt if it concluded that he purposely committed any one of the six charged acts.

  4. In re Town of Lincoln

    172 N.H. 244 (N.H. 2019)   Cited 14 times
    Construing statute

    Because our holding on this issue is dispositive of this case, we decline to address the parties' other arguments. Dionne v. City of Manchester, 134 N.H. 225, 230, 589 A.2d 1016 (1991). Reversed.

  5. Antosz v. Allain

    163 N.H. 298 (N.H. 2012)   Cited 13 times
    Declining to apply "Firemen's Rule," barring a firefighter's ability to sue for negligence, to a suit that fell outside statute's specific prohibitions

    Because we conclude that the plain language of RSA 507:8–h does not bar Mr. Antosz's negligence claim, we need not decide whether the statute applies only to claims by paid firefighters. See Dionne v. City of Manchester, 134 N.H. 225, 230, 589 A.2d 1016 (1991) (declining to address parties' other arguments where holding on one issue was dispositive).We hold, therefore, that based upon the plain language of RSA 507:8–h, the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

  6. Progressive Ins. v. Enterprise, Boston

    149 N.H. 489 (N.H. 2003)   Cited 4 times
    Characterizing the decision as “interpret[ing] conflicting provisions in the parties' insurance policies”

    "This court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole." Dionne v. City of Manchester, 134 N.H. 225, 227 (1991) (quotations and brackets omitted). "[L]egislative intent is to be found not in what the legislature might have intended, but rather, in the meaning of what it did say."

  7. Nashua Teachers Union v. Nashua School District

    142 N.H. 683 (N.H. 1998)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that deductions do not "encourage" union membership "provided that such fees are tailored to nonunion employees' pro rata share of the cost of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment"

    As noted by the majority, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "[t]o compel employees financially to support their collective-bargaining representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests," Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977), and that requiring non-union employees to pay agency fees is "a significant impingement on First Amendment rights," Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984). In light of the constitutional right implicated by the imposition of agency fees and the absence of explicit legislative authorization, we will not guess "what the legislature might have intended," Dionne v. City of Manchester, 134 N.H. 225, 227, 589 A.2d 1016, 1017 (1991) (quotation omitted), or "add words that the legislature did not see fit to include," Cheever, 141 N.H. at 592, 688 A.2d at 567. Instead, we believe that this is a matter for "legislative assessment rather than for determination by judicial fiat," Am. Employers Ins. Co., 102 N.H. at 536, 163 A.2d at 569 (Kenison, C.J., dissenting), and decline to interpret the legislature's silence on this issue as implicitly authorizing agency fees, cf. Lakin v. Daniel Marr Son Co., 126 N.H. 730, 732-33, 495 A.2d 1299, 1301 (1985) (refusing to implicitly allow workers' compensation carrier to recover interest on lien where legislature silent on issue).

  8. State v. Harnum

    142 N.H. 195 (N.H. 1997)   Cited 8 times
    In Harnum, the defendant was arrested in Florida for a New Hampshire probation violation and later extradited to New Hampshire, tried and convicted. Harnum, 142 N.H. at 196.

    State Employees' Ass'n of N.H. v. Bd. of Trustees, 120 N.H. 272, 273, 415 A.2d 665, 666 (1980). We construe each statute as a whole, Dionne v. City of Manchester, 134 N.H. 225, 228, 589 A.2d 1016, 1018 (1991), and if the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language of the statute to discern legislative intent, Silva v. Botsch, 120 N.H. 600, 601, 420 A.2d 301, 302 (1980). Accordingly, "[w]e interpret legislative intent from the statute as written, and therefore, will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include."

  9. O'Brien v. O'Brien

    141 N.H. 435 (N.H. 1996)   Cited 8 times
    Construing RSA 458:17–d to authorize grandparent visitation only when one of the following conditions has come to pass: "divorce, death, relinquishment or termination of parental rights, or other cause of the absence of a nuclear family"

    As with every other statute, we construe the grandparent visitation statute as a whole, with an eye towards avoiding absurd results. Dionne v. City of Manchester, 134 N.H. 225, 228, 589 A.2d 1016, 1018 (1991); cf. Petition of The State of New Hampshire (State v. Langille), 139 N.H. 705, 707, 661 A.2d 766, 768 (1995). A cursory reading of the first sentence of the grandparent visitation statute might suggest that a grandparent has standing at all times, and in all circumstances. See RSA 458:17-d, I. Other provisions of RSA 458:17-d only make sense, however, if standing is limited to the circumstances detailed in the second sentence of the statute.

  10. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc. v. Town of Carroll

    141 N.H. 402 (N.H. 1996)   Cited 10 times
    In Arthur Whitcomb, a case involving excavation associated with a permit-exempt stationary manufacturing plant, see RSA 155–E:2, III, we held that by enacting the statute, the legislature intended to preempt "only local ordinances and regulations that would have the effect or intent of frustrating State authority" to regulate the field of excavation.

    As we have stated many times, "this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole." Dionne v. City of Manchester, 134 N.H. 225, 227, 589 A.2d 1016, 1017 (1991) (quotations omitted). The town argues in its brief that RSA 155-E:2, III(b) specifically requires Whitcomb to comply with local land use ordinances and regulations.