Having taken possession, he had the right to collect the rents. Dime Savings Bank of Hartford v. Bragaw, 125 Conn. 281, 284; Desiderio v. Iadonisi, supra. The defendant failed to pay the $75 instalment of principal due on October 1, 1950, and again on November 1, 1950. A note is payable at the time fixed therein; General Statutes § 6377; and the maker engages to pay according to its tenor § 6352.

On the basis of its conclusion that the plaintiff's were entitled to a deficiency judgment, this court concluded that it also followed that the plaintiff's were entitled to have the net sum in the receiver's hands as of the date of foreclosure sale paid to them in reduction of the amount of their deficiency judgment. Id., 696; see also Dime Savings Bank of Hartford v. Bragaw, 125 Conn. 281, 284, 4 A.2d 924 (1939) ("The right of the mortgagor is not to receive the rentals so collected, but to require their application to reduce the amount he must pay in order to redeem. The reduction of the debt in this way is but the application to it of something which primarily belongs to the mortgagor. . . .

The plaintiff, however, in his brief, disputes facts appearing in the memorandum of decision. See Dime Savings Bank v. Bragaw, 125 Conn. 281, 284, 4 A.2d 924. On such a record, we are confined to the material facts which appear from the pleadings and judgment. Mendrochowicz v. Wolfe, 139 Conn. 506, 509, 95 A.2d 260.

Such rights to it as the plaintiff can claim must rest upon the provisions of exhibit E. That instrument begins with a purported assignment of the equity in the stock and, had it stopped there, it may well be that the effect would have been to transfer all the rights Hastings had as to it; Tracy v. Hammond Co., 5 App.Div. 39, 40 N.Y.S. 30; and one of these rights would be to have the stock returned to him when the indebtedness for which it was held as collateral had been satisfied. Dime Savings Bank of Hartford v. Bragaw, 125 Conn. 281, 285, 4 A.2d 924. The instrument, however, goes on to define the word "equity" as used in it, stating its meaning to be either "the value of the securities in excess of the amount due" the defendant or any funds received on their sale after the payment in full of that indebtedness. The first portion of this definition does not purport to assign all Hastings' interest in the stock and it cannot be construed as an assignment of an interest in it equal to the excess of its value above Hastings' debt. An assignment to be effective must transfer some chose in action or thing which actually or potentially exists as a specific entity or some definite part thereof.

McPartland v. Beaumart, Inc., 124 Conn. 539, 542, 200 A. 1018. Furthermore, the defendant had no right to an accounting. An owner in possession is entitled to the rents and profits; if the mortgagee is in possession, it is his duty to apply them on the debt, should the owner seek redemption, and the owner may require him to account for them. Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 654, 163 A. 254; Dime Savings Bank of Hartford v. Bragaw, 125 Conn. 281, 284, 4 A.2d 924. While as between a junior and a senior mortgagee the former, on redeeming, can ordinarily require the latter to account for the rents and profits, the sound rule is that as there is no contractual relationship between them the junior mortgagee's rights must be worked out through the mortgagor, and if the mortgagor has lost the right the junior mortgagee cannot assert it. In Gaskell v. Viquesney, 122 Ind. 244, 23 N.E. 791, a junior mortgagee was omitted from a foreclosure proceeding as in the present case, and the above rule was applied, with the result that in an action he brought to redeem from a prior mortgagee he was denied the right to an accounting of the profits.

Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 655, 163 A. 254; City Lumber Co. of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Murphy, 120 Conn. 16, 20, 179 A. 339. From our conclusion that the plaintiffs were entitled to a deficiency judgment, it follows that under this principle they were entitled to have this net sum in the receiver's hands as of the date of sale paid to them in reduction of the amount of their judgment. See Dime Savings Bank of Hartford v. Bragaw, 125 Conn. 281, 284, 4 Atl. (2) 924. The $770.93 which subsequently accrued belonged to them as purchasers.

The court made a finding containing the same subordinate facts as were stated in the report, as to cruelty, and also certain other facts as undisputed or admitted, and concluded that the latter established condonation. As the trial court heard no evidence, there was no basis upon which it could make a finding; Luth v. Butwill, 119 Conn. 697, 698, 176 A. 552; Dime Savings Bank of Hartford v. Bragaw, 125 Conn. 281, 283, 4 A.2d 924; the facts contained in the report were already a matter of record and the court could only correct the report by striking out findings made without evidence or adding findings which stated facts which were admitted or undisputed. Practice Book, 172. The defendant filed a counterfinding, and to give that effect we would have to treat it as a remonstrance seeking certain corrections in the facts contained in the referee's report; but as our conclusion in regard to the finding of the trial court that the plea of condonation was established requires us to hold that there was error, we do not need to consider the counterfinding. The additional findings made by the trial court were restricted to the issue of condonation, and, regarding them as in effect collections of the referee's report, they fall short of establishing that the referee's conclusion upon this issue should be overruled. Corrected as they must be in certain respects, they amount merely to this: After the parties separated,