"An overriding requirement for establishing a prescriptive easement is 'evidence which will enable the easement to be located.'" Wells v. Carpenter, 916 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Mo.App. 1996) (quoting Dillon v. Norfleet, 813 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Mo.App. 1991)). Here, while there was no specific legal description entered into evidence relating to the physical location of the Old Roadway, as previously related, there was extensive reference at trial to "Exhibit A," a plat of Harmony Cove subdivision, which contained metes and bounds descriptions; township and range notations; and notations regarding the "Point of Beginning" and the "Point of Ending."
The trial court, however, has inherent power and authority to order a survey in order to establish a proper legal description in a case where land boundaries are in issue. Dillon v. Norfleet, 813 S.W.2d 31, 33 Mo.App. W.D. 1991). See alsoWills v. Meador, 638 S.W.2d 297, 298 Mo.App. S.D. 1982); State ex rel. County ofShannon v. Chilton, 626 S.W.2d 426, 429-30 Mo.App. S.D. 1981).
Rather, the judgment must describe with reasonable certainty the real estate affected by the judgment. Dillon v. Norfleet, 813 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Mo.App. W.D.1991); Patterson v. Harrison, 46 S.W.3d 580, 581 (Mo.App. S.D.2001). As previously noted in response to this point, the trial court's judgment references and incorporates the 1967 deed of easement recorded with the St. Louis County Recorder of Deeds, Book 5600, Page 483, to which a survey is attached depicting Karen Ellis's property; the easement thereon; and the entire east driveway, indicating the property line that divides it, designating distances and specific points of origin and termination with respect to the dividing property line.
Rather, the judgment must describe with reasonable certainty the real estate affected by the judgment. Dillon v. Norfleet, 813 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Mo.App. W.D.1991) ; Patterson v. Harrison , 46 S.W.3d 580, 581 (Mo.App. S.D.2001). As previously noted in response to this point, the trial court's judgment references and incorporates the 1967 deed of easement recorded with the St. Louis County Recorder of Deeds, Book 5600, Page 483, to which a survey is attached depicting Karen Ellis's property; the easement thereon; and the entire east driveway, indicating the property line that divides it, designating distances and specific points of origin and termination with respect to the dividing property line.
And, in proving one's right to a prescriptive easement, all that is required is "[e]vidence [that] will enable the easement to be located." Dillon v. Norfleet, 813 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991). For example, in Dillon, this court held that the "plaintiffs' evidence was sufficient to establish the boundaries of the alleyway [claimed by prescriptive easement]" where [s]everal witnesses estimated the width of the alley to be 12 feet[; o]ne of the plaintiffs by actual measure had found the length of the alleyway . . . to be 301.6 feet, although only the south 200 feet of the alleyway was on defendants' property[; t]he south boundary of the alleyway was testified to be 33rd Street[; and t]he alleyway was described in the testimony as running along the back of plaintiffs' properties, and as being located on defendants' land along the entire 200-foot north-south length thereof.
In accordance with that inherent authority, the cost of such a court-ordered survey may be taxed as court costs. Id. ; Dillon v. Norfleet, 813 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Mo. App. 1991). The rationale for such a rule is set forth in Hart v. T. L. Wright Lumber Co., 355 Mo. 397, 196 S.W.2d 272, 278 (Mo. 1946).
Rather, the judgment must describe with reasonable certainty the real estate affected by the judgment. Dillon v. Norfleet, 813 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Mo.App. W.D.1991); Patterson v. Harrison, 46 S.W.3d 580, 581 (Mo.App. S.D.2001). As previously noted in response to this point, the trial court's judgment references and incorporates the 1967 deed of easement recorded with the St. Louis County Recorder of Deeds, Book 5600, Page 483, to which a survey is attached depicting Karen Ellis's property; the easement thereon; and the entire east driveway, indicating the property line that divides it, designating distances and specific points of origin and termination with respect to the dividing property line.
Rather, the judgment must describe with reasonable certainty the real estate affected by the judgment. Dillon v. Norfleet, 813 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Mo.App. W.D.1991) ; Patterson v. Harrison , 46 S.W.3d 580, 581 (Mo.App. S.D.2001). As previously noted in response to this point, the trial court's judgment references and incorporates the 1967 deed of easement recorded with the St. Louis County Recorder of Deeds, Book 5600, Page 483, to which a survey is attached depicting Karen Ellis's property; the easement thereon; and the entire east driveway, indicating the property line that divides it, designating distances and specific points of origin and termination with respect to the dividing property line.
See Creech, 87 S.W.3d at 882 n. 1. The trial court has the inherent authority to order a survey to establish a proper legal description. See Harmon v. Hamilton, 903 S.W.2d 610, 615 (Mo.App.1995); Dillon v. Norfleet, 813 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Mo.App.1991). The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Roths argue that the trial court should have ordered a survey to establish the legal description and parameters of the parcel of property in question, which would then have provided the information necessary to partition the tract and grant the Roths adverse possession over the pasture land. As support for their argument, the Roths rely on the Western District Court of Appeals in Dillon v. Norfleet, 813 S.W.2d 31 (Mo.App. W.D. 1991). In Dillon, the court examined the trial court's decision to order a survey to mark out the easement in question.