Opinion
TTDCV126004754S.
11-01-2012
Kenneth DILLON v. Paul SCHMIDT.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SFERRAZZA, S.J.
On October 10, 2012, the plaintiff, Kenneth Dillon, filed an offer of compromise in this motor vehicle accident case. The defendants move for an extension of time in which to consider whether to accept the offer. The basis for the extension of time is because the plaintiff has yet to be deposed.
Neither General Statutes § 52-192a nor our rules of practice expressly allow the court to grant extensions of time with respect to plaintiffs' offers of compromise. Section 52-192a and Practice Book § 17-16 require the defendant to respond to such an offer within thirty days of notice of the offer. This motion presents the issue of whether a trial court has authority to grant such a motion for additional time.
There is a split among trial court decisions as to whether the statutory time limits for offers of compromise are mandatory or directory. See Goldrich v. USAA, Superior Court, New London J.D., CV 10-6003468 (April 1, 2011), Cosgrove, J. [ 51 Conn. L. Rptr. 655]. This court determines that stretching the time constraints set forth in the statute governing offers of compromise defeats the core purpose of such statutes. " The purpose of [the statute] is to encourage early, fair and reasonable settlements, and to encourage [parties] to make offers of [compromise] promptly, " Lutynski v. B.B. and J. Trucking, Inc., 31 Conn.App. 806, 814 (1993) (emphasis added), affirmed per curiam, 229 Conn. 525 (1994).
" The statute is admittedly punitive in nature, " Id., at 812. " It is the punitive aspect of the statute that effectuates the underlying purpose of the statute and provides the impetus to settle cases." Id., at 812-13. In Lutynski, supra, the plaintiff was permitted to amend the complaint to add new damages claims arising from previously undiagnosed traumatic brain injury. This amendment postdated the expiration of the time in which the defendant could have accepted the plaintiff's offer of judgment. A jury awarded damages exceeding that offer, and the defendant protested any award of § 52-192a interest because the traumatic brain injury claim did not exist when the defendant was compelled to decide whether to accept the offer of judgment.
The trial court agreed with this analysis and refused to assess § 52-192a interest. The Appellate Court reversed this decision stating, " we conclude that the plaintiff made an offer to settle that claim, including present and future damages arising from injuries known and unknown as of that date." Id., at 814 (emphasis added).
The statute and rules of practice impose deadlines on both the offering plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff is precluded from making an offer of compromise sooner than six months after service upon the defendant nor later than thirty days before trial, § 52-192a. The language of Practice Book § 17-16 appears emphatic and mandatory. " [S]uch offer of compromise shall be considered rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled, " if the defendant fails to accept the offer within thirty days. (Emphasis added.) It is difficult to see why the phrase " not subject to acceptance unless refiled, " is present except to stress the mandatory nature of the time limit.
Also, through P.A. 05-275, the acceptance period was reduced from sixty to thirty days. This amendment confirms that prompt response is the essence of the statute.
Section 52-192 facilitates resolution of civil cases in more than one way. Of course, early settlements unclog court dockets and save the participants time, money, and anxiety. But the statute also creates the occasion for the parties to gather evidence expeditiously and take a realistic look at the merits of their claims early in the litigation, even where no settlement is reached. This may accelerate the discovery process and every other stage of litigation.
For these reasons, the court concludes that it lacks authority, in the absence of a stipulation, to extend the acceptance period under § 52-192a. The motion, is therefore, denied.