C. Dikeou v. Dikeou ¶ 12 In 1996, the Colorado Supreme Court decided Dikeou v. Dikeou , 928 P.2d 1286 (Colo. 1996). Dikeou addressed whether a late payment charge in a nonconsumer loan was interest or an unenforceable penalty under Perino v. Jarvis , 135 Colo. 393, 312 P.2d 108 (1957).
We will not read in a statutory exception to pre-1991 postsecondary education support order modifiability that the General Assembly opted not to include. See Dikeou v. Dikeou, 928 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 n. 4 (Colo. 1996). Rather, fulfilling our duty to construe statutes according to their plain meaning so as to best effectuate the General Assembly's intent and purpose, we apply subsection 14-10-115(1.
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 20–22. Rejecting Blooming Terrace’s argument that the forbearance fee should be annualized during the period of forbearance alone, and not over the entire life of the loan, the majority concluded that Colorado’s usury statute and our opinion in Dikeou v. Dikeou , 928 P.2d 1286 (Colo. 1996), require courts to "determine whether the effective interest rate is usurious by retrospectively applying it to the entire principal over the life of the loan." Id. at ¶ 19.
In fact, the Colorado Usury Statute "applies only to nonconsumer loans." Dikeou v. Dikeou , 928 P.2d 1286, 1293 (Colo. 1996). Violation of the Colorado Usury Statute is a criminal offense.
In fact, the Colorado Usury Statute "applies only to nonconsumer loans." Dikeou v. Dikeou, 928 P.2d 1286, 1293 (Colo. 1996). Violation of the Colorado Usury Statute is a criminal offense.
To the contrary, the single qualification under the language of the Notes is that the payment not be paid with 20 days of the date it is due. The language of the Notes contains no further requirement in order for the late payment fee to become due and payable. In Dikeou v. Dikeou, 928 P.2d 1286 (Colo. 1996) (en banc), the Colorado Supreme Court was faced with a note in the amount of $900,000.00 that provided for a $700.
The statute does not contain an exception, and we eschew creating one out of thin air because "an exception not expressly made by the legislature should not be read into a statute by the courts." Dikeou v. Dikeou , 928 P.2d 1286, 1293 n.4 (Colo. 1996) ; see In re Marriage of Chalat , 112 P.3d 47, 57 (Colo. 2005) ("Straining the statute to read otherwise would ignore its plain language ... and read in a judicially created exception that the General Assembly did not include.").
Under Colorado law, miscellaneous charges such as default charges and exit fees are permissible as long as the total amount of the interest and fees and charges to be paid is less than Colorado's usury rate of 45 percent. In Dikeou v. Dikeou, 928 P.2d 1286 (Colo. 1996) (en banc ), the Colorado Supreme Court held that late payment charges provided in a non-consumer loan agreement as a condition of credit being extended constituted "interest" within the meaning of the non-consumer usury statute as the numerical late charges were easily convertible to a percentage of the unpaid balance of the loan. Id. at 1293-94.
Colorado law allows default interest, as long as it is not usurious. See In re Wood Family Trust, Ltd., 135 B.R. 407, 409 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); see also Dikeou v. Dikeou, 928 P.2d 1286, 1289-90 (Colo. 1997) (late charges and default interest are enforceable under Colorado law). After reviewing the relevant legal authority noted above and the particular facts and circumstances herein, the Court finds, if a default exists in this case, default interest may be applied to the Note regardless of the applicability of Entz-White.
See § 5–1–102(2)(a)–(g). See generally Dikeou v. Dikeou, 928 P.2d 1286, 1293 (Colo.1996) (“[The UCCC] is designed to protect a typically unsophisticated borrower from a generally sophisticated lender.”).¶ 37 The somewhat amorphous goal of consumer protection leaves room for a reasonable disagreement about whether and how litigation finance agreements should be regulated. Amici advance arguments why litigation finance is or is not ultimately good for consumers.