Opinion
Civil Action No. C-07-127.
April 5, 2007
ORDER
On this day came on to be considered Plaintiff Theodoros George Dimopoulos' motion for reconsideration of a portion of this Court's Order entered March 23, 2007 (D.E. 25), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and 59(e) (D.E. 28). Specifically, Plaintiff requests the Court to alter or amend the portion of its Order staying the instant case pending the outcome of removal proceedings against Mr. Dimopoulos. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED, and this case remains stayed pending the outcome of removal proceedings against Plaintiff.
I. Rule 59(e) Motions
A Rule 59(e) motion is one that seeks to "alter or amend" a previous judgment entered by the Court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). "Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly." Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit has held "that such a motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment." Id.;see also Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990) ("These motions cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued"). Rather, Rule 59(e) "serves the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Templet, 367 F.3d at 479 (citing Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989)). A Rule 59(e) motion "must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence" that was not available before the judgment issued. See Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567-68 (5th Cir. 2003) (citingRosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863-64 (5th Cir. 2003)).
II. Board of Immigration Appeals Decision: Matter of Acosta-Hidalgo
III. The Instant Action Must Remain Stayed
Matter of Acosta-Hidalgo24 I. N. Dec. 103108 Matter of Acosta-Hidalgo See Matter of Acosta-Hidalgo Acosta-Hidalgo could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued. Simon891 F.2d at 1159 See e.g. Dominguez v. Ashcroft 2004 WL 2632916Meraz v. Comfort 2006 WL 861859Gatcliffe v. Reno 23 F.Supp.2d 5818 U.S.C. 1429 Ogunfuye v. Acosta 2006 WL 3627144 Ogunfuye 8 U.S.C. § 1447Id. Ogunfuye
This case was transferred from the Western District of Texas to the Southern District of Texas on March 15, 2007. Plaintiff could have filed a supplemental response to Defendants' motion to dismiss either in the transferor court or the transferee court prior to this Court's issuance of its Order on March 23, 2007.
Moreover, despite Plaintiff's implication to the contrary, theAcosta-Hidalgo decision does not state that to terminate removal proceedings, an immigration judge requires a communication from a district court that an alien is prima facie eligible for naturalization. (See Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2, stating that "the immigration judge cannot terminate [Plaintiff's] removal proceedings unless this Court declares that he is prima facie eligible for naturalization"). Rather, the Acosta-Hidalgo decision focuses on how an immigration judge requires an affirmative communication from the Department of Homeland Security in order to terminate removal proceedings. See id. at 106 ("it is appropriate for the Board [of Immigration] and the Immigration Judges to require some form of affirmative communication from the DHS prior to terminating proceedings based on [an applicant's] pending naturalization application." Id. at 106 (emphasis added). Importantly, the Acotsa-Hidalgo decisiondoes not find that in order to terminate removal proceedings, an immigration judge requires the decision of a district court that an applicant is prima facie eligible for naturalization.
Plaintiff also refers to this Court's Order in Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Security, 2005 WL 2230152 (S.D. Tex. 2005). Ibrahim is factually distinguishable from the instant case. In Ibrahim, removal proceedings had not been officially instituted as of the time the Court took jurisdiction over the case. See id. at *5. However, the Court's Order in Ibrahim unequivocally states that "Defendants are correct that if removal proceedings had been commenced against Plaintiff, . . . this Court likely would stay these proceedings until the conclusion of the removal proceedings. " Id. at *3. In this case, removal proceedings were officially instituted against Mr. Dimopoulos prior to the date he filed the instant case in federal court, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). This case is distinguishable from Ibrahim, and inIbrahim the Court stated that it would likely stay the case if it were in the same procedural posture as the instant action. See id.
The Court also notes that Plaintiff files his motion under both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)(6). Rule 59(e) has been addressed above. Rule 60(b)(6) states that "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any . . . reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that there is no valid reason justifying relief from this Court's March 23, 2007 Order in this case. As noted above, Plaintiff could have made his argument regarding the BIA ruling in Matter of Acosta-Hidalgo prior to this Court's March 23, 2007 Order. Further, this Court has stayed the case pursuant to the 2006 Fifth Circuit case of Ogunfuye v. Acosta, as well as other courts that have stayed Section 1447(b) cases pending the outcome of removal proceedings. See Ogunfuye, 2006 WL 3627144 at *2. In this case, removal proceedings were not instituted solely because the Plaintiff filed a case in federal court, rather, removal proceedings were instituted well before Mr. Dimopoulos filed the instant action. There is no indication that removal proceedings have been instituted for an improper purpose, or that they are proceeding in an untimely matter. Rather, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration indicates that an immigration judge has been assigned to the case, and this Court will allow the pending removal proceedings to reach their conclusion, at which point this Court will conduct a hearing, if necessary, on Plaintiff's naturalization application. Based on the above, this Court finds no valid reason to vacate its stay order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).