Thus, the disqualification is removed when a claimant acquires subsequent employment. Section 604 did not require such a claimant to show that the interim employment was bona fide or permanent. Dienes v. Holland, 64 Ill. App.3d 109, 113-14 (1978). This court affirmed, holding that "the appellate court was correct in reading the statute just as it was enacted."

MR. JUSTICE WARD delivered the opinion of the court: This appeal is from a judgment of the appellate court reversing a decision of the circuit court of Cook County which upheld a finding by Kenneth W. Holland, Director of Labor. ( 64 Ill. App.3d 109.) The Director had denied claims for unemployment compensation filed by John Dienes, Alfred Cavozos and Reuben Rodriguez (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 48, par. 434).

It follows, however, that where an agency has interpreted a statute contrary to the plain meaning of the language used by the General Assembly, we will reverse it. The deference accorded to an agency is not so extensive as to render a reviewing court a "rubber stamp." See, e.g., Dienes v. Holland, 64 Ill. App.3d 109, 113-14, 380 N.E.2d 1156, 1160 (1978) (appellate court reversed the Director's interpretation of section 604 when the Director failed to give application of the ordinary meaning of the words "or was last employed"). The majority's reasoning is that section 604 is inapplicable because the defendants were no longer unemployed due to the strike once they were discharged. Rather, they were unemployed because of the discharge.

In Dienes, the interim employer, Carey, stood to lose nothing from the court's ruling. Either no benefits would be paid out, or, if benefits were due, Continental, not Carey, was the chargeable employer under the Act as it existed then. See Dienes v. Holland, 64 Ill. App.3d 109, 110, 380 N.E.2d 1156, 1157 (1978) (noting that the Director's decision had been in favor of Continental). Section 1502.1 of the Act changes all this and shifts the potential economic consequences to the interim employer.

In the present case, the language is certain and unambiguous, and in such a case it is never proper for a court to depart from plain language by reading into a statute exceptions, limitations, and conditions which conflict with the legislative intent. ( Harvey Firemen's Association v. City of Harvey (1979), 75 Ill.2d 358; Dienes v. Holland (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 109.) As defendant states, it would appear that the provision in question was placed in the statute in an effort to allow a motorist to adjust his speed within a reasonable period of time.

( Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin (1978), 72 Ill.2d 189, 381 N.E.2d 222.) A court is not free to restrict or enlarge the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. ( Dienes v. Holland (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 109, 380 N.E.2d 1156, aff'd (1979), 78 Ill.2d 8, 397 N.E.2d 1358.) Here, the statute provides that proof of reliance is only a factor to be considered. It does not provide that proof of reliance is a defense to an action against a licensee for violation of the Act.