Opinion
CASE NO. 4:14CV01453
01-09-2015
TOMMY DILLE, Plaintiff, v. ROTH BROS., INC., et al., Defendants.
JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
On July 1, 2014, Plaintiff Tommy Dille, proceeding pro se, filed this Title VII action against Roth Bros. Inc. and Gary Elbel. He alleges in his brief Complaint [ECF No. 1] that he was suspended from his employment at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant for one year by his employer, Day & Zimmerman NPS. The suspension allegedly resulted from a statement made by Project Supervisor Elbel, an employee of Roth Bros., that Plaintiff was sleeping during a pre-job briefing. ECF No. 1.
Now before the Court is Defendant Roth Bros.'s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 3], wherein Defendant asserts: 1) Plaintiff did not file an administrative charge against Roth Bros. with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; 2) the Complaint does not set forth allegations of an employment relationship between Plaintiff and Roth Bros.; 3) there are no allegations of unlawful discrimination against Plaintiff by Defendants or of adverse employment action taken by Defendants against Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 5], in which he concedes he was not employed by Roth Bros., and states that he does not believe he should need permission from a government agency to file a lawsuit.
II. Law and Analysis
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require "detailed factual allegations," but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Id. A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Id It must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.' " Id.
Principles requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are not without limits. Beaudett v. City of Hampton , 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc. , 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. Beaudett , 775 F.2d at 1278 . To do so would "require ...[the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, ... [and] would...transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party." Id.
Plaintiff's Complaint does not set forth the basic elements for a Title VII action, namely: an employer-employee relationship with Defendants, unlawful discrimination by Defendants based on Plaintiff's membership in a protected class, and exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, even construing his pleadings liberally, Plaintiff has simply not set forth a valid federal claim. See, e.g., Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ, , 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996) (court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED. January 9, 2015
Date
/s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge