She asserted that if she were removed to Senegal, she and her daughters would be subjected to FGM by her relatives. We fully described the details of petitioners’ asylum proceedings in Dieng v. Holder , 698 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2012). We revisit only the facts necessary to give context to the present petition.

Thus, to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution, the government must satisfy a two-part inquiry: (1) "whether ‘[t]he applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country,’ " and (2) "whether ‘under all the circumstances, it is reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.’ " Id. at 32 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) ); see also Dieng v. Holder , 698 F.3d 866, 872 (6th Cir. 2012). Assessing whether internal relocation is reasonable "requires the consideration of numerous factors, including ‘whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties.’ "

The IJ concluded that the overall rate of female genital mutilation was significantly lower in Nigeria—around 30%—than it had been in Ethiopia at the time Abay was decided—over 90%—and therefore Abay was distinguishable. The IJ reasoned that the present case was much closer to Dieng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 866, 873 (6th Cir. 2012), where we held that an asylum seeker could not show a likelihood that her daughter would be subjected to female genital mutilation in part because the rate of the practice in her home country of Senegal was only 20%. On West's appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Board affirmed.

This requires an objectively reasonable fear of the possibility of persecution upon his return to Sri Lanka. See Dieng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 866, 872 (6th Cir. 2012). Here too he has not met his burden.

Second, Yousif cites Matter of H-L-H-, 25 I. &N. Dec. 209 (BIA 2010), and Dieng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2012), to argue that the BIA failed to treat the U.S. State Department's reports with sufficient weight, including the 2018 Country Report and the 2017 International Religious Freedom Report in support of his motion to remand. These cases support the proposition that State Department reports are "highly probative evidence and are usually the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations."

The substantial-evidence standard is highly deferential-we cannot disturb a factual finding unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Dieng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 866, 871 (6th Cir. 2012).

Rofa claims that he would be tortured based on his Westernization, but the evidence suggests otherwise. The State Department reports, which "are generally the best gauge of conditions in foreign countries," Dieng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 866, 872 (6th Cir. 2012), did not "provide a single incident of the torture or killing of Americanized or Christian Iraqis, solely on account of those bases." (A.R. 159-60)

In determining the reasonableness of internal relocation, the agency may consider "whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties." 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3); Dieng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 866, 872 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the BIA reasoned:

We review any factual determinations under the highly deferential substantial-evidence standard, treating them as "conclusive" and reversing only if "any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Dieng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 866, 871-72 (6th Cir. 2012). To establish eligibility for asylum applicants must show that they meet the definition of "refugee": "a person who is unable or unwilling to return to [his] home country because of past persecution or a 'well-founded fear' of future persecution 'on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.'"

The BIA's factual findings—including a determination that an asylum application was frivolous—are subject to "the highly deferential substantial-evidence standard," under which "we will not reverse a factual determination . . . unless we find that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it." Dieng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 866, 871 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ceraj v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Thus, although we "must take into account contradictory evidence in the record[,] 'the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.'"