Opinion
District Court Cause No. 1:04-cv-1340-JDT-WTL, Bankruptcy Cause No. 03-07725-JKC-1, Adversary Proceeding Cause No. 03-0525.
November 24, 2004
ENTRY ON BANKRUPTCY APPEAL
Defendant Daniel A. Dilk appeals the Bankruptcy Court's order denying his motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(9). The court heard oral argument on this matter on November 19, 2004, and now reverses.
The court granted Dilk's Motion for Leave to Appeal from Interlocutory Order on August 19, 2004 (Docket No. 2).
I. BACKGROUND
Randall and Rose Delph ("Plaintiffs" or the "Delphs") allege that Daniel Dilk, while intoxicated, piloted a motorboat into their vessel on the night of July 14, 2001. Randall Delph suffered severe injuries as a result of the accident, and Plaintiffs filed a civil complaint against Dilk in Hamilton County, Indiana. Dilk subsequently filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition, triggering a stay of the civil action as a result of the operation of 11 U.S.C. § 362. Plaintiffs then filed a two-count adversary complaint that asks the Bankruptcy Court in the first count to prevent from discharge those debts resulting from "death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9). Dilk responded with a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the term "motor vehicle" as used in § 523(a)(9) does not include motorboats, and thus warrants dismissal even if the Plaintiffs prove causation, intoxication, and unlawfulness. The Bankruptcy Court denied Dilk's motion and this appeal followed.
The Plaintiffs' second claim seeks to prevent a discharge of debts resulting from Dilk's operation of the boat on the grounds that his conduct was "willful and malicious" within the discharge exception of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). This second claim is not before the court in this appeal. However, counsel agreed at oral argument that the same evidence would be used in Plaintiffs' efforts to prove Dilk liable for non-dischargeable damages.
Rule 12(b)(6) is made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings under Rule 7012 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
II. DISCUSSION
The Bankruptcy Court, in a thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion, found that the term "motor vehicle," as used in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9), encompasses motorboats. Such an interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code is a conclusion of law, which this court reviews de novo. Monarch Air Sev. v. Solow (In re Midway Airlines, Inc.), 383 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
As with any question of statutory interpretation, the court must begin with the language of the statute itself. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). Absent any contrary definitions, words in a statute are presumed to have their "ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993) (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). The actual text of the statute "is the most reliable indicator of congressional intent." Visiting Nurses Ass'n of Southwestern Ind., Inc. v. Shalala, 213 F.3d 352, 355 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). As the Supreme Court has stated, "courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says . . . When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: `judicial inquiry is complete.'" Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "motor vehicle," nor do the terms "motorboat," "boat," "vessel," or "watercraft" appear in § 523(a)(9). Therefore, Dilk's challenge to the adversary proceeding requires a determination of whether the ordinary or common meaning of "motor vehicle," as used in § 523(a)(9), includes motorboats. Only if the term is ambiguous, or if the application of the statute as written will produce an absurd result, should the court look beyond the statutory language. See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241; United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
As Bankruptcy Court Coachys noted, the term "motor vehicle" has been defined as "an automotive vehicle not operated on rails; esp: one with rubber tires for use on highways." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1476 (1986); see also Webster's II New College Dictionary 715 (1999) (defining "motor vehicle" as "[a] self-propelled wheeled conveyance not running on rails"). Furthermore, the federal Dictionary Act provides that "[t]he word `vehicle' includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on land." 1 U.S.C. § 4 (emphasis added). The Dictionary Act "provides general definitions for a handful of words appearing within the code, along with general rules of construction, that apply to the entire code in the absence of a more specific indication within the statute being analyzed." United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (D. Mass. 2002) (citing Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 200 (1993)). Immediately before its definition of "vehicle," the Dictionary Act provides that "vessel" includes "every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water." 1 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added). Moreover, Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court, concluded that "vehicle" as defined in the Dictionary Act did not include aircraft. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1931) (holding that an airplane did not constitute a "motor vehicle" under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act). Holmes recognized that "it is possible to use the word [vehicle] to signify a conveyance working on land, water or air," but emphasized that "in everyday speech `vehicle' calls up the picture of a thing moving on land." Id. at 26.
It should be observed that the Dictionary Act was not cited or argued before the Bankruptcy Court in this case.
Not to harp on the obvious, but both McBoyle and the structure of the Dictionary Act demonstrate that Congress knows how to distinguish between land-based and water-based transportation when it wants to. This notion is bolstered by the fact that Congress has used the term "motor vehicle" to refer solely to land-based transportation in other statutes. For instance, Chapter 113 of the Criminal Code defines "motor vehicle" as "an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle designed for running on land but not on rails." 18 U.S.C. § 2311; see also 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(6) ("`motor vehicle' means a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line."). Moreover, Congress consistently refers to motor vehicles and water-based conveyances separately throughout the Code. For example, a customs law has separate definitions for vehicles, which it defines as forms of transportation on land, and for vessels, which it defines as forms of transportation on water. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(a), (b). In placing restrictions on the use of federally protected wilderness areas, Congress refers to "motor vehicles," "motorized equipment," "motorboats," and "aircraft." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). Finally, an insurance law refers separately to "motor vehicles, vessels, and aircraft," 22 U.S.C. § 4304a(a)(2), and the Code criminalizes the importation or exportation of a "motor vehicle . . ., vessel, [or] aircraft" known to have been stolen. 18 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1). The foregoing examples reveal a statutory pattern wherein Congress consistently uses "vehicle" in a specific manner — a manner distinct from that used when referencing or defining water-based forms of transportation. See Boyce v. Greenway (In re Greenway), 71 F.3d 1177, 1179 (5th Cir. 1996); Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 139-40.
Based on the discussion above, the court holds that the ordinary and common meaning of the term "motor vehicle" does not include motorboats. As such, this court agrees with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of § 523(a)(9). Greenway, 71 F.3d at 1180. According to Greenway, "[h]ad Congress intended to include motorboats within § 523(a)(9), they would have either defined the term "motor vehicle" to include motorboats or added motorboats to the exception." Id.; see also Schachter v. Fall (In re Fall), 192 B.R. 16, 21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) (finding, for purposes of § 523(a)(9), that it is "absolutely clear that the term `motor vehicle' pertains to a means of transportation on land, not water."). The courts that have found to the contrary with respect to § 523(a)(9) either failed to analyze or refused to acknowledge the plain meaning of "motor vehicle." For example, one district court concluded that "[m]otor vehicle is a broad term that has no universally accepted meaning," but did not consult a single dictionary or the Dictionary Act, and made no reference to Congress' consistent method of separately defining land-based and water-based transportation. Williams v. Radivoj, 111 B.R. 361, 362 (S.D. Fla. 1989). In Willison v. Race, 192 B.R. 949, 952 (W.D. Mo. 1995), the court agreed that "the most common understanding of a `motor vehicle' is a car or truck," but ultimately refused to accept "such a narrow definition" after looking to legislative history. See also Morse v. Soda (In re Soda), 261 B.R. 342, 349 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2001) (expressly adopting the Willison court's reasoning without performing its own inquiry into the plain meaning of "motor vehicle").
In the instant case, the Bankruptcy Court agreed with those courts that have ruled to the contrary of the Fifth Circuit and found that the term "motor vehicle" is either ambiguous, or, given the policy behind § 523(a)(9), would produce an absurd result if limited to land-based means of transportation. The Bankruptcy Court thus turned to the "frustratingly sparse" legislative history of § 523(a)(9) — including proposed, but not enacted, amendments — as support for its holding. However, the Bankruptcy Court's approach, though well-organized and thorough, cannot be adopted by this court. First, even assuming arguendo that "motor vehicle" is ambiguous, exceptions to discharge, such as the one found in § 523(a)(9), "are construed strictly against a creditor and liberally in the debtor's favor." Kolodziej v. Reines (In re Reines), 142 F.3d 970, 972-73 (7th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Furthermore, as the parties seeking an exception to discharge in this case, Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof. Id. at 973. "So the ball starts firmly in [the creditor's] court." Id.
Additionally, the Bankruptcy Court's treatment of legislative history — even if appropriate — is problematic. As already stated, the plain meaning of "motor vehicle" is made clear by ordinary dictionaries, the Dictionary Act, and the overall statutory framework of the United States Code. Therefore, "[w]hen the language of a statute is lucid, we examine the legislative history only to see whether it reflects `a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary.'" United States. v. Doherty, 969 F.2d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). In the instant case, not only is there no clearly expressed intention to the contrary, but several aspects of § 523(a)(9)'s legislative history could be viewed as confirming that Congress intended the term to be applied solely to means of transportation used on roads and highways. For example, Senator Dole stated that § 523(a)(9) was intended to "ensure that victims of the drunk driver do not have their judgments against the drunk driver discharged in bankruptcy. . . ." 130 Cong. Rec. S8890 (daily ed. Jun. 29, 1984). This statement is rather innocuous when viewed in isolation, but as the Willison court acknowledged, "the few statistics cited in the legislative history deal specifically with highway fatalities. . . ." 192 B.R. at 954 (emphasis added). The Bankruptcy Court also relied on a report in favor of the 1990 amendments to § 523(a)(9). This report identified certain congressional goals with respect to § 523(a)(9), including the protection of victims of drunk driving and the overall deterrence of drunk driving, but again the only statistical data cited relates to alcohol-related highway fatalities. S. Rep. No. 101-434 (1990), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4065, 4066-69 (emphasis added). Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned, "the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) (citation omitted). It is certainly possible that Congress, in crafting § 523(a)(9) with full knowledge of how the term "motor vehicle" is used throughout the Code, may have been specifically concerned with what it deemed a more serious and pervasive problem of drunk driving on America's roads, rather than drunk driving on her lakes and rivers.
Counsel for the Delphs emphasized at oral argument that the purpose of this dischargeability exception was to prevent those who cause injury through intoxicated and unlawful conduct from avoiding responsibility for their actions. True enough, and that is a worthy purpose, but construction of the term "motor vehicle" to include watercraft would require an expansive interpretation of this term and runs counter to the more appropriate principle of narrow construction that must be applied to bankruptcy discharge exceptions. The plain language of § 523(a)(9) does not provide an ambiguity that allows this court to search for a means to extend that legislative purpose to conveyances not described in the exception.
Finally, the Bankruptcy Court suggests that proposed, but not enacted, amendments to § 523(a)(9) indicate that the failure to include watercraft along with "motor vehicle" in the section was a mere oversight. For support, the Court looked to the Boating and Aviation Operation Safety Act of 1996 and the statements of the representative sponsoring that bill. The Act would have amended § 523(a)(9) to include "watercraft, or aircraft" after "motor vehicle." H.R. 234, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996). However, the amendment passed the House of Representatives but was never considered in the Senate. Not only is it difficult to discern intent from the views of a later Congress, "[i]t is a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute when it concerns, as it does here, a proposal that does not become law." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990). Furthermore, the proposed amendment exemplifies the routine congressional practice of identifying land-based, water-based, and air-based means of transportation by separate, distinct terms. In that respect, the failed amendment underscores the conclusion that § 523(a)(9) as enacted does not include motorboats within its ambit.
"The bill itself is very simple. It simply makes clear that anyone who is operating a motor vehicle, a watercraft or an aircraft illegally by virtue of being intoxicated . . . may not hide from responsibility for damages by making this dischargeable debt by declaring bankruptcy." 142 Cong. Rec. H5784-01 (June 4, 1996).
III. CONCLUSION
It might be said that failing to construe the term "motor vehicle" to include watercraft is unfair. The court understands and is sympathetic to that view. In a more perfect world, no person who causes injury through the intoxicated operation of any motorized conveyance should be able to escape financial responsibility for such conduct through bankruptcy. However, an "unfair" result does not equate to an absurd result. As Justice Holmes opined after finding that an airplane, because not land-based, did not fall within the common meaning of "vehicle,"
[w]hen a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon speculation that if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have been used.McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 27. This court does not have legislative powers. The Supreme Court has said that where statutory language is plain, "the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241 (citation omitted). An amendment to § 523(a)(9) that would preclude this result would take little effort by Congress. But until such action is taken, the court must adhere to the plain meaning of the statutory language in its present form.
For the foregoing reasons, the court REVERSES the Bankruptcy Court's order denying Dilk's motion to dismiss. Pursuant to Rule 8013 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court finds no just reason for delay and hereby DECREES that Plaintiffs' First Claim for Nondischargeability will be DISMISSED with prejudice.
As noted, the second claim for nondischargeability is still pending in the Bankruptcy Court. Because the Delphs have more than one claim for relief, and because both are based on two distinctly different legal theories, a separate judgment should be entered on the first claim so that appellate review can be obtained on this issue without further delay. Otherwise, multiple trials may have to occur in the Bankruptcy Court and state court before review of this issue could be obtained, yet the same evidence would apply to both theories.