A. The referee and Commission erred in completely, arbitrarily and capriciously disregarding the uncontradicted testimony to the effect that Dubose, the claimant, was disabled at the time of the hearing. Blackfoot Coal Land Corp. v. Cooper (Ind.), 95 N.E.2d 639; Bluebird Mining Co. v. Kelly (Ky.), 237 S.W.2d 530; Fore v. United States Rubber Co. (R.I.), 79 A.2d 925; Holmes v. Holmes, 154 Miss. 713, 123 So. 865; Ingall's Shipbuilding Corp. v. Howell, 221 Miss. 824, 74 So.2d 863; Lucedale Veneer Co. v. Rogers, 211 Miss. 613, 53 So.2d 69; Mobile, J. K.C.R. Co. v. Jackson, 92 Miss. 517, 46 So. 142; Reyer v. Pearl River Tung Co., 219 Miss. 211, 68 So.2d 442; Traver v. Lindsey, 161 Miss. 379, 137 So. 93; Valente v. Bourne Mills (R.I.), 75 A.2d 191; Dunn's Mississippi Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 173 pp. 136, 137. II. The concurring injury in the inguinal region is compensable where this injury results in additional disability even though the claimant also suffers a hernia.

In other cases, however, the testimony of the injured employee has been sufficient to establish causation. In Di Fiore v. United States Rubber Co., 78 R.I. 124, 79 A.2d 925 (1951) the only testimony as to the cause of the injury was by the employee and his testimony was in conflict with some of the medical evidence. Nevertheless, the Court held that the employee's testimony that he hurt his back in the accident was some evidence of causation.

the witnesses' choice of words as sometimes happens in respect to medical testimony. A doctor's use of such words as `might,' `could,' `likely,' `possible,' and `may have,' coupled with other credible evidence of a nonmedical character, such as a sequence of symptoms or events corroborating the opinion, is sufficient to sustain an award." 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 547 (10); Sharp v. Esso Standard Oil Co., La. App., 72 So.2d 601; Carpenter v. Sibley, Lindsay Curr Co., 302 N.Y. 304, 97 N.E.2d 915; Industrial Commission v. Royal Indemnity Co., 124 Colo. 210, 236 P.2d 293; Indiana Power Water Co. v. Miller, 73 Ind. App. 521, 127 N.E. 837; Magazine v. Shull, 116 Ind. App. 79, 60 N.E.2d 611; Blackfoot Coal Land Corp. v. Cooper, 121 Ind. App. 313, 95 N.E.2d 639; Eureka Chevrolet Co. v. Franklin, 126 Ind. App. 435, 131 N.E.2d 330; Continental Steel Corp. v. Fitch, 127 Ind. App. 224, 137 N.E.2d 450; Atkinson v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., Tex. Civ. App., 235 S.W.2d 509; Di Fiore v. United States Rubber Co., 78 R.I. 124, 79 A.2d 925; Flocco v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 3 N.J. Super. 109, 65 A.2d 619; Dole v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 311, 204 P.2d 462. It is indeed a gross misconception to say that certain awards are not valid because of the lack of a positive medical finding as to causal relationship, or that the disability "in all probability" or "very probably" resulted from the injuries complained of.

None of our prior decisions is precisely in point with the facts of this case, but when all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence are considered, we think that they are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference of causal connection between the claimant's accident and injury and the disability proved to exist. Research on our part discloses two cases from other jurisdictions involving ruptured disks in which awards were sustained and where, as here, a finding of causal connection between an accidental injury and a ruptured disk was unsupported by medical evidence. Smith v. Terminal TransferCo. et al., 372 S.W.2d 659 (Kansas City, Mo., Ct. App. 1963); Di Fiore v. United States Rubber Co., 78 R.I. 124, 79 A.2d 925 (1951). No decision contrary to those cited has come to our attention.

nia was so close and immediate, and where, on the undisputed facts, a layman could clearly reasonably infer, without medical testimony, that the strain caused the hernia": Lovely's Case, 336 Mass. 512, 515, 146 N.E.2d 488. See, also, Valeri v. Village of Hibbing, 169 Minn. 241, 211 N.W. 8, 60 ALR 1296. Cf. Crowley's Case, 287 Mass. 367, 191 N.E. 668, and Casey's Case, 348 Mass. 572, 204 N.E.2d 710. Similarly, in a case of low back strain claimed to have been sustained by an automobile repairman while using a long wrench, the petitioner's testimony as to the accident and its consequences was held sufficient to make a prima facie case on the question of causation: Costa v. Cars, Inc., 96 RI 396, 192 A.2d 1. Another case of low back strain in which the court held that medical testimony was not essential for proof of causation is Marley Construction Co. v. Westbrook, 234 Miss. 710, 720, 107 So.2d 104, 108. See, also, Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 253 Wis. 618, 34 N.W.2d 821; DiFiori v. U.S. Rubber Co., 78 RI 124, 79 A.2d 925; Jarka Corporation of Philadelphia v. Norton, 56 F.2d 287; Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law § 79.51. Orr v. SIAC, 217 Or. 249, 342 P.2d 136, cited by the defendant, is not in point.

III. In a proper case, proof by direct medical testimony of causal relation between the employment and the injury sustained is not necessary and may be inferred by the trier of fact. Alexander Smith, Inc. v. Genette, supra; Atlantic Steel Co. v. McLarty, 74 Ga. App. 300, 39 S.E.2d 733; Autry v. General Motors BOP Assembly Plant, 85 Ga. App. 312, 69 S.E.2d 697; Ballenger v. Southern Worsted Corp., 209 S.C. 463, 40 S.E.2d 681; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Ziegenfuss, 187 Md. 283, 49 A.2d 793; B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Arnold, 88 Ga. App. 64, 76 S.E.2d 20; Blue Bird Mining Co. v. Kelly (Ky.), 237 S.E.2d 530; Conner v. M. M. Packing Co., 166 Kan. 98, 199 P.2d 458; Di Fiore v. U.S. Rubber Co. (R.I.), 79 A.2d 925; Dolhonde v. Gullett Gin Co. (La.), 25 So.2d 104; Fulton Bag Cotton Mills v. Speaks, 90 Ga. App. 685, 83 S.E.2d 872; In re Harrington's Case, 285 Mass. 69, 188 N.E. 499; Hartford A. I. Co. v. Waters, 87 Ga. App. 117, 73 S.E.2d 70; Hayes v. Louisiana Long Leaf Lbr. Co. (La.), 51 So.2d 855; Holmes v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. (La.), 91 So.2d 90; In re Frihauf (Wyo.), 135 P.2d 427; In re Long's Case (Mass.), 150 N.E.2d 282; In re Lovely's Case (Mass.), 146 N.E.2d 488; Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Marks, 88 Ga. App. 167, 76 S.E.2d 507; Luzerne-Graham Min. Corp. v. Tanner, 314 Ky. 875, 238 S.W.2d 842; Marine Operators v. Barnhouse, 61 F. Supp. 572; Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 253 Wis. 618, 34 N.W.2d 821; Nicholas Co. v. Dodson, supra; Pennsylvania Thresh. F. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gilliam, 88 Ga. App. 451, 76 S.E.2d 834; Polston v. Ready Made Homes, 171 Kan. 336, 232 P.2d 446; Reyer v. Pearl River Tung Co., supra; Utah Delaware Min. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 76 Utah 187, 289 P.

Other courts have reached substantially the same position which we now reach on comparable circumstances where clear symptoms and incapacity have closely followed an injury. Hampton Roads Stevedoring Corp. v. O'Hearne, 184 F.2d 76, 77-78 (C.A. 4). Valente v. Bourne Mills, 77 R.I. 274, 278-279. DiFiore v. United States Rubber Co. 78 R.I. 124, 128-130. See Jarka Corp. of Philadelphia v. Norton, 56 Fed. 2d 287, 288 (D.C. Pa.); Crowley's Case, 130 Maine, 1, 3-4; Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, §§ 79.50-79.

Chain of events, circumstances, the lay testimony, all corroborate the finding of the Attorney-Referee. In addition, it is fortified by the positive, unequivocal testimony of claimant's medical witness, Dr. E.A. Bertucci. Handford v. International Paper Co., 223 Miss. 747, 78 So.2d 895; Doane v. Board of Comrs. of Port of N.O. (La.), 163 So. 717-18; Rogers v. Union Indem. Co. (La.), 146 So. 505, 507; Phillips v. Yazoo M.V. RR. Co. (La.), 183 So. 43, 46; Clifton v. Glassell-Taylor Co. (La.), 19 So.2d 590; Lowery v. W. Horace Williams Co. (La.), 8 So.2d 704; Powell v. Travelers Ins. Co. (La.), 58 So.2d 563; Reyer v. Pearl River Tung Co., 219 Miss. 211, 68 So.2d 442, 444; Railway Express Agency v. Hollingsworth, 221 Miss. 688, 74 So.2d 754; Sunnyland Contracting Co. v. Davis, 221 Miss. 744, 74 So.2d 858; Pearson v. Dixie Elec. Power Assn., 219 Miss. 884, 70 So.2d 6; Bluebird Mining Co. v. Kelly (Ky.), 237 S.W.2d 530; Fore v. U.S. Rubber Co. (R.I.), 79 A.2d 925; Valente v. Bourne Mills (R.I.), 75 A.2d 191; Blackfoot Coal Land Corp. v. Cooper (Ind.), 95 N.E.2d 639; Jones v. California Packing Corp. (Utah), 244 P.2d 640; Industrial Comm. v. Royal Indemnity Co. (Colo.), 236 P.2d 293. Eaton, Cottrell Galloway, Gulfport, for appellee.

I. The Commission erred in that it completely, arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the uncontradicted testimony to the effect that Mrs. John Reyer, the claimant, was disabled at the time of the hearing. Blackfoot Coal Land Corp. v. Cooper, 95 N.E.2d 639; Bluebird Mining Co. v. Kelly, 237 S.W.2d 530; Evi Fore v. U.S. Rubber Co., 79 A.2d 925; Ind. Comm. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 236 P.2d 293; Jones v. Calif. Packing Corp., 244 P.2d 640; Lucedale Veneer Co. v. Rogers, 211 Miss. 613, 53 So.2d 69; Valente v. Bourne Mills, 75 A.2d 191. II. The precipitation of a dormant neurosis in a person of a neurotic tendency is compensable where this neurosis results in disability where the claimant was previously able to work.

In such circumstances the evidence and inferences were conflicting and in the absence of fraud, which is not claimed, the finding of fact that petitioner was not an employee of respondent, being supported by legal evidence, is conclusive under the act. Even if the evidence can be considered as undisputed so as to bring the case within Henry v. Mondillo, supra, and Corry v. Commissioned Officers' Mess (Open), 78 R.I. 264, rather than under DiFiore v. United States Rubber Co., 78 R.I. 124, in our opinion the legal effect of the evidence and inferences is clearly that petitioner was not an employee of the respondent; that the father was an independent contractor; and that he, petitioner, was either an employee of his father or in partnership with him as an independent contractor. Whether he was such an employee or partner is unimportant since in either event he had not sustained the burden of showing that he was an employee of respondent under the act.