We there held that the word "disabled" as used in the Vehicle Code means that a vehicle is mechanically defective when it is in a condition which prevents it from being operated on its own power; or when it is difficult to do so on that account. Also see Dillon v. Sterling Rendering Works, 106 Colo. 407 [ 106 P.2d 358, 361], in which it was held that a vehicle was not disabled within the meaning of a similar statute because frost had entirely covered the windshield, materially affecting visibility. As we find no error in the record justifying reversal, the judgment is affirmed.

We are not called upon to determine whether funeral expenses are recoverable in addition to the amount which can be recovered in the death action inasmuch as the settlement of the death claim was in the amount of $7,500, whereas the limit was then $10,000, and thus the funeral expenses in the case at bar are within those limitations. Cf. Dillon v. Sterling Rendering Works, 106 Colo. 407, 106 P.2d 358."

While the driver of a motor vehicle whose vision is obscured by dirt or atmospheric conditions (such as ice and snow) must exercise care commensurate with the situation (see People's Drug Stores v. Windham, supra, and State, use of Mitchell v. Jones, 186 Md. 270), it is generally held that the provisions of a statute exempting disabled vehicles from the prohibition of stopping on a highway are not applicable when a vehicle has been stopped on the main traveled part of such highway for the purpose of removing an obstruction from the windshield. See O'Brien v. Dunigan, 210 P.2d 567 (Ore. 1949); Legere v. Tatro, 52 N.E.2d 11 (Mass. 1943); Dillon v. Sterling Rendering Works, 106 P.2d 358 (Colo. 1940); Sidle v. Baker, 3 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio 1936). Cf. Tuhn v. Clark, 41 N.W.2d 13 (Iowa 1950), where the question was held to be one of fact rather than law.

In that case there was an unforeseeable brake failure, and in Parker v. Couch, supra, the defendant was required to stop because of zero visibility created by a dust storm. See also Dillon v. Sterling Works, 106 Colo. 407, 106 P.2d 385. Unlike Eddy and Parker, the instant case does not have in it the factor of an unforeseeable and uncontrollable happening as the cause of the injury. It is undisputed that defendant lost control of his vehicle. Whether this occurred three hundred feet from the point of collision or two hundred feet (according to defendants' version) is a matter of dispute.

it cannot always be extended to cover situations where, as here, a stop is necessitated because traffic in one's own lane has stopped, obstructing the flow of traffic. Thus, violation of this statute may not constitute negligence per se. See Dillon v. Sterling Works (1940), 106 Colo. 407, 106 P.2d 358. Such a question of negligence is one to be resolved by the jury under proper instructions. Even where the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant in circumstances such as shown here, nevertheless, the defendant may overcome such prima facie showing by establishing that the accident was not caused by any negligence on his part.

There is no doubt that funeral expenses are recoverable as damages in actions brought under the wrongful death statute. Dillon v. Sterling Works, 106 Colo. 407, 106 P.2d 358, citing Tadlock v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 173 Pac. 200. However, it cannot be said that every action for the recovery of such expenses must be maintained under the statute.

00 whereas the limit was then $10,000.00, and thus the funeral expenses in the case at bar are within those limitations. Cf. Dillon v. Sterling Rendering Works, 106 Colo. 407, 106 P.2d 358. We do not believe there is any merit in the contention that this claim must be asserted in the wrongful death action if such an action is filed or if such a claim is made and it is settled.

Upon the great weight of authority, however, under statutes like ours, permitting recovery of damages in such cases, funeral expenses are a proper element of damage especially where, as in this case, the plaintiff, the father, was bound in law to assume and pay them." The subject of damages resulting from a wrongful-death accident was again discussed in Dillon v. Sterling Rendering Works, 106 Colo. 407, 106 P.2d 358, and finally determined in McEntyre v. Jones, 128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313. The present action is for recovery, independent of the wrongful-death statute.

Ordinarily all questions related to a case of this character, including negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk and proximate cause, are questions of fact for determination by the jury. Denver Rio Grande R. R. Co. v. Sipes, 26 Colo. 17, 55 Pac. 1093; Clark v. Wallace, 51 Colo. 437, 118 Pac. 973; Dillon v. Sterling Rendering Works, 106 Colo. 407, 106 P.2d 358; McCarthy v. Eddings, 109 Colo. 526, 127 P.2d 883; Wilson v. Hill, 103 Colo. 409, 86 P.2d 1084. "Every presumption favors the correctness of the verdict, and that the conclusions and findings of the jury, as the trier of facts, will not be disturbed on review in the absence of a clear showing of passion or prejudice."

Neither do we consider it error that the court failed to submit the second paragraph of § 169.32. It does not seem to us that it properly can be said under the facts and circumstances here that the Ramirez car was disabled in such a manner at the time it was stopped as to come within the meaning of that paragraph. In Dillon v. Sterling Rendering Works, Inc. 106 Colo. 407, 411, 106 P.2d 358, 361, it was held that an automobile was not disabled, within the meaning of a statute similar to § 169.32, when a motorist, who was driving in fog, sleet, and freezing temperature, stopped his automobile for the purpose of removing frost which had covered his windshield. Even the testimony of Ramirez himself that immediately following his cleaning of the windshield he entered his car and drove on before the accident occurred would indicate that his car was not disabled in the sense that it could not be moved, as in the case where something suddenly goes wrong with the motor so that it is impossible to move a car on a highway.