Dinini v. Mechanics Savings Bank

7 Citing cases

  1. Fasano v. Meliso

    152 A.2d 512 (Conn. 1959)   Cited 20 times
    In Fasano v. Meliso, 146 Conn. 496, 152 A.2d 512 (1959), this court held that a trust account, similar to the accounts in the present case, was invalid as "an attempted testamentary disposition of the trustee's own property in a manner forbidden by the Statute of Wills."

    In the absence of proof to the contrary, however, a person is presumed to know and understand the contents of a simple instrument which he signs. Dinini v. Mechanics Savings Bank, 85 Conn. 225, 228, 82 A. 580. It follows that as of the time each of the accounts, A and B, was opened, the decedent's intention must have been as contained in the statement of ownership, that is, that the money on deposit was wholly his and should remain wholly his during his lifetime and that what, if anything, remained on deposit at his death should then, and not before, belong and be paid to the named beneficiary.

  2. Polonsky v. Union Federal Savings Loan Association

    334 Mass. 697 (Mass. 1956)   Cited 9 times
    In Polonsky v. Union Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, supra, the Massachusetts court said at page 700: "But according to the weight of authority a depositor by accepting and retaining a pass book wherein such a provision is printed is deemed to have assented to it, and the provision becomes a part of the contract between the bank and the depositor."

    But according to the weight of authority a depositor by accepting and retaining a pass book wherein such a provision is printed is deemed to have assented to it, and the provision becomes a part of the contract between the bank and the depositor. Dinini v. Mechanics Savings Bank, 85 Conn. 225, 228. Ladd v. Augusta Savings Bank, 96 Maine, 510, 513. Heath v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 46 N.H. 78. Cosgrove v. Provident Institution for Savings, 35 Vroom, 653, 654. Wharton v. Poughkeepsie Savings Bank, 262 App. Div. (N.Y.) 598, 601. Royon v. Greenstein, 122 Ohio St. 340, 345, 347. Bulakowski v. Philadelphia Saving Fund Society, 270 Pa. 538, 541-542. Davis v. Chittenden County Trust Co. 115 Vt. 349, 352-353.

  3. Batter Building Materials Co. v. Kirschner

    142 Conn. 1 (Conn. 1954)   Cited 112 times
    Concluding that while a material breach relieves the injured party from further fulfillment of his contractual obligations, the breaching party could still avail itself of the contract's arbitration provision, because that clause "survives for the purpose of measuring the claims arising out of the breach, and . . . determining the mode of their settlement."

    Nor is a party allowed, in the absence of accident, fraud, mistake or unfair dealing, to escape his contractual obligations by saying, as each of the plaintiffs does here, that he did not read what was expressly incorporated as specific provisions of the contract into which he entered. See Dinini v. Mechanics Savings Bank, 85 Conn. 225, 228, 82 A. 580; West v. Suda, 69 Conn. 60, 62, 36 A. 1015. The plaintiffs, however, maintain that, even though articles 39 and 40 of Form A2 are within the agreement, the defendants are precluded from demanding arbitration because of their failure to provide an architect on the job.

  4. Mutual Assurance Co. v. Norwich Savings Society

    128 Conn. 510 (Conn. 1942)   Cited 12 times

    "The deposit book shall be the voucher of the depositor, and possession of the deposit book shall be sufficient authority to the Society to warrant any payment made and entered in it, and any payment to a person producing a deposit book issued by this Society shall be a valid payment to discharge the Society." These provisions became a part of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant with reference to the deposit, and, in the absence of some further agreement or waiver, the bank could not properly pay out any part of the deposit except in accordance with them. Chase v. Waterbury Savings Bank, 77 Conn. 295, 300, 59 A. 37; Dinini v. Mechanics Savings Bank, 85 Conn. 225, 228, 82 A. 580. They were for the protection of the bank and of the depositor but the two could, by joint agreement or action, waive compliance with them. Candee v. Connecticut Savings Bank, 81 Conn. 372, 377, 71 A. 551; Wood v. Connecticut Savings Bank, 87 Conn. 341, 347, 87 A. 983. The directors of the plaintiff met once a year to hear and approve the treasurer's report, elect a secretary and treasurer, appoint an auditor, provide for compensation for these officers and vote to indorse premiums on outstanding policies.

  5. Savings Bank v. Appler

    151 Md. 571 (Md. 1926)   Cited 22 times
    In Appler, husband and wife had a joint savings account with the bank, subject to the order of either, the balance at the death of either to belong to the survivor.

    And it is universally held that reasonable rules and by-laws of a savings bank become, when assented to by the depositor, part of the contract between them, and the depositor has a right to rely on these rules and by-laws. People'sSav. Bank v. Cupps, 91 Pa. 315; Allen v. Williamsport Sav. Bank, 69 N.Y. 314, 321; Ackenhanson v. People's Sav. Bank, 110 Mich. 175; Brown v. Merrimack River Sav. Bank, 67 N.H. 549; Cosgrove v. Provident Sav. Inst., 64 N.J.L. 653; Dinini v. Mechanics Sav. Bank, 85 Conn. 225. And a provision requiring the production of the pass book when deposits or withdrawals are to be made is quite customary, and has frequently been held reasonable and enforceable by the courts. Rosenthal v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 113 N.Y. Supp. 787; Whalen v. Millholland, 89 Md. 199; Mathias v. Fowler, 124 Md. 655; Frentz v. Schwarze, 122 Md. 12-17; Conser v. Snowden, 54 Md. 175; 7 C.J. 867.

  6. Lippitt v. Ashley

    89 Conn. 451 (Conn. 1915)   Cited 58 times
    In Lippitt v. Ashley, 89 Conn. 451, 480, 94 A.2d 995, 1005 (1915), the Connecticut court stated that the statute is tolled when "the defendants' conduct or representations were directed to the very point of obtaining the delay of which he afterwards seeks to take advantage by pleading the statute."

    Such cases present only an unreviewable question of fact save, of course, where the conclusion reached is one which could only be reached in violation of the rules of logic or reason. Lord v. Lamonte, 72 Conn. 37, 39, 43 A. 491; Fox v. Kinney, 72 Conn. 404, 407, 44 A. 745; Murphy v. Derby Street Ry. Co., 73 Conn. 249, 253, 47 A. 120; Dinini v. Mechanics Savings Bank, 85 Conn. 225, 230, 82 A. 580. Applying these well-established principles to the present situation, we are bound to remember that the question before us is whether we are prepared to pronounce, and justified in pronouncing, a judgment of unreasonableness upon the conclusion of fact of the court below, that the defendants were not negligent. No disregard of legal principles is discoverable, and we are driven, if error is to be found, to the extreme indicated.

  7. Wood v. Connecticut Savings Bank

    87 A. 983 (Conn. 1913)   Cited 10 times

    This regulation appears to relate to the conduct of the officers and agents of the bank in the management of its affairs. If it were intended to safeguard the bank in relieving it from liability from fraud practiced upon it in withdrawing money by means of forged signatures, its language and position in the by-laws were such that it could not be fairly held that the depositors should be presumed to know of its terms. See Dinini v. Mechanics Savings Bank, 85 Conn. 225, 228, 82 A. 580. It is a further ground of appeal that the court instructed the jury that when the plaintiff demanded the sums of money in question, "he offered to the bank a good and sufficient bond with surety to protect the bank from any loss which it might thereafter meet with in consequence of the payments to him of such sums."