Opinion
C. A. 9:24-00235-JD-MHC
06-10-2024
Henry O'Neal Dingle, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Warden John Palmer, Associate Warden Thomas Robertson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Henry O'Neal Dingle, Jr., proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action against Defendants alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
In an Order entered April 23, 2024, Plaintiff was advised of material deficiencies in his Complaint and given the opportunity to file an amended Complaint. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently an inmate at the Broad River Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). See ECF No. 5-1. He alleges claims against Defendants MCI Warden John Palmer (Palmer) and MCI Associate Warden Thomas Robertson (Robertson) about incidents at the McCormick Correctional Institution (MCI) of the SCDC. Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) for alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 1 at 5. He requests monetary damages and injunctive relief. Id. at 14.
In October 2022, Defendant Palmer accused Plaintiff of “being involved with a drone and a package,” which Plaintiff denies. ECF No. 1 at 7. Plaintiff asserts that he was put in lockup and recommended for security detention (SD) on October 31, 2022. He claims that his due process and equal protection rights were violated because he was recommended for S.D. without a prior disciplinary hearing to determine whether he was innocent or guilty of the accusations. Id.
Plaintiff received a notice of a custody hearing on December 2 (presumably in 2022), but he claims he did not receive the due process protections afforded with disciplinary hearings. ECF No. 1 at 7. He alleges that SCDC policies were violated because he did not receive a 90-day custody hearing on April 10, 2023, and did not receive a 120-day custody hearing. Plaintiff asserts that he “caught a disciplinary infraction” on June 19, 2023, and based on the disciplinary infraction he was denied advancement at his S.D. review on July 7, 2023. He contends that if he received his S.D. review at the proper time, the hearing would have been before his June 2023 disciplinary infraction, which he speculates would have resulted in a favorable S.D. review. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants should have taken him off S.D. because he did not receive a hearing within 90 days. ECF No. 1 at 9. He also appears to allege that his grievances were not properly handled. ECF No. 1 at 9. Plaintiff received a hearing on September 27, 2023, at which time he was again denied custody advancement because of the June 2023 infraction. ECF No. 1 at 10. Plaintiff also complains that at his DHO hearing (presumably as to the June 2023 disciplinary infraction) he was sentenced to 120 days of restrictions. ECF No. 1 at 10.
Defendant Palmer allegedly violated Plaintiff's equal protection rights because other inmates with similar disciplinary charges were given DHO hearings. ECF No. 1 at 4. Defendant Robertson allegedly violated Plaintiff's equal protection rights by denying Plaintiff advancement from level 2 to level 3 custody because Plaintiff was only disciplinary free for 90 days, but Robertson advanced the custody classification of other inmates who had only been disciplinary free for 90 days. ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff also alleges that Palmer and Robertson violated his equal protection rights because Plaintiff did not receive timely S.D. hearings, but other inmates received “a review 120 days after being on SD[.]” ECF No. 1 at 4.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se Complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
It is recommended that this action be summarily dismissed because Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable federal claim, as discussed below.
A. Due Process Claims as to Custody Classification
Plaintiff appears to allege that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because Defendants placed him in S.D. without giving him a disciplinary hearing and other related procedures. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty interest and (2) show deprivation of that interest without due process of law. Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015).
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge his S.D. status and procedures related to this, including his initial S.D. placement, hearings as to the continuation of his S.D. status, advancement of his S.D. status, or damages based upon his custody classification, his claims are subject to dismissal because prisoners generally do not have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in a particular security classification or prison placement. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (finding no constitutional right under the due process clause to a particular security classification or prison placement), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Because “the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner,” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. at 478 (1995), “to demonstrate a liberty interest meriting procedural due process protection, a prisoner must show (1) denial of an interest that can arise either from the Constitution itself or from state laws or policies, and that (2) this denial imposed on him an atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Prieto, 780 F.3d at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to rise to such a level.
While the Fourth Circuit has held that a prisoner may set forth a viable due process claim relating to a custody status decision under some circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to set forth facts sufficient to proceed on such a claim in this case. See Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015). To determine whether an “atypical and significant hardship” has been imposed, the Supreme Court has outlined a fact intensive inquiry into “(1) the magnitude of confinement restrictions; (2) whether the administrative segregation is for an indefinite period; and (3) whether assignment to administrative segregation had any collateral consequences on the inmate's sentence.” Incumaa, 791 F.3d at 530 (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005)).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to state a due process claim. He fails to allege any facts to indicate that his S.D. classification and placement imposed an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Further, although reviews were allegedly delayed, Plaintiff admits he received classification reviews. Additionally, he has not alleged any facts to indicate that his assignment to S.D. custody had any collateral consequences on his sentence. Thus, Plaintiff has alleged no facts to indicate that the conditions of S.D. imposed an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
B. Due Process Claims as to June 2023 Disciplinary Hearing
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to challenge his June 2023 disciplinary conviction, he fails to state a constitutional claim. Records from SCDC indicate that Plaintiff was convicted on June 30, 2023, for possession or attempt to possess a cell phone for which he received loss of canteen, telephone, and visitation privileges for 100 days. He did not lose any good-time credits. See SCDC Incarcerated Inmate Search, http://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ [Search Inmate “Henry Dingle”] (last visited June 7, 2024). Plaintiff's claims should be summarily dismissed because he has not alleged that he was denied a protected liberty interest. Disciplinary proceedings which implicate a protected liberty interest demand due process. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). However, to prevail on a due process claim, an inmate must first demonstrate that he was deprived of “life, liberty, or property” by governmental action. Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997). When the punishment does not cause the original sentence to be enhanced, protected interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint that imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. at 484 (holding that disciplinary segregation did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might create a liberty interest).
This Court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n. 1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869, at * 2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records).
C. Claims as to Violations of SCDC Rules and/or Policies
Plaintiff alleges that SCDC violated its own rules and/or policies by failing to provide him with certain hearings as to his custody classification. However, such allegations are not actionable in a § 1983 action as violations of SCDC policies and/or procedures do not constitute violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992); cf. Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., No. 06B2062, 2007 WL 904826 at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) (A plaintiff's allegation that defendants did not follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.) (citing Riccio v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990)) (if state law grants more procedural rights than the Constitution requires, a state's failure to abide by that law is not a federal due process issue).
D. Equal Protection Claims
Plaintiff appears to allege that his equal protection rights were violated because some other inmates who had the same or similar charges received a DHO hearing or had their custody levels advanced sooner than his custody level was advanced. To establish an equal protection violation,
Plaintiff first must demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated, and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). If that initial showing has been made, “the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.” Id. Here, Plaintiff fails to state an equal protection claim as he has not alleged any facts to indicate that he was treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated. Even if he has alleged sufficient facts to establish that similarly-situated inmate(s) were treated better, he fails to allege any facts to indicate that the alleged unequal treatment was a result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
Plaintiff alleges that inmates with similar charges were treated better, but fails to identify which inmate or inmates were similarly situated to him and he has not alleged any facts to indicate that these unidentified inmate(s) were accused of the same infractions or had similar custody classification factors (such as similar disciplinary convictions, overall disciplinary action records, and criminal convictions).
E. Claims about SCDC Grievances
Any complaints by Plaintiff about the handling of his SCDC grievances should also be summarily dismissed. It is well-settled that prison inmates have no federal constitutional right to have any inmate grievance system in operation at the place where they are incarcerated. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Smith v. Ray, 36 Fed.Appx. 99 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A]ccess to the grievance procedure is not a constitutionally protected right[.]”); Oliver v. Myers, No. 7:08-CV-558, 2008 WL 5212409, at *4 (W.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2008) (stating that “because state grievance procedures are separate and distinct from state and federal legal procedures, an institution's failure to comply with state grievance procedures does not compromise its inmates' right of access to the courts”).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process.
See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend ... the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).