Dinwiddie v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency of Louisville

8 Citing cases

  1. Prestonia Area Neighborhood v. Abramson

    797 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1990)   Cited 14 times
    In Prestonia Area Neighborhood, the Supreme Court said, "Kentucky law does not permit the taking of private property for the purpose of transfer to another private enterprise."

    Our review of urban renewal ordinances has been under the standard of whether or not the enactment was arbitrary. Watkins v. Fugazzi, Ky., 394 S.W.2d 594, 598 (1965); Dinwiddie v. Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency, Ky., 393 S.W.2d 872, 874 (1965). The "arbitrary" standard has been defined to mean whether or not the act or decision was supported by "substantial evidence."

  2. Henn v. City of Highland Heights

    69 F. Supp. 2d 908 (E.D. Ky. 1999)   Cited 1 times

    Our review of urban renewal ordinances has been under the standard of whether or not the enactment was arbitrary. Watkins v. Fugazzi, Ky., 394 S.W.2d 594, 598 (1965); Dinwiddie v. Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency, Ky., 393 S.W.2d 872, 874 (1965). The "arbitrary" standard has been defined to mean whether or not the act or decision was supported by "substantial evidence."

  3. Prudential Building & Loan Ass'n v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency of Louisville

    464 S.W.2d 629 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 5 times

    Prudential concedes that although its property was not in itself blighted, it could have been included in the project originally if found necessary to the accomplishment of an over-all plan for an area which as a whole was blighted. See Miller v. City of Louisville, Ky., 321 S.W.2d 237; Dinwiddie v. Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency of Louisville, Ky., 393 S.W.2d 872. The project here in question was instituted under the provisions of the Act of 1950 compiled as KRS 99.330 to 99.510. It is true that there is no specific provision in that Act authorizing an amendment of a plan to embrace additional territory.

  4. Usher & Gardner, Inc. v. Mayfield Independent Board of Education

    461 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 13 times
    Reading a "good faith" requirement into Ky. Rev. Stat. § 162.030, which grants local school boards eminent domain authority

    We held that the proper taking date was 1963, but that the jury should be advised by proper instruction that neither enhancement nor depreciation in value attributable to the public project was to be considered in their determination of the "before" valuation. In both Dinwiddie v. Urban Renewal Community Dev. Agency, Ky., 393 S.W.2d 872 (1965) and Urban Renewal Com. Develop. Agency v. Fledderman, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 741 (1967), the trial judge fixed the taking date for valuation purposes as the time the public project became generally known even though that date was considerably before the time of the trial of the issue of just compensation. In both instances we held the determination of the taking date was erroneous, but the error was regarded as harmless because admittedly there had been no change in property values in the interim.

  5. Wolf Creek Collieries Company v. Davis

    441 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 7 times

    Of course the evidence was inadmissible. Whitney v. Penick, 281 Ky. 474, 136 S.W.2d 570; Dinwiddie v. Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency, Ky., 393 S.W.2d 872. Nevertheless appellee's counsel brought it in five different times. The trial court did sustain objections and make some admonitions, but the admonitions were not of a character calculated to have much admonitive effect.

  6. West Fork Clarks River W. Con. Dis. v. Ransbottom

    420 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967)

    This Court has consistently considered such evidence incompetent and prejudicial. See also Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Brubaker, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 404 (1964); Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Raleigh, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 384 (1964); Dinwiddie v. Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency of Louisville, Ky., 393 S.W.2d 872 (1965)."

  7. Finch v. Commonwealth

    419 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 13 times
    In Finch, this Court's predecessor held that the trial court erred in overruling the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars.

    On appeal to the Court of Appeals Dinwiddie asserted as one of his claims of error that Emerson had erroneously been adjudged not to be a necessary party. This Court, in its opinion on the appeal, Dinwiddie v. Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency, 393 S.W.2d 872 @ 875, said, "The evidence shows that he [Emerson] transferred such interest as he had in the lease to Phillips Petroleum Company * * *." This statement in the opinion is what the circuit court in the instant case said was a conclusive adjudication that Lewis had not sworn falsely.

  8. Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Johnson

    403 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 4 times

    This Court has consistently considered such evidence incompetent and prejudicial. See also Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Brubaker, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 404 (1964); Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Raleigh, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 384 (1964); Dinwiddie v. Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency of Louisville, Ky., 393 S.W.2d 872 (1965). Finally, appellant complains of the testimony of Mrs. G.D. Johnson relative to her reason for the purchase of the farm out of which the land herein sought was taken.