Therefore, we address only plaintiff's appeal. Summary judgment is properly granted if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Diehl v. Polo Cooperative Ass'n, 328 Ill. App.3d 576, 579 (2002). The nonmovant need not prove its case at the summary judgment stage but must come forward with evidence that establishes a genuine issue of material fact.

In other words, "when reasonable people cannot draw divergent inferences from the undisputed facts." Diehl v. Polo Co-op. Ass'n, 328 Ill. App. 3d 576, 582, 766 N.E.2d 317, 322 (Ill.App.Ct. 2002) (citing Englund v. Englund, 246 Ill. App. 3d 468, 477, 615 N.E.2d 861 (1993); see also Kleen v. Homak Mfg. Co., Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 639, 749 N, E.2d 26 (Ill.App.Ct. 2001) (citing Williams v.University of Chicago Hospitals, 179 Ill.2d 80, 88, 688 N.E.2d 130, 134 (1997)) ("[P]roximate cause . . . becomes a question of law where there is no material issue of fact regarding the matter or only oneconclusion is clearly evident."). As grounds contending Plaintiff's allegations of proximate cause, in their Answers to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Docs. 26 27), Defendants raise the affirmative defenses of Plaintiff's misuse of the product and secondary causes.

Legal cause is established only when it can be said that the injury was reasonably foreseeable. Id. ¶ 24; see also Suwanski v. Village of Lombard, 342 Ill. App. 3d 248, 255 (2003) ("[A] negligent act is a legal proximate cause of an injury if the injury is of the type that a reasonable person would foresee as a likely result of his conduct."); Diehl v. Polo Cooperative Ass'n., 328 Ill. App. 3d 576, 582 (2002). ("An injury will be found to be beyond the scope of the defendant's duty if it appears highly extraordinary that the breach of the duty should have caused the particular injury.").

said that the injury was reasonably foreseeable. Id. ¶ 24 ; see also Suwanski v. Village of Lombard , 342 Ill. App. 3d 248, 255, 276 Ill.Dec. 766, 794 N.E.2d 1016 (2003) ("[A] negligent act is a legal proximate cause of an injury if the injury is of the type that a reasonable person would foresee as a likely result of his conduct."); Diehl v. Polo Cooperative Ass'n. , 328 Ill. App. 3d 576, 582, 262 Ill.Dec. 697, 766 N.E.2d 317 (2002). ("An injury will be found to be beyond the scope of the defendant's duty if it appears highly extraordinary that the breach of the duty should have caused the particular injury.").

Id. ¶ 24; see also Suwanski v. Village of Lombard, 342 Ill. App. 3d 248, 255 (2003) ("[A] negligent act is a legal proximate cause of an injury if the injury is of the type that a reasonable person would foresee as a likely result of his conduct."); Diehl v. Polo Cooperative Ass'n., 328 Ill. App. 3d 576, 582 (2002). ("An injury will be found to be beyond the scope of the defendant's duty if it appears highly extraordinary that the breach of the duty should have caused the particular injury.").

She correctly notes that causation is ordinarily a question of fact for a jury to determine. See Vorpagel v. Maxell Corp. of America, 333 Ill.App.3d 51, 56, 266 Ill.Dec. 818, 775 N.E.2d 658 (2002) (citing Diehl v. Polo Cooperative Ass'n, 328 Ill.App.3d 576, 582, 262 Ill.Dec. 697, 766 N.E.2d 317 (2002) ). She argues that, contrary to the trial court's ruling, significant gaps in time between a plaintiff's activity and termination do not automatically defeat a claim that the termination was retaliatory.

¶ 21 Finally, we hold that under the circumstances in this case, the determination as to whether any damages were proximately caused by defendants' alleged fraudulent conduct is a question of fact unsuited for summary judgment. See, e.g., Diehl v. Polo Cooperative Ass'n, 328 Ill.App.3d 576, 582, 262 Ill.Dec. 697, 766 N.E.2d 317 (2002) (proximate cause is generally a question of fact). ¶ 22 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

Jinkins v. Evangelical Hospitals Corp., 336 Ill. App. 3d 377, 382 (2002). Proximate cause is generally a question of fact. Diehl v. Polo Cooperative Ass'n, 328 Ill. App. 3d 576, 582 (2002). It becomes a question of law only when "there can be no reasonable differences in the inferences to be drawn by reasonable men from the undisputed facts."

Ordinarily, proximate cause is a question of fact for the jury. Diehl v. Polo Cooperative Ass'n, 328 Ill. App. 3d 576, 582 (2002). Defendant cites no authority for the premise that causation automatically becomes too attenuated after the passage of a certain amount of time.