OCGA § 16-5-23 (a). Miles contends that this case is identical to Dinkler v. State , 305 Ga. App. 444, 699 S.E.2d 541 (2010), overruled on other grounds, Stuart v. State , 318 Ga. App. 839, 842-843 (3), 734 S.E.2d 814 (2012), where this Court concluded that the trial court erred in refusing to give the defendant's written request to charge the jury on battery as a lesser-included offense of cruelty to children in the first degree. Id. at 449 (1), 699 S.E.2d 541.

To the extent that King v. State, 295 Ga.App. 865, 867(2), 673 S.E.2d 329 (2009) adopts Hill 's proposition that a defendant may be convicted of a lesser offense if the facts alleged throughout the indictment and the evidence presented at trial establish the elements necessary to convict on the lesser offense, it is also overruled. Finally, in Dinkler v. State, 305 Ga.App. 444, 448(1), n. 2, 699 S.E.2d 541 (2010), this Court held incorrectly that the "required evidence" test does not apply when considering the propriety of giving a jury charge on a lesser included offense, only when considering whether multiple convictions are precluded, citing Stepp v. State, 286 Ga. 556, 690 S.E.2d 161 (2010). But this conclusion is based on the misreading of a Drinkard footnote and of Stepp. The court in Drinkard clarified in a footnote that "[t]he ‘required evidence’ test applies strictly within the context of determining whether multiple convictions are precluded because one of the crimes was ‘established by proof of the same or less than all the facts' that were required to establish the other crime under OCGA § 16–1–6(1)."

1. The evidence outlined above was sufficient to sustain Chambers's conviction for first-degree cruelty to children. See OCGA § 16–5–70(b) (defining cruelty to children in the first degree as “maliciously caus [ing] a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain”); Dinkler v. State, 305 Ga.App. 444, 449–450, 699 S.E.2d 541 (2010) (evidence that defendant beat victims with bat and belt was sufficient to sustain conviction on two counts of first-degree cruelty to children). 2. Under OCGA § 17–8–57, “[i]t is error for any judge in any criminal case, during its progress or in his charge to the jury, to express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.