Dieterich Internat. Truck v. J.S. J. Serv

16 Citing cases

  1. Avalon Pacific-Santa Ana, L.P. v. HD Supply Repair & Remodel, LLC

    192 Cal.App.4th 1183 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 37 times
    Reversing and directing that judgment be entered for defendants based on plaintiff's failure to present sufficient evidence, citing Frank

    As Defendants point out, only two reported decisions after Rowe use the "substantially or permanently diminished" standard: Dieterich Internat. Truck Sales, Inc. v. J. S. J. Services, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1601 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 388] ( Dieterich) and Freeze v. Brinson (1991) 3 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 227]. Dieterich was not a waste case, but addressed the issue whether a prescriptive easement could be obtained against a landlord reversioner.

  2. Greenfield MHP Associates, L.P. v. Ametek, Inc.

    145 F. Supp. 3d 1000 (S.D. Cal. 2015)   Cited 3 times
    Dismissing strict liability claims because "[p]laintiffs cite no cases supporting the proposition that the use, storage and/or disposal of such solvents is considered an ultrahazardous activity"

    Senior argues that Plaintiffs cannot assert a claim for trespass because as landlords, they do not have a possessory interest in the land at issue and thus cannot bring a trespass claim. Sen. Mot. 22 (citing Dieterick Int'l Truch Sales v. J.S. & J. Servs., Inc. , 3 Cal.App.4th 1601, 1609, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 (1992) ). Senior's reliance on Dieterick is misplaced.

  3. Unaatuq, LLC v. Green (In re Catholic Bishop)

    509 B.R. 229 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2014)   Cited 2 times   1 Legal Analyses

    .Restatement (First) of Property § 222 (emphasis added); see also 16 Powell on Real Property § 91.12 (2006). See generally Dieterich Int'l Truck Sales, Inc. v. J.S. & J. Serv., Inc., 3 Cal.App.4th 1601, 1608, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 388, 392 (1992) (“A future interest, such as a landlord's reversion cannot be the subject of a prescriptive easement because the statutory period for acquiring the easement runs only against a possessory interest.”)..Restatement (Second) of Property: Landlord & Tenant § 1.2 (1977)(“A landlord-tenant relationship exists only if the landlord transfers the right to possession of the leased property.”

  4. Atallah v. Patel

    No. A147184 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2018)

    Appellants rely primarily on California Civil Code section 741 and Dieterich Internat. Truck Sales, Inc. v. J. S. & J. Services, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1601 (Dieterich), where the court held that a prescriptive easement could not ripen against a landlord who was not in possession of the property and was legally unable to bring an action to prevent the plaintiff from gaining the easement by prescription. The Dieterich court held that its holding was "supported by Civil Code section 741 which explicitly recognizes that a future estate cannot be harmed during the pendency of the intervening estate.

  5. Shaw Rd. Props., LLC v. Mitchell

    No. A145995 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 1, 2017)

    Thus, they argue a prescriptive easement cannot be found against a landlord who is not in possession of the property citing Dieterich Internat. Truck Sales, Inc. v. J. S. & J. Services, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1601 (Dieterich). In Dieterich, the plaintiff owned a truck sales and repair business.

  6. Friends of the Trails v. Blasius

    78 Cal.App.4th 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 63 times
    Denying relief against easement owner was proper when the easement owner had no interest adverse to the plaintiffs

    The Landowners' last argument is that the application of the Gion-Dietz doctrine is unfair because, in light of the NID easement, their predecessor in interest lacked the ability to prevent the public use. The Landowners point to Dieterich International Truck Sales, Inc. v. J.S. J. Services, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1601, which holds that a landlord has no cause of action to sue to halt a trespass, hence prescription cannot run against the landlord's reversion. They argue that the situation is analogous to the NID easement in this case.

  7. Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim

    25 Cal.App.4th 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 172 times
    Holding that plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance because "there was no breach on which to predicate it," the court stated that ". . . specific performance is a remedy for breach of contract, a cause of action which requires proof the contract was breached"

    ( Dieterich Internat. Truck Sales, Inc. v. J.S. J. Services, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1601, 1603-1604 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 388] [quiet title to an easement for access]; Kennecott Corp. v. Union Oil Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1179, 1182-1183 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 403] [quiet title to lease]; Twain Harte Homeowners Assn. v. Patterson (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 184, 188-189 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 316] [quiet title to easement]; see also German-Amer. Savings Bank v. Gollmer (1909) 155 Cal. 683, 686 [ 102 P. 932] [title may be quieted to leasehold]; 5 Witkin, supra, Pleading, § 605, p. 63 [quiet title available to quiet any interest in real property]; but see Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020, subd. (b) [complaint shall allege plaintiff's "title"].

  8. City of W. Sacramento v. R & L Bus. Mgmt., Corp.

    No. 2:18-cv-900 WBS EFB (E.D. Cal. Jun. 27, 2018)

    "A plaintiff asserting a claim for trespass must have a possessory interest in the land at issue; mere ownership is not sufficient." Gregory Vill. Partners, L.P., 805 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (citing Dieterich Int'l Truck Sales, Inc. v. J.S. & J. Servs., Inc., 3 Cal. App. 4th 1601, 1608-10 (4th Dist. 1992)). A trespass claim may include wrongful entry or invasion by pollutants.

  9. United States v. Ellis

    121 F. Supp. 3d 927 (N.D. Cal. 2015)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that an officer's entry into a privately owned driveway or parking lot did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation

    However, the state court decisions cited by defendants do not extend a tenant's right to exclude others to encompass common areas beyond their own leased apartment or residence. SeeFriends of the Trails v. Blasius, 78 Cal.App.4th 810, 830, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 193 (2000) (affirming judgment against irrigation district and landowners establishing public easement for recreational trail on portion of irrigation district's canal easement, and distinguishing authority recognizing that a landlord has no cause of action to prevent a trespass because “under the law of landlord tenant relations, the landlord surrenders possession, ‘that stick in the bundle of rights” which is critical’ ”) (quoting Dieterich Int'lTruck Sales, Inc. v. J.S. & J. Serv. Inc., 3 Cal.App.4th 1601, 1610, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 (1992) (holding that a landlord, who does not have a present possessory interest, has no cause of action for trespass to prevent a prescriptive easement across a portion of the landlord's property, and that a prescriptive easement could not ripen against the landlord's future reversionary interest)); Allred v. Harris, 14 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1390 and n. 3, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 (1993) (recognizing that “[a]s a general rule, landowners and tenants have a right to exclude persons from trespassing on private property; the right to exclude persons is a fundamental aspect of private property ownership,” and finding that the tenant “had a possessory interest in the parking lot and walkways, had the landlord's specific authorization to take steps necessary for the security of the parking areas and was affected by the defendants' activities which were aimed at disrupting his normal business activities”) (citation omitted); Smith v. Cap Concrete, Inc., 133 Cal.App.3d 769, 774, 184 Cal.Rptr. 308 (Cal.Ct.App

  10. Mardikian v. CitiMortgage, Inc.

    1:14-CV-00407-LJO-SKO (E.D. Cal. Jul. 21, 2014)   Cited 2 times
    Rejecting similar res judicata and "full faith and credit" arguments where the plaintiff sought to enforce, and not to re-litigate, a state court judgment in federal court

    Id. at 775; see also, Dieterich Internat. Truck Sales, Inc. v. J. S. & J. Servs., Inc., 3 Cal. App. 4th 1601, 1610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (adopting and applying the distinction set forth in Smith). Here, Mardikian alleges that CMI and Safeguard's unlawful trespass onto the Property injured Mardikian in that "Plaintiff has been unable to enter his property to begin making repairs and therefore has been unable to bring the property to rentable condition, thus losing potential rental income, and has been unable to bring the property to marketable condition, resulting in Plaintiff not being able to sell his property at a time when the property market is skyrocketing."