Opinion
A21-0258
11-02-2021
Freddie Louis Dillard, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-K4-00-001040
Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Theodora Gaïtas, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Freddie Louis Dillard appeals from the denial of his most recent petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying his petition. Because Dillard's postconviction claims are procedurally barred and the new issues he raises on appeal are forfeited, we affirm.
2. In 2000, a jury found Dillard guilty of soliciting a person under the age of 16 years to practice prostitution, Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1(1) (1998), engaging in prostitution with a person between the ages of 13 to 15, Minn. Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(1) (1998), and kidnapping, Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(2) (1998). The district court imposed concurrent 158-month, 48-month, and 108-month sentences, respectively, for these offenses.
3. Dillard filed a direct appeal. We affirmed his convictions but reversed his 48-month sentence for engaging in prostitution with a person between the ages of 13 to 15 years old because the offense involved the same behavioral incident as the conduct underlying the conviction for soliciting prostitution. State v. Dillard, No. C7-00-2168, 2001 WL 1491295, at *4 (Minn.App. Nov. 27, 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 29, 2002).
4. Since his direct appeal, Dillard has filed approximately 17 petitions for postconviction relief. He filed his first petition in October 2004, and filed subsequent petitions in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2018, and 2020.
5. On September 8, 2020, Dillard filed the postconviction petition that is the subject of this appeal. Dillard raised the following six claims: (1) "The Most Serious Offense within a Single Behavioral Incident" rule violates his civil rights and the Minnesota Constitution; (2) Minnesota Statutes sections 609.035, subdivision 1, and 609.04, subdivision 1(4), are "directory" statutes; (3) his double-jeopardy claim is not procedurally barred; (4) his convictions violate due process and double jeopardy protections; (5) criminal procedure rule 27.03, subdivision 9, "infringe the petitioners rights to have a determination"; and (6) "Most Serious Offense within State v. Johnson [citation omitted] is a routine practice and habit of the court consistent Minn. R. Evid. 406."
6. The district court observed that Dillard's postconviction petition failed to provide "identifiable facts warranting relief," and instead consisted of "a series of general assertions." But the district court understood Dillard's request to be "that the Court overturn his conviction and sentence." The district court concluded that because all of Dillard's claims were known at the time of his direct appeal, they were procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976), and Doppler v. State, 660 N.W.2d 797, 801 (Minn. 2003). Accordingly, the district court summarily denied the postconviction petition.
7. On appeal from the district court's order denying postconviction relief, Dillard identifies the following issues: (1) the district court's instruction "under prostitution for the same offense as engaging violates . . . due process," (2) "the district court procedural bar where multiple convictions for the same offense warrant in the interest of justice," (3) the district court's "ruling support procedural bar" where "new ruling of law exist," and (4) the "trial court committed error when defining prostitution in soliciting as in engaging." In the body of Dillard's brief, he also raises two additional issues, arguing that (5) the police improperly entered his hotel room and therefore some evidence against him should have been suppressed and (6) inadmissible hearsay at trial deprived him of his right to confront witnesses.
8. Appellate courts "review the denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion." Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2020). A district court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition "[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief." Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020). When a second or successive postconviction petition raises issues that an appellate court has already decided in the same case, the district court may summarily deny the petition. Id., subd. 3 (2020). And pursuant to Knaffla, "where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief." 243 N.W.2d at 741.
9. The district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying Dillard's postconviction petition. Because Dillard's postconviction petition raised issues that could have been raised in his direct appeal, and Dillard cited no exception to the Knaffla rule, the district court correctly concluded that the claims are Knaffla barred.
Although not raised by respondent State of Minnesota or the district court, we also note that Dillard's postconviction petition was filed well outside of the two-year general statutory time bar. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2020).
10. In his brief to this court, Dillard raised at least two issues that were not presented to the district court in his petition for postconviction relief. Because those issues are forfeited, we will not consider them. See Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 445 (Minn. 2006) (stating that, in an appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, issues not raised below are forfeited).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's December 11, 2020 order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.