On the other hand, "[i]t is a fundamental principle of law that judgments by default are not encouraged and should be employed only as a last resort." ( Dienthal v. Branovacki (1974), 23 Ill. App.3d 726, 728.) Further, it has been held that
) Other opinions have expressly stated that courts should be more liberal in setting aside a default judgment when the motion is filed within 30 days of the judgment. ( Adams v. Grace, 128 Ill. App.2d 69, 262 N.E.2d 489; Keafer v. McClelland, 23 Ill. App.3d 1035, 321 N.E.2d 136.) Additional factors are the residence of plaintiff in Illinois ( Prenzler v. Prenzler, 55 Ill. App.3d 244, 370 N.E.2d 642), the severity of the penalty as a result of the default judgment ( People ex rel. Difanis v. Futia, 56 Ill. App.3d 920, 373 N.E.2d 530), and the attendant hardship on the plaintiff to proceed to a trial on the merits ( In re Application of County Collector, 58 Ill. App.3d 228, 374 N.E.2d 277; Dienthal v. Branovacki, 23 Ill. App.3d 726, 320 N.E.2d 177). Usually "[a]ny imposition that a trial may be on the plaintiff is outweighed by the respected maxim that a litigant is entitled to his day in court." Karaskiewicz v. Karaskiewicz, 38 Ill. App.3d 509, 512, 348 N.E.2d 184.
However, the trial court's granting the defendant additional time in which to file his appearance was in accord with long-standing precedent; the entry of a default judgment is discretionary and should only be employed as a last resort. ( Smith v. National Drag Racing Enterprises Inc. (2d Dist. 1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 91, 320 N.E.2d 43 (abstract); Dienthal v. Branovicki (1st Dist. 1974), 23 Ill. App.3d 726, 320 N.E.2d 77.) Moreover, in an instance such as in the case at bar, where the issues are relatively uncomplicated, it is not even an abuse of discretion to allow a defendant to file his answer instanter and to thereafter proceed to trial, since the ends of justice are better served by trial on the merits than by entering default judgments. Rowe v. Mardis (1st Dist. 1955), 4 Ill. App.2d 81, 123 N.E.2d 340 (abstract).
( Sarro v. Illinois Mutual Fire Insurance Co. (2d Dist. 1962), 34 Ill. App.2d 270, 181 N.E.2d 187. See also Dienthal v. Branovacki (1st Dist. 1974), 23 Ill. App.3d 726, 320 N.E.2d 177.) But this does not mean that the appellate court is to give blanket approval to any and every such decision by the trial court.
While the plaintiff bases such assertion on the fact that the defendant failed to file an answer or an appearance prior to its motion to dismiss his amended complaint it must be remembered that default judgments are drastic remedies which are not encouraged by courts and are entered with great caution and only as a last resort when necessary to enforce a just demand. ( E.g., Dienthal v. Branovacki, 23 Ill. App.3d 726, 728, 320 N.E.2d 177, 179; Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 20 Ill. App.3d 422, 427, 314 N.E.2d 294, 298.) Moreover, such motions presented by plaintiffs are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
• 2, 3 A fundamental principle of Illinois law is that default judgments are not encouraged and should be employed only as a last resort. ( Dienthal v. Branovacki, 23 Ill. App.3d 726, 320 N.E.2d 177.) Litigants, however, owe a duty to the court to be prepared to proceed with trial when their cases are reached on the trial calendar. ( Bender v. Schallerer, 9 Ill. App.3d 951, 293 N.E.2d 411.)