Opinion
HHDCV136040890
12-18-2015
Quintino Dinino, Jr. v. Federal Express Corporation et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Constance L. Epstein, J.
Facts
On April 3, 2013, plaintiff, in the course of his employment with Federal Express (FedEx), was assisting with the movement of heavy containers from the back of a truck onto a loading dock at the FedEx warehouse in Enfield, Connecticut. The procedure employed was to back up the tractor trailer to the loading dock and leave a space between the rear of the trailer and the dock so the containers could be rolled off the trailer on the air-lift roller conveyer system that was on the back of the trailer. Co-employee, Earnest Hawkins, had backed up the truck to the loading dock, had stopped the truck, and had exited the cab of the truck. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Hawkins had left too large a space between the rear of the trailer and the loading dock, and in plaintiff's efforts to move the containers, his leg slipped into the gap, causing him to be pinned between the truck and the loading dock, and further causing a container to roll onto his leg.
Discussion and Legal Analysis
Mr. Hawkins has moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff's claim is barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provisions and that it does not fall within the motor vehicle exception to those provisions.
Summary judgment is appropriately invoked if the movant contends there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Connecticut Practice Book Sec. 17-49.
Under Connecticut law, a party injured in the course of his employment is entitled to workers' compensation benefits from his employer, regardless of fault for the accident, and the employee is barred from pursuing a civil action for damages against the employer, a doctrine commonly called the exclusive remedy rule. Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 31-284. Pietraroia v. Northeast Utilities, 254 Conn. 60, 756 A.2d 845 (2000). The statutory scheme also extends this prohibition to suits against potentially negligent co-employees, providing at General Statues Sec. 31-293a that one entitled to workers' compensation benefits " . . . no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was willful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in section 14-1" There is no question that the truck at issue falls within the definition in General Statutes Sec. 14-1 and that it is not one of the types of vehicles excluded from the so-called " operation of a motor vehicle" exception set forth in General Statutes Sec. 31-293a. Mr. Hawkins asserts, however, that he is entitled to judgment in his favor because the accident was not caused by his operation of a motor vehicle.
Although our statutes provide definitions of many of the terms used in the workers' compensation and related statutes, the term " operation" is not included in those definitions. There has been, however, quite a bit written about the subject. In addressing the application of the exclusive remedy rule to workplace accidents, the Connecticut Supreme court stated in dictum that the legislative history suggested that " the intention was to distinguish 'simple negligence on the job' from negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle. Unlike the special hazards of the work place, the risk of a motor vehicle accident is a common danger to which the general public is exposed." Dias v. Adams, 189 Conn. 354, 360, 456 A.2d 309 (1983). This underlying rationale had been adhered to in previous Supreme and Appellate Court cases, as well as subsequent ones. In Davey v. Pepperidge Farms, Inc., 180 Conn. 469, 429 A.2d 943 (1980), the high court did not find the operation-of-a-motor-vehicle exception applicable to an injury caused during the operation of a hydraulic hoist on a truck. In Dias v. Adams, supra, a similar holding was applied to a case involving the shovel of a backhoe being operated separately from the movement of the vehicle. In Kegel v. McNeely, 2 Conn.App. 174, 476 A.2d 641 (1984), a crane mounted to a truck, for which each had separate controls, was similarly treated and the exception was held to not apply.
In Public Act 83-297, the General Assembly enacted an amendment to General Statutes Sec. 31-293a which specified that " contractors' mobile equipment such as bulldozers, power shovels, rollers, graders or scrapers, farm machinery, cranes, diggers, forklifts, pumps, generators, air compressors, drills or other similar equipment designed for use principally off the roads are not motor vehicles if the claimed injury involving such equipment occurred at the worksite . . ."
In Fields v. Giron, 65 Conn.App. 771, 783 A.2d 1097, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 936, 785 A.2d 230 (2001) the exclusive remedy rule barring suit against a co-employee was determined to be applicable to a situation in which an employee was injured when the rope connecting a tree to a truck snapped and struck the plaintiff. Although the Supreme Court had denied certification in the Fields v. Giron case, in Colangelo v. Heckelman, 279 Conn. 177, 900 A.2d 1266 (2006), our Supreme Court again addressed the issue before us in this matter and explicitly rejected the basis of the Fields v. Giron decision, holding that General Statutes Sec. 31-293a " contains no language suggesting that its exception to the general rule of fellow employee immunity excludes any motor vehicle accident that, because of the nature of the employment, is a special risk of that employment not common to members of the public generally." Id. at 190.
As plaintiff has argued in this case, Colangelo provides a different perspective from that of previous caselaw. However, this court is not convinced that it affects the result in this case. In that case the factual situation differs considerably and the high court holding and directives do not dictate the plaintiff's desired ruling on the motion for summary judgment in this case. In Colangelo, plaintiff and defendant were technicians conducting an inspection of a vehicle. Defendant had driven the vehicle into the service bay onto a plate designed to prevent movement of the vehicle. The engine remained running, the transmission was in neutral, but the emergency brake was not engaged. As the plaintiff was raising the hood of the vehicle in order to check engine fluids, the vehicle lurched forward, causing him to be pinned to the wall and causing him injuries. While the Supreme Court rejected the " special hazards of the workplace" theory that had been applied by the lower court in granting summary judgment, it sent the matter back to the trial court to rule on the alternative basis of defendant's summary judgment motion--that is, whether the accident was caused by the " operation" of a motor vehicle. Id. at 192.
In the case before this court, the vehicle was stationary, was turned off, and, indeed, the driver was not even in the cab. The accident did not result from the movement of the truck after it had been parked, and indeed, the accident had nothing whatsoever to do with the operation of the truck. In addition, the proximity of the rear of the truck to the platform onto which the cartons were to be rolled also had nothing whatsoever to do with the operation of the truck. Indeed, while it is not the basis of this decision, one cannot help but notice that the extension of the special roller equipment employed to remove the freight from the trailer at the warehouse dock resembles the category of equipment that is excluded from the statutory motor vehicle definitions contained in General Statutes Sec. 31-293a.
There are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For all of the above reasons, the motion for summary judgment is granted.