Opinion
Case No. 1:03-CV-538.
July 23, 2004
ORDER AND PARTIAL JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Opinion of this date;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Summit Polymers, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 45) is GRANTED and summary judgment is entered in favor of Defendant as to Count III of the Complaint.
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Summit Polymers, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. This Motion has been fully briefed. It is unnecessary to hear oral argument concerning the Motion since the briefing sufficiently addresses the issues raised. See W.D. Mich. L. Civ.R. 7.2(d).BACKGROUND
This suit was filed on August 19, 2003, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq., and other state and federal statutes. Count III of the Complaint alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff Michael Dinsmore's rights to overtime wages under section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
On May 26, 2004, Defendant filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment requesting dismissal of Count III on the ground that Plaintiff Michael Dinsmore was at all times pertinent to the claims a salaried and "exempt" employee — i.e., one not entitled to overtime wages under 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
At the time of the "overtime" work at issue (from 1997 to 2003), Plaintiff Michael Dinsmore was employed as the Director of Product Engineering and the Director of the Visteon/Nissan Business Unit. He was designated an annual salary exceeding $100,000 per year for the past several years of his employment. ( See Gregory Goodman Aff., at ¶ 2.) Though so designated, his pay check records indicate that pay was computed based on an 86.67 hour work week (even though Plaintiff routinely worked greater hours during the work week).
During this time period, Plaintiff Michael Dinsmore was allotted a given number of vacation days per year. In the fiscal year between October 1997 and October 1998, Plaintiff Michael Dinsmore had deducted from his pay one eight-hour day due to excessive vacation days. (Plaintiffs' Ex. A.) In the fiscal year between October 2001 and October 2002, Plaintiff Michael Dinsmore had deducted from his pay three eight-hour days due to excessive vacation days. (Plaintiffs' Ex.A; M. Dinsmore Dep. at 99.) Some of the absences deducted were recorded as half-day absences and were part of the total excessive days deducted when totaled. ( Id.) According to the records and Defendant's employee, Greg Goodman, there was no practice of deducting partial days as to salaried employees. (Goodman Aff., at ¶¶ 4-5.)
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The initial burden is on the movant to specify the basis upon which summary judgment should be granted and to identify portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to come forward with specific facts, supported by the evidence in the record, upon which a reasonable jury could find there to be a genuine fact issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If, after adequate time for discovery on material matters at issue, the non-movant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of a material disputed fact, summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
As explained in the briefing, there is a two-part test for determining whether an employee is a salaried employee who is exempt from the overtime wage laws. The questions are: (1) whether the employee is paid the same amount each work week regardless of the hours worked; and (2) whether the compensation is not subject to reduction based on the quantity or quality of the work performed. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a). In this case, it is clear that Plaintiff was paid the same weekly salary, and the remaining question is whether his salary was "reduced" based on the quantity of hours worked. This latter requirement is commonly referred to as the non-docking rule. See DiGiore v. Ryan, 172 F.3d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 1999).
The non-docking rule is further qualified by the regulations, which state:
Deductions may be made, however, when the employee absents himself from work for a day or more for personal reasons, other than sickness or accident. Thus, if an employee is absent for a day or longer to handle personal affairs, his salaried status will not be affected if deductions are made from his salary for such absences.
29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(2). Consistent with this regulation, the Department of Labor has issued multiple Opinion Letters authorizing full-day pay deductions for salaried employees in circumstances similar to the deductions made in this suit. ( See Def.'s Attchs. 1-3.)
The Department of Labor's understanding of these regulations has been upheld by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Schaeffer v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., 358 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2004), the court explicitly recognized that deductions to a "bank of time" as opposed to partial-day pay deductions do not affect a worker's exempt status. This practice is also consistent with the Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Renfro v. Indian Michigan Power Co., 370 F.3d 512, 516 (6th Cir. 2004), which suggested as much (as well as other cases from other of the Circuit Courts of Appeals).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given, an Order and Partial Judgment shall issue granting Defendant Summit Polymers, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count III.