This court must respect the intricate priority scheme that the legislature has established." Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB v. Mumnelli, 39 Conn. App. 736, 739, 667 A.2d 803 (1995), cert. denied, 236 Conn. 902, 670 A.2d 321 (1996). Specifically, § 47-258 (b) provides in relevant part: "In all actions brought to foreclose a lien under this section or a security interest … the lien is also prior to all [first or second] security interests … to the extent of (A) an amount equal to the common expense assessments based on the periodic budget adopted by the association … which would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the nine months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce either the association’s lien or a security interest … excluding any late fees, interest or fines which may be assessed by the association during the nine-month period, and (B) the association’s costs and reasonable attorney’s fees in enforcing its lien, A lien for any assessment or fine specified in subsection (a) of this section

51 Am.Jur.2d Liens § 56 at 133–34 (2011). See, BA Mortg. v. Quail Creek Condominium Ass'n, 192 P.3d 447 (Colo.App.2008) ; Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y. v. Muranelli, 39 Conn.App. 736, 667 A.2d 803 (1995) ; Hudson House Condo. Ass'n v. Brooks, 223 Conn. 610, 611 A.2d 862 (1992) ; Brask v. Bank of St. Louis, 533 S.W.2d 223 (Mo.App.1975). See, also, Spanish Court Two Condominium Ass'n v. Carlson, 2014 IL 115342, 12 N.E.3d 1, 382 Ill.Dec. 1 (2014) ; Elbadramany v. Oceans Seven Condominium Ass'n, 461 So.2d 1001 (Fla.App.1984).

Decided January 17, 1996 The petition of the defendant Laurelton House Condominium Association, Inc., for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 736 (AC 14269), is denied. William W. Ward and Steven Stanford Berizzi, in support of the petition.

Moreover, although the parties have not cited any cases addressing homeowners association challenges to lien priority statutes, our independent research reveals that the courts that have considered such challenges—Connecticut and Florida state appellate courts—have rejected them. (See Dime Sav. Bank, FSB v. Muranelli (Conn.Ct.App. 1995) 667 A.2d 803, 806 [rejecting association's argument that "because [association] expenditures are used for the common good of all units and the mortgagee often takes title to the unit as a result of the foreclosure action, the mortgagee realizes a gain at the expense of the association"]; U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ex rel. Harborview 2005-10 Trust Fund v. Tadmore (Fla.Ct.App. 2009) 23 So.3d 822, 823 (Tadmore) [reversing trial court's order requiring lender to pay association dues during foreclosure action where association challenged lender's alleged " 'undue delay in pursuing . . . foreclosure' "]; U.S. Bank N.A. v. Farhood (Fla.Ct.App. 2014) 153 So.3d 955, 959-960 [reversing trial court's order requiring lender to pay homeowners association dues as sanction for dilatory pursuit of foreclosure action].) The Association's reliance on In re Spa at Sunset Isles Condo. Ass'n, Inc. (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) 454 B.R. 898, is misplaced.

The priority, however, is temporally limited by § 47-258(b) to the amount of the common expense assessments . . . which would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the [nine] months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce . . . the association's lien . . ." (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hudson House Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, 223 Conn. 614; accord Linden Condominium Assn., Inc. v. McKenna, 247 Conn. 575, 584-85, 726 A.2d 502 (1999); Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB v. Muranelli, 39 Conn.App. 736, 739-41, 667 A.2d 803 (1995), cert. denied, 236 Conn. 902, 670 A.2d 321 (1996). " The split priority [created by § 47-258(b)] establishes a superpriority for up to [nine] months of common charges and attorneys fees and costs prior to first and second mortgages and taxes, and establishes a recording lien for the remainder of the common charges that is prior to many other liens.

" This statutory remedy has rarely been cited, see e.g. Dime Savings Bank v. Muranelli, 39 Conn.App. 736, 741 (1995). One commentator has observed:

Although the "first in time is first in right" is a fundamental principal in the determination of priority of interests, there are a number of exceptions to this rule. State v. Bucchieri, 176 Conn. 339, 346-47 (1978) (priority of certain debts due the federal government); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47-258 (priority of liens with respect to foreclosure involving condominium confirmed by Dime Savings Bank v. Muranelli, 39 Conn.App. 736, 739 (1995)). The doctrine of equitable subrogation is an exception to the first in time, first in right theory.