Opinion
03 Civ. 4112 (RWS)
June 16, 2003
NATHANIEL K. CHARNY, ESQ., EISNER ASSOCIATES, P.C., New York, NY, Attorneys for Plaintiff
ROBERT M. CHEVERIE, ESQ., JOHN T. FUSSELL, ESQ., ROBERT M. CHEVERIE ASSOCIATES, P.C., East Hartford, CT, Attorneys for Defendants
OPINION
Plaintiff Peter J. Dinuzzo ("Dinuzzo") has moved for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to direct that the ballot being used for an on-going union election, on which a particular candidate's name has been stricken, be replaced by one in which the candidate's name is replaced. Defendants Local 79 ("Local 79") of the Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO ("LIUNA"); Joseph Guerrirri, Jr. ("Guerrirri"), in his capacity as LIUNA Special Elections Officer; and Paul Drazen ("Drazen"), Dave Bolger ("Bolger") and Chris Columbia ("Columbia") in their capacity as Judges of Election for Local 79 (collectively the "Defendants") have moved in opposition to the motion and have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
For the following reasons, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted, and Dinuzzo's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.
Prior Proceedings
Dinuzzo commenced suit on June 5, 2003, alleging violations of Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 411. He asserts that the Defendants violated Local 79's constitution, which states, "Once the Judges of Election have declared the nominee eligible to run, no nominee will be stricken from the ballot for any reason." The complaint claims that this constitution is a contract enforceable pursuant to LMRA § 301. It further asserts that the purported violation results in the unequal and discriminatory deprivation of Dinuzzo's LMRDA Title I right to nominate and vote in local elections, and that it implicates this Court's prior consent decree in a related case.
On June 5, 2003, Dinuzzo made the instant motion by order to show cause. The Defendants moved in opposition and cross-moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds on June 11, 2003. Dinuzzo replied on June 11, 2003. A hearing was held on June 11, 2003, at which time the motion was considered fully submitted.
Parties
Dinuzzo is a member of Local 79.
Local 79, located at 520 Eighth Avenue, New York, New York, is a subordinate body of the Mason Tenders District Council ("MTDC") and is a local union affiliate of LIUNA.
Drazen, Bolger and Columbia are members and Judges of Election of Local 79. Local 79's Executive Board appoints three Judges of Election to administer Local 79's officer elections. The judges serve for a three-year term.
Guerrirri is an attorney who served as the LIUNA Special Election Officer. He is not a member of any of the relevant unions.
The Ballot
A consent decree was issued in December 1994 as a result of a pattern of organized corruption within the MTDC (the "Consent Decree"). The June 2003 election at issue marks the first time since the Consent Decree was entered that Local 79 was scheduled to hold free and democratic elections for officers.
On May 15, 2003, a nomination meeting was held by Local 79. The President of Local 79 chaired the meeting, and Drazen, Bolger and Columbia were present in their capacities as Judges of Election. At the meeting, Dinuzzo nominated Michael Stuto ("Stuto") for the position of President of Local 79 and for the position of District Council Delegate. Stuto accepted the nomination.
On May 17, 2003, Stuto met with the Judges of Election, who examined Stuto's qualifications to confirm his eligibility to hold the offices to which he was nominated. At the conclusion of that meeting, Stuto was advised that he was eligible to run for the offices of President and Delegate.
Dinuzzo received a copy of the official ballot on May 23, 2003. It listed Stuto as a candidate for President and Delegate.
The official ballot was printed and prepared for mailing, which was set to begin on June 2, 2003.
On May 29, 2003, Stuto filed a protest concerning the eligibility of another candidate for president, the current president, Frank Noviello ("Noviello").
Dinuzzo alleges that the next day, on May 30, 2003, a protest regarding Stuto's candidacy was received. He further alleges that Guerrirri's investigation into the protest consisted of a short telephone conversation with Stuto.
Guerrirri issued an opinion dated June 2, 2003 — the day the ballots were supposed to be mailed — that ordered Local 79 to remove Stuto's name from the official ballot. Stuto's name was removed and new ballots were printed. The new ballots were mailed to approximately 8,000 members on June 4, 2003. The election is now on-going.
Discussion
I. Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12, courts must "accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint, and draw all inferences in favor of the pleader." Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1052 (2d Cir. 1993)).
The complaint may only be dismissed when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitled him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). See also Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991); Berheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1996). Review must be limited to the complaint and documents attached or incorporated by reference thereto. Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991).
II. The Complaint Must Be Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A. Section 301 Does Not Apply LMRA § 301 establishes federal jurisdiction over suits for a violation of a contract between labor organizations or between a labor organization and an employer. Wooddell v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 98 (1991); Shea v. McCarthy, 953 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
Section 301 is applicable to allegations by a union member of a breach of an international union's constitution. E.g., Korzen v. Local Union 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 75 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Shea v. McCarthy, 953 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1992)). This is because the international union's constitution is considered to be a contract between unions, as it involves an agreement between the international and its constituent locals. Id.
By contrast, however, union members' disputes regarding breaches of local union constitutions do not fall within the boundaries of § 301 because such disputes are between an individual member and a union. E.g., Rodriguez v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 1999 WL 816182, at *3 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999) (citing Korzen v. Local Union 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 75 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Thus, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 301 turns on whether Dinuzzo alleges a violation of the Local's or the International's Constitution. The complaint refers to various provisions of the "Local 79 Constitution." There is no allegation in the complaint that such constitution is in fact the International's constitution. As a result, because Dinuzzo alleges a violation of provisions of the Local 79 constitution, there is no jurisdiction pursuant to § 301.
In Dinuzzo's reply papers, he implies that a violation of the International's constitution has occurred. Yet he does not establish how the document that he labelled the "Local 79 Constitution" in the complaint is in fact the International's constitution. In the absence of such groundwork, his arguments must fail and this portion of his complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. The LMRDA Title I Relief Sought Is Preempted by Title IV
The Defendants contend that Title IV of the LMRDA preempts this Court's jurisdiction to grant the relief requested pursuant to Title I.
Title I provides a "Bill of Rights" whereby each union member shall have "equal rights" to, inter alia, vote in elections and participate in the deliberations and voting of membership meetings. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1).
Title IV governs union elections by, inter alia, fixing the terms of office, requiring that elections be by secret ballot, requiring a reasonable opportunity for nomination of candidates, and authorizing unions to fix reasonable qualifications for officers. Title IV seeks "to guarantee fair union elections in which all the members are allowed to participate." Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964); 29 U.S.C. § 482.
The enforcement mechanisms provided by Title I and Title IV differ. A union member may seek appropriate relief, including injunctive relief, in a district court pursuant to Title I. 29 U.S.C. § 412. An action pursuant to Title IV, however, may only be pursued by the Secretary of the Department of Labor (the "Secretary") after a labor organization member exhausts internal remedies and then files a complaint with the Secretary. 29 U.S.C. § 482.
Title IV contains an exclusivity provision such that, if Title IV applies, no other remedy is available. 29 U.S.C. § 483.
A bright-line rule has been established by the applicable statutes such that Title IV applies to all contests that arise after the conclusion of elections, but Title I applies to all contests that arise before the commencement of an election. 29 U.S.C. § 483.
The question of whether Title I or Title IV applies while an election is ongoing, such as is the situation here, is more open to debate.
In Local No. 92, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen and Packers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 539, 104 S.Ct. 2557, 81 L.Ed.2d 457 (1984) ("Crowley"), the Supreme Court considered whether Title IV should govern complaints arising during the course of an election but prior to its conclusion. The Supreme Court concluded that a district court's jurisdiction depends upon the appropriateness of the remedy sought in light of the intent of Congress in enacting a different regulatory regime in Title IV. Id. The Court's rationale was that Congress had recognized the "undesirable consequences that follow from judicial supervision of a union election." Id. at 550. As the Supreme Court noted, "throughout the congressional discussions preceding enactment of both Title I and Title IV, Congress clearly indicated its intent to consolidate challenges to union elections with the Secretary of Labor, and to have the Secretary supervise any new elections necessitated by violations of the Act." Id. at 543. On the other hand, "members may properly allege violations of Title I that are easily remediable under that Title without substantially delaying or invalidating an ongoing election." Id. at 546. As an example of an "easily remediable" problem, the Court hypothesized a situation where certain union members did not receive ballots as a result of their opposition to incumbent officers. Id. In such a situation, a district court may order the union to forward ballots to the members prior to the close of the election. Id.
Because the election at issue is on-going, it is necessary to determine whether the relief requested is more similar to the "easily remediable" problem of an incomplete mailing of ballots, or whether it is likely to result in a substantial delay or invalidation of the on-going election. Dinuzzo argues that he is not seeking the invalidation of the ongoing election, but rather that he merely seeks relief by which all the outstanding ballots would be collected and new ballots would be sent out. Such action would essentially invalidate the ongoing election and require a new one to be held. A delay would be inevitable given the 8,000 members who would have to return the purportedly erroneous ballots, obtain new ballots, and have a certain period of time in which to vote. The problem presented therefore is not "easily remediable", and would result in the ill-favored active participation of the Court in the union election.
As a result, it is found that Title IV is the appropriate provision under which relief must be sought, and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction.
C. All Writs Act
Dinuzzo's final claim is that this Court should act pursuant to the All Writs Act in order to prevent the frustration of the Consent Decree, which requires that MTDC and its subordinate entities be maintained democratically, with integrity and solely for the benefit of its members. The All Writs Act cannot, however, confer an independent basis of jurisdiction. E.g., Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 283 F.3d 404, 413 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Tablie, 166 F.3d 505, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1999). Because Dinuzzo has failed to establish another means of jurisdiction for the reasons discussed above, it is unnecessary to reach his claim pursuant to the All Writs Act.
Even if the merits of the claim were to be reached, however, Dinuzzo would not be successful.
The standard for granting a preliminary injunction in this Circuit is "(1) a showing of irreparable injury and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and the balance of hardships tipping in favor of the movant." North Atlantic Instrs., Inc. v. Haber, 188 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1997); Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1994).
Dinuzzo has failed to establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation. The All Writs Act states that federal courts may issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). This includes the power to "issue such commands . . . as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and to prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained." United States v. Mason Tenders District Council, 205 F. Supp.2d 183, 188 (May 30, 2002).
Dinuzzo has failed to establish a likelihood that he will be able to establish that it would be "necessary and appropriate" for this Court to intervene in the on-going election in order to preserve the Consent Decree. The equitable remedy provided by the All Writs Act should only be employed when parties have no other remedies available. E.g., Clinton v. Goldsmith, 119 S.Ct. 1538 (1999) ("The All Writs Act invests a court with a power essentially equitable and, as such, not generally available to provide alternatives to other, adequate remedies at law.") (citations omitted). As detailed above, Dinuzzo may proceed under Title IV to obtain redress for the alleged election improprieties. Therefore, even if it had jurisdiction this Court could not provide the relief Dinuzzo seeks and Dinuzzo's motion for a preliminary injunction would be denied.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' motion to dismiss on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted, and Dinuzzo's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.
It is so ordered.